Harming Future Persons (eBook)

Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem

Melinda A. Roberts, David T. Wasserman (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

2009 | 2009
VII, 335 Seiten
Springer Netherland (Verlag)
978-1-4020-5697-0 (ISBN)

Infos

Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether-that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be 'fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons-persons who don't yet but will exist-in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful-not worth having-can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

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Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether-that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be "e;fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth"e; 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons-persons who don't yet but will exist-in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful-not worth having-can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

Inhalt

Acknowledgements 6
Contents 7
Contributors 10
Harming Future Persons: Introduction 12
1 Purpose of this Collection 12
2 The Person-Affecting Intuition and the Nonidentity Problem 13
3 The Nonidentity Cases 14
4 Three Strategies for Addressing the Nonidentity Problem 19
5 Contributions to this Collection 22
6 Conclusion 34
Notes 34
References 36
Part I 38
The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem 39
1.1 The Logical and Metaphysical Dimensions of the Problem 39
1.2 Four Strategies for Responding to the Nonidentity Problem 41
1.3 Numerical, Biographical and Autobiographical Identity 53
1.4 Conclusion 57
Notes 57
References 60
Part II 62
Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives 63
2.1 The Asymmetry, Common Sense Morality and Rights 63
2.2 How the Doctrine of Negative Rights Explains the Asymmetry 64
2.3 The Grounds and Groundlessness of Rights 67
2.4 The Symmetry of Reasons of Beneficence 71
Notes 79
References 81
Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist 82
3.1 Introduction 82
3.2 Definitions and Distinctions 83
3.3 Reasons and Values Presupposed by the Asymmetry 85
3.4 The Distinction Between Harming and Benefiting 87
3.5 The Individual-Affecting Symmetry View 91
3.6 The Antinatalist Symmetry View 94
3.7 The Impersonal Symmetry View 97
3.8 Conclusion 99
Notes 100
References 101
Part III 102
Who Cares About Identity? 103
4.1 Introduction 103
4.2 The Moral Insignificance of Transworld Identity 106
4.3 The Prudential Insignificance of Transworld Identity 112
4.4 Genes and Identity 116
Notes 120
References 122
Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternate Possible Identities? 125
5.1 The Erewhon Hypothesis 125
5.2 Variations on a Theme by Parfit 126
5.3 The No-Difference Thesis 130
5.4 Identity-Determining Choices and Identity-Determining Characteristics 131
5.5 Ambiguous “Identities” 133
5.6 Vague “Identities” 134
5.7 Alternative Conceptions of “Identity” 136
5.8 Future Persons as Vague but Identifiable Objects of Present Obligations 137
5.9 Parfit and “The Descriptive View” 142
5.10 Return to Erewhon 144
Notes 145
References 146
Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity 147
6.1 Introduction 147
6.2 Two Decisive Intuitions 148
6.3 How Simple Consequentialism Fails 151
6.4 Why Simple Consequentialism Fails 154
6.5 Rule Consequentialism 155
6.6 A Contingent Morality 159
6.7 Rule Consequentialism and Moral Philosophy 162
Notes 164
References 165
Part IV 167
Harming as Causing Harm 168
7.1 Introduction 168
7.2 Harming as Causing Harm 170
7.3 Solving the Non-identity Problem 171
7.4 Harming and Benefiting Those Who Independently Exist 176
7.5 Is Causing Harm Sufficient for Harming? 179
7.6 Conclusion 181
Notes 182
References 185
Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions 186
8.1 Introduction 186
8.2 How Bad Is It? 188
8.3 The Philosophical Problem 188
8.4 Preventing Births to Protect Children 189
8.5 The Nonexistence Condition 192
8.6 The Human Rights Approach 197
8.7 The Non-Identity Problem 198
8.8 Conclusion 205
Notes 205
References 208
Other References 209
Harming and Procreating 210
9.1 210
9.2 212
9.3 213
9.4 215
9.5 217
9.6 221
9.7 223
9.8 225
9.9 225
9.10 226
Notes 227
References 230
The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When is One Act Better for a Person than Another? 231
10.1 Parallel Problems 231
10.2 A Person-Based Approach to Procreative Choice 235
10.3 The Nonidentity Problem 239
10.4 The Two-Envelope Problem 247
10.5 Conclusion 252
Notes 253
References 257
Part V 259
Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-identity Problem 260
11.1 The Liberal View of Reproduction 260
11.2 Reproduction and Non-identity 261
11.3 Reproduction and Partiality 263
11.4 The Case Against Impartiality 266
11.5 The Case Against Partiality 269
11.6 A Pessimistic Conclusion? 274
Notes 276
References 276
Two Varieties of “Better-For” Judgements 278
12.1 The Principle of Procreative Beneficence 278
12.2 PPB and the Non-Identity Problem 281
12.3 Internal and External Perspective “Better-For” Judgements 282
12.4 Prospective Parenthood and the Internal Perspective 285
12.5 Principled Procreation 287
12.6 Summary 291
Notes 291
References 291
Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions 293
13.1 Introduction 293
13.2 Must We Create the Best? Partiality Toward Future Imperfect People 294
13.3 Justifying Harm in Different-Number Cases: The Generation-Adding Policy 297
13.4 Justifying Harm in Same-Number Cases: The Chauvinist Policy 298
13.5 An Impersonal Explanation of the Chauvinist Policy 299
13.6 Limits on the Role of Procreative Intentions in Justifying Harm 301
13.7 An Alterative? Asymmetrical Responsibility for Harms and Benefits 303
13.8 The Limitations of Asymmetrical Responsibility 306
13.9 Selectivity, Partiality, and Procreative Intentions 307
13.10 Conclusion 308
Notes 309
References 312
Part VI 314
Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics? 315
14.1 Introduction 315
14.2 Comparativism 316
14.3 The Person Affecting Restriction 317
14.4 Strict Comparativism 319
14.5 Asymmetrical Comparativism 320
14.6 Inconsistency 321
14.7 Personal Good Restriction Regained 323
14.8 A Normative Version of the Restriction 324
14.9 Soft Comparativism 327
14.10 Dominated Outcomes 329
14.11 Future Populations and Trade Offs 332
14.11 Summary 334
Notes 335
References 339
Part VII 341
Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty 342
15.1 Fundamental Liberties 343
15.2 Types of Harm to Future Children 344
15.3 Compelling State Interests 345
15.4 Two Different Distinctions 347
15.5 Future Children, Whoever They May Be 348
15.6 Will the Courts Agree? 352
Notes 354
References 355
Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice Over Time 357
Notes 363
References 363
Name Index 364
Subject Index 368

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 31.7.2009
• Reihe/Serie: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine
• Reihe/Serie: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine
• Zusatzinfo: VII, 335 p.
• Verlagsort: Dordrecht
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik
• Themenwelt: Studium ► 2. Studienabschnitt (Klinik) ► Humangenetik
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Öffentliches Recht ► Verfassungsrecht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Privatrecht / Bürgerliches Recht ► Medizinrecht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie
• Schlagworte: Bioethics • Children's rights • Consequentialism • ethics • Future Generations • Genetics • Harm • Justice • Ligation • Morality • Reproductive • will
• ISBN-10: 1-4020-5697-4 / 1402056974
• ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-5697-0 / 9781402056970