Constructing Cassandra
Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001
Seiten
2013
Stanford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-8047-8580-8 (ISBN)
Stanford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-8047-8580-8 (ISBN)
This book is an inquiry into the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four critical strategic surprises experienced by the US over a fifty-year period which still play out today.
Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon.
To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.
Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon.
To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.
Milo Jones is Managing Director of a consulting firm and teaches geopolitics and strategy as a Visiting Professor at IE Business School in Madrid, Spain. Philippe Silberzahn is Professor of Strategy at EMLyon Business School in France and a Research Fellow at Ecole Polytechnique in France.
| Verlagsort | Palo Alto |
|---|---|
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 635 g |
| Themenwelt | Literatur ► Biografien / Erfahrungsberichte |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-8047-8580-5 / 0804785805 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-8047-8580-8 / 9780804785808 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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Buch | Softcover (2024)
Rehm Verlag
CHF 53,20
