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Knowledge in an Uncertain World - Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath

Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Buch | Softcover
262 Seiten
2011
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-969467-9 (ISBN)
CHF 63,95 inkl. MwSt
Fantl and McGrath explore the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. They argue that you can rely on what you know in action and belief, since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems required if we know much of anything at all - this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know.
In defending these points, Fantl and McGrath investigate the ramifications for debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief. The book is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers who work on reasons and rationality, philosophers of language and mind, and decision theorists.

Jeremy Fantl received his Ph.D. from Brown University in 2000 and is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Calgary. Matthew McGrath received his Ph.D. from Brown University in 1998 and is currently Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri.

Introduction ; 1. Fallibilism ; 2. Contextualism ; 3. Knowledge and Reasons ; 4. Justification ; 5. Belief ; 6. The Value and Importance of Knowledge ; 7. Infallibilism or Pragmatic Encroachment? ; Appendix I Conflicts with Bayesian Decision Theory? ; Appendix II Does KJ entail infallibilism? ; Glossary ; Bibliography

Erscheint lt. Verlag 24.11.2011
Verlagsort Oxford
Sprache englisch
Maße 157 x 235 mm
Gewicht 376 g
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
Wirtschaft Betriebswirtschaft / Management Allgemeines / Lexika
ISBN-10 0-19-969467-2 / 0199694672
ISBN-13 978-0-19-969467-9 / 9780199694679
Zustand Neuware
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