Quine’s Epistemic Norms in Practice
Bloomsbury Academic (Verlag)
978-1-350-30426-0 (ISBN)
Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. Part III is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formalizing inferences to behaviour. He presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine’s own epistemological naturalism.
By reassessing Quine’s normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine’s philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.
Michael Shepanski is Adjunct Lecturer of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University, Australia.
Preface
Acknowledgements
Part I. Undogmatic Empiricism
1. Wanted: A Normative Epistemology in Working Order
2. Epistemological Dissociative Disorder
3. Empiricism Without (Even Mentioning) the Dogmas
4. Conservatism is not a Third Norm
5. Sufficient Logical Explicitness is Norm Zero
Part II. Application to Philosophy
6. Touching Base
7. The Armchair
8. Adapting to Predicate Logic
Part III. Case Study: Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
9. Destination and Horizon
10. Sententialism
11. From Sententialism to Russellianism
12. Sententialism with Non-Designating Names
Part IV. Paths Not Taken
13. The “Two Dogmas” Argument
14. Naturalized Epistemology
15. Attitudes to Sets of Possibilia
16. The Mythical Given
17. Epistemology as the Theory of Knowledge
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Erscheinungsdatum | 10.07.2023 |
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Verlagsort | London |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 156 x 234 mm |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie der Neuzeit | |
Naturwissenschaften | |
ISBN-10 | 1-350-30426-3 / 1350304263 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-350-30426-0 / 9781350304260 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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