Patronage at Work
Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina
Seiten
2021
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-316-51408-5 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-316-51408-5 (ISBN)
Using a mixed methods research design, Oliveros examines how patronage – the exchange of public sector jobs for political support – works. The book provides a detailed description of what patronage employees do in exchange for their jobs, as well as a novel explanation of why they do it.
In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services – such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.
In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services – such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.
Virginia Oliveros is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. She co-edited (with Noam Lupu and Luis Schiumerini) Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies (2019). Her research has appeared in American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, and Comparative Politics.
1. Introduction; 2. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage; 3 Getting the Job; 4. Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments; 5. Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration; 6. Self- Enforcing Patronage Contracts; 7. Beyond the Argentine Case; 8. Conclusions and Broader Implications.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 17.11.2021 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 158 x 236 mm |
| Gewicht | 500 g |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Ethnologie |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-316-51408-0 / 1316514080 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-316-51408-5 / 9781316514085 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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