Unelected Power
The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
Seiten
2019
|
2nd edition
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-19630-5 (ISBN)
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-19630-5 (ISBN)
Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.
How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy
Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy
Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
Paul Tucker is a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and chair of the Systemic Risk Council.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 07.09.2019 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | New Jersey |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 156 x 235 mm |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung |
| Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Finanzierung | |
| Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Spezielle Betriebswirtschaftslehre ► Bankbetriebslehre | |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-691-19630-3 / 0691196303 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-691-19630-5 / 9780691196305 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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