Unelected Power (eBook)

The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

Paul Tucker (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2019 | 2. Auflage
664 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-19698-5 (ISBN)

Infos

How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.

Autor

Paul Tucker is a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and chair of the Systemic Risk Council.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 10.9.2019
• Verlagsort: Princeton
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Öffentliches Recht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Systeme
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Finanzierung
• Themenwelt: Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Spezielle Betriebswirtschaftslehre ► Bankbetriebslehre
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik
• Schlagworte: Accountability • Adjudication • administrative law • balance sheet • Bank • Bank for International Settlements • Bank of England • Basic Law • Central Bank • civil service • Committee • Consideration • Constitutionalism • Contract • Cost–benefit analysis • Crisis Management • Criticism • de facto • Deliberation • Democracy • democratic deficit • Discretion • Due Process • Economic Policy • Economics • economist • economy • Election • Executive agency • Executive (government) • Financial Crisis • Financial institution • Financial Intermediary • Financial regulation • Fiscal Policy • Governance • Government • government agency • Government bond • Government Failure • Inflation • Institution • Interest Rate • Job Security • Judicial Independence • Judiciary • Jurisdiction • Lawmaking • Legislation • Legislator • Legislature • Legitimacy (political) • Legitimation • Lender of last resort • liberal democracy • Liberalism • Macroeconomics • Market Economy • market liquidity • monetary authority • monetary policy • Monetary Policy Committee • Nondelegation doctrine • Ordinary law • Policy • Political Economy • Political Party • Political Philosophy • Political Science • Politician • Politics • Primary and secondary legislation • Principal–agent problem • Principles (retailer) • Provision (contracting) • public administration • Public consultation • Public Policy • Regime • Regulation • Regulatory Agency • Regulatory Capture • regulatory state • Representative Democracy • Requirement • Rule of Law • Separation of Powers • Social Cost • state of emergency • Statute • Supply (economics) • Tax • technocracy • The Administrative State • Trade-off • Treaty • Uncertainty • Veto • Voting • welfare
• ISBN-10: 0-691-19698-2 / 0691196982
• ISBN-13: 978-0-691-19698-5 / 9780691196985