Cyberspace Mimic Defense (eBook)

Generalized Robust Control and Endogenous Security

Jiangxing Wu (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2019 | 1st ed. 2020
L, 735 Seiten
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-030-29844-9 (ISBN)

Infos

This book discusses uncertain threats, which are caused by unknown attacks based on unknown vulnerabilities or backdoors in the information system or control devices and software/hardware.  Generalized robustness control architecture and the mimic defense mechanisms are presented in this book, which could change 'the easy-to-attack and difficult-to-defend game' in cyberspace. The endogenous uncertain effects from the targets of the software/hardware based on this architecture can produce magic 'mimic defense fog', and suppress in a normalized mode random disturbances caused by physical or logic elements, as well as effects of non-probability disturbances brought by uncertain security threats.

Although progress has been made in the current security defense theories in cyberspace and various types of security technologies have come into being, the effectiveness of such theories and technologies often depends on the scale of the prior knowledge of the attackers, on the part of the defender and on the acquired real-timing and accuracy regarding the attackers' behavior features and other information. Hence, there lacks an efficient active defense means to deal with uncertain security threats from the unknown. Even if the bottom-line defense technologies such as encrypted verification are adopted, the security of hardware/software products cannot be quantitatively designed, verified or measured. Due to the 'loose coupling' relationship and border defense modes between the defender and the protected target, there exist insurmountable theoretical and technological challenges in the protection of the defender and the target against the utilization of internal vulnerabilities or backdoors, as well as in dealing with attack scenarios based on backdoor-activated collaboration from both inside and outside, no matter how augmented or accumulated protective measures are adopted. Therefore, it is urgent to jump out of the stereotyped thinking based on conventional defense theories and technologies, find new theories and methods to effectively reduce the utilization of vulnerabilities and backdoors of the targets without relying on the priori knowledge and feature information, and to develop new technological means to offset uncertain threats based on unknown vulnerabilities and backdoors from an innovative perspective.

This book provides a solution both in theory and engineering implementation to the difficult problem of how to avoid the uncontrollability of product security caused by globalized marketing, COTS and non-trustworthy software/hardware sources. It has been proved that this revolutionary enabling technology has endowed software/hardware products in IT/ICT/CPS with endogenous security functions and has overturned the attack theories and methods based on hardware/software design defects or resident malicious codes.

This book is designed for educators, theoretical and technological researchers in cyber security and autonomous control and for business technicians who are engaged in the research on developing a new generation of software/hardware products by using endogenous security enabling technologies and for other product users. Postgraduates in IT/ICT/CPS/ICS will discover that (as long as the law of 'structure determines the nature and architecture determines the security is properly used), the problem of software/hardware design defects or malicious code embedding will become the swelling of Achilles in the process of informationization and will no longer haunt Pandora's box in cyberspace. Security and opening-up, advanced progressiveness and controllability seem to be contradictory, but there can be theoretically and technologically unified solutions to the problem.

Jiangxing WU serves as the Director of China National Digital Switching System Engineering & Technological R&D Center. He was elected as a Fellow of China Academy of Engineering in 2003. As a renowned expert in information & communication and network switching in China, he has played an important role in China and worked as the Vice Director in the communication section and the Vice Director of the Expert Board in the information section in the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Five-year Plans of China National High-tech R&D Program (863 Program); he has been the General Director of the High Speed Information Demonstration Network(CAINONet) , 3TNet, the Next Generation Broadcasting Network (NGB) and the New Concept High-efficient Computer System and Architecture R&D. He took charge of the New Generation High Credibility Network and Flexible Reconfiguration Network and served as the Director of the Technical Board of the Mobile Communication for the National Key Technologies R&D Program and the First Vice Director of the Expert Board of the National Tri-network Convergence Committee. From 1990s, after the great success of the first high capacity Digital SPC Switching System in China, Jiangxing Wu successively presided over the development of the first high-speed core router in China, the world's first massive Access Convergence Router (ACR) and information communication core infrastructure of the Flexible Reconfiguration Network. In 2013 he first launched the high-efficient computer prototype based on Mimic Computing and the theory of Cyberspace Mimic Defense, which went successfully through the test and assessment in 2016.He was awarded the First Prize for National Science and Technological Progress for three times and the Second Prize for the National Science and Technological Progress for four times  in addition to the First Prize of the National Teaching Achievement Award. He received the Prize for Scientific and Technological Progress from Ho Leung Ho Lee Foundation in 1995 and the Prize for Scientific and Technological Achievements from the same foundation in 2015. Wu's team was awarded four times with the First Prize of th National Science and Technology Progress Award, nine times with the Second Prize of the National Science and Technology Progress Award and recognized in honor as the Innovation Team of State Science and Technology Progress Award in 2015.

Inhalt

Preface 6
Author’s Profile 13
Brief Introduction (Abstract) 15
Preface 16
Acknowledgments 27
Contents 29
Abbreviations 40
Part I 48
Chapter 1: Security Risks from Vulnerabilities and Backdoors 49
1.1 Harmfulness of Vulnerabilities and Backdoors 49
1.1.1 Related Concepts 52
1.1.2 Basic Topics of Research 53
1.1.2.1 Accurate Definition of Vulnerability 53
1.1.2.2 Reasonable Classification of Vulnerabilities 54
1.1.2.3 Unpredictability of Vulnerabilities 55
1.1.2.4 Elimination of Vulnerabilities 56
1.1.3 Threats and Impacts 56
1.1.3.1 Broad Security Threats 56
1.2 Inevitability of Vulnerabilities and Backdoors 62
1.2.1 Unavoidable Vulnerabilities and Backdoors 63
1.2.1.1 The Contradiction Between Complexity and Verifiability 64
1.2.1.2 Challenges in Supply Chain Management 65
1.2.1.3 Inadequacy of Current Theories and Engineering Techniques 67
1.2.2 Contingency of Vulnerability Emergence 69
1.2.2.1 Contingent Time of Discovery 69
1.2.2.2 Contingent Form of Emergence 71
1.2.3 The Temporal and Spatial Characteristic of Cognition 72
1.2.3.1 From Quantitative Changes to Qualitative Changes 72
1.2.3.2 Absolute and Relative Interdependence and Conversion 73
1.2.3.3 The Unity of Specificity and Generality 74
1.3 The Challenge of Defense Against Vulnerabilities and Backdoors 75
1.3.1 Major Channels for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Attacks 75
1.3.2 Uncertain Unknown Threats 75
1.3.3 Limited Effect of Traditional “Containment and Repair” 77
1.3.3.1 Reduce the Introduction of Vulnerabilities into Software Development, but Oversights Are Inevitable 77
1.3.3.2 Discovering Vulnerabilities in the Testing Phase, but New Ones Are Emerging 78
1.3.3.3 Exploit Mitigation Measures Keep Improving, but the Confrontation Never Stops 79
1.3.3.4 The Careful Designing of White List Detection Mechanisms for System Protection Fails to Prevent Bypassing from Taking Place from Time to Time 80
1.4 Inspirations and Reflection 80
1.4.1 Building a System Based on “Contamination” 81
1.4.2 From Component Credibility to Structure Security 81
1.4.3 From Reducing Exploitability to Destroying Accessibility 81
1.4.4 Transforming the Problematic Scenarios 82
References 83
Chapter 2: Formal Description of Cyber Attacks 85
2.1 Formal Description Methods of Conventional Cyber Attacks 86
2.1.1 Attack Tree 86
2.1.2 Attack Graph 88
2.1.3 Analysis of Several Attack Models 90
2.2 The AS Theory 91
2.2.1 The AS Model 92
2.2.2 Defects in the AS Theory 94
2.3 The MAS 95
2.3.1 Definition and Nature of the MAS 95
2.3.2 MAS Implementation Methods 96
2.3.3 Limitations of the MAS 97
2.4 New Methods of Formal Description of Cyber Attacks 98
2.4.1 Cyber Attack Process 98
2.4.2 Formal Description of the Attack Graph 100
2.4.3 Formal Description of an Attack Chain 101
2.4.4 Vulnerability Analysis of Cyber Attack Chains 102
2.4.4.1 Conditions for the Successful Implementation of Atomic Attacks 103
2.4.4.2 The Conditions on Which the Successfully Completed Attack Chain Depends 106
References 111
Chapter 3: Conventional Defense Technologies 112
3.1 Static Defense Technology 112
3.1.1 Overview of Static Defense Technology 112
3.1.2 Analysis of Static Defense Technology 113
3.1.2.1 Firewall Technology 113
3.1.2.2 Intrusion Detection Technology 115
3.1.2.3 Intrusion Prevention Technology 117
3.1.2.4 Vulnerability Scanning Technology 119
3.2 Honeypot 121
3.2.1 Network Intrusion and Malicious Code Detection 122
3.2.2 Capturing Samples of Malicious Codes 123
3.2.3 Tracking and Analysis of Security Threats 124
3.2.4 Extraction of Attack Features 124
3.2.5 Limitations of Honeypot 125
3.3 Collaborative Defense 126
3.3.1 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Detection and Firewall 127
3.3.2 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Prevention and Firewall Systems 128
3.3.3 Collaborative Defense Between the Intrusion Prevention System and Intrusion Detection System 129
3.3.4 Collaborative Defense Between Intrusion Prevention and Vulnerability Scanning Systems 130
3.3.5 Collaborative Defense Between the Intrusion Prevention System and Honeypot 130
3.4 Intrusion Tolerance Technology 132
3.4.1 Technical Principles of Intrusion Tolerance 132
3.4.1.1 Theoretical Model 133
3.4.1.2 Mechanisms and Strategies 133
3.4.2 Two Typical Intrusion Tolerance Systems 136
3.4.2.1 Scalable Intrusion-Tolerant Architecture 136
3.4.2.2 Malicious and Accidental Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications [75] 137
3.4.3 Comparison of Web Intrusion Tolerance Architectures (Table 3.1) 139
3.4.4 Differences Between Intrusion Tolerance and Fault Tolerance 140
3.5 Sandbox Acting as an Isolation Defense 142
3.5.1 Overview of Sandbox 142
3.5.2 Theoretical Principles of Sandbox 144
3.5.2.1 Application Layer Sandbox 144
3.5.2.2 Kernel Layer Sandbox 145
3.5.2.3 Hybrid Sandbox 145
3.5.3 Status Quo of Sandbox Defense Technology 145
3.6 Computer Immune Technology 147
3.6.1 Overview of Immune Technology 147
3.6.2 Artificial Immune System Status 148
3.7 Review of Conventional Defense Methods 151
References 154
Chapter 4: New Approaches to Cyber Defense 157
4.1 New Developments in Cyber Defense Technologies 157
4.2 Trusted Computing 160
4.2.1 Basic Thinking Behind Trusted Computing 160
4.2.2 Technological Approaches of Trusted Computing 161
4.2.2.1 Root of Trust 161
4.2.2.2 Trust Measurement Model and Chain of Trust 162
4.2.2.3 Trusted Computing Platform (TCP) 164
4.2.3 New Developments in Trusted Computing 167
4.2.3.1 Trusted Computing 3.0 167
4.2.3.2 Trusted Cloud 169
4.2.3.3 SGX Architecture 171
4.3 Tailored Trustworthy Spaces 173
4.3.1 Preconditions 174
4.3.1.1 Communication 174
4.3.1.2 Computing 174
4.3.1.3 Security 176
4.3.1.4 Summary 176
4.3.2 Tailored Trustworthy Spaces (TTS) 177
4.3.2.1 Features Research 177
4.3.2.2 Trust Negotiation 178
4.3.2.3 Set of Operations 178
4.3.2.4 Privacy 178
4.4 Mobile Target Defense 179
4.4.1 MTD Mechanism 180
4.4.1.1 Randomization 180
4.4.1.2 Diversification Mechanism 181
4.4.1.3 Dynamic Mechanism 181
4.4.1.4 Symbiotic Mechanism 182
4.4.2 Roadmap and Challenges of MTD 182
4.5 Blockchain 183
4.5.1 Basic Concept 184
4.5.2 Core Technologies 185
4.5.3 Analysis of Blockchain Security 187
4.6 Zero Trust Security Model 188
4.6.1 Basic Concept 189
4.6.2 Forrrester’s Zero Trust Security Framework 190
4.6.3 Google’s Solution 191
4.6.3.1 Principles of Identifying Security Devices 192
4.6.3.2 Principles for Identifying Users’ Security 193
4.6.3.3 Removing Trust from the Network 193
4.6.3.4 Externalizing Applications and Workflows 193
4.6.3.5 Implementing Inventory-Based Access Control 194
4.7 Reflections on New Cyber Defense Technologies 194
References 199
Chapter 5: Analysis on Diversity, Randomness, and Dynameicity 202
5.1 Diversity 203
5.1.1 Overview 203
5.1.2 Diversity of the Executors 204
5.1.2.1 Executor Diversity in Network Operating Systems 205
5.1.2.2 Executor Diversity in the Path 205
5.1.3 Diversity of the Execution Space 208
5.1.3.1 Execution Space Diversity in Network Operating Systems 208
5.1.3.2 Execution Space Diversity in the Path 211
5.1.4 Differences Between Diversity and Pluralism 212
5.2 Randomness 213
5.2.1 Overview 213
5.2.2 Address Space Randomization 214
5.2.3 Instruction System Randomization 216
5.2.4 Kernel Data Randomization 218
5.2.5 Cost of Introduction 220
5.2.5.1 Different Software and Hardware Versions Require Different Expert Teams to Design and Maintain 220
5.2.5.2 The Cost Will Inevitably Increase if a Multi-version Service System Is Constructed 222
5.2.5.3 Introduction of Diversity Makes Multi-version Synchronized Updating a New Challenge 223
5.3 Dynamicity 224
5.3.1 Overview 224
5.3.1.1 Resource Redundancy Configuration 226
5.3.1.2 Cost of Randomness 227
5.3.1.3 Cost of Effectiveness 228
5.3.2 Dynamic Defense Technology 228
5.3.2.1 Dynamic Network 229
5.3.2.2 Dynamic Platform 231
5.3.2.3 Dynamic Software 233
5.3.2.4 Dynamic Data 235
5.3.3 Dynamicity Challenges 236
5.4 Case of OS Diversity Analysis 237
5.4.1 Statistical Analysis Data Based on the NVD 238
5.4.2 Common OS Vulnerabilities 239
5.4.3 Conclusions 243
5.5 Chapter Summary 245
References 247
Chapter 6: Revelation of the Heterogeneous Redundancy Architecture 249
6.1 Introduction 249
6.2 Addressing the Challenge of Uncertain Failures 251
6.2.1 Proposal of the Problem 251
6.2.2 Enlightenment from TRA 252
6.2.3 Formal Description of TRA 254
6.3 The Role of Redundancy and Heterogeneous Redundancy 256
6.3.1 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance 256
6.3.2 Endogenous Functions and Structural Effects 258
6.3.3 Redundancy and Situational Awareness 258
6.3.4 From Isomorphism to Heterogeneity 259
6.3.4.1 Isomorphic Redundancy 259
6.3.4.2 Heterogeneous Redundancy 260
6.3.4.3 Appropriate Functional Intersections 261
6.3.5 Relationship Between Fault Tolerance and Intrusion Tolerance 262
6.4 Voting and Ruling 263
6.4.1 Majority Voting and Consensus Mechanism 263
6.4.2 Multimode Ruling 264
6.5 Dissimilar Redundancy Structure 265
6.5.1 Analysis of the Intrusion Tolerance Properties of the DRS 269
6.5.2 Summary of the Endogenous Security Effects of the DRS 273
6.5.3 Hierarchical Effect of Heterogeneous Redundancy 274
6.5.4 Systematic Fingerprint and Tunnel-Through 276
6.5.5 Robust Control and General Uncertain Disturbances 277
6.6 Anti-attack Modeling 281
6.6.1 The GSPN Model 282
6.6.2 Anti-attack Considerations 283
6.6.3 Anti-attack Modeling 286
6.7 Anti-aggression Analysis 288
6.7.1 Anti-general Attack Analysis 288
6.7.1.1 Non-redundant System 288
6.7.1.2 Dissimilar Redundant System 291
6.7.2 Anti-special Attack Analysis 300
6.7.2.1 Non-redundant System 300
6.7.2.2 Dissimilar Redundant System 301
6.7.3 Summary of the Anti-attack Analysis 306
6.8 Conclusion 308
6.8.1 Conditional Awareness of Uncertain Threats 308
6.8.2 New Connotations of General Robust Control 308
6.8.3 DRS Intrusion Tolerance Defect 309
6.8.4 DRS Transformation Proposals 311
References 313
Chapter 7: DHR Architecture 314
7.1 Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundant Architecture 315
7.1.1 Basic Principles of DHRA 316
7.1.1.1 Assumed Conditions 316
7.1.1.2 Composition and Functions 317
7.1.1.3 Core Mechanism 319
7.1.1.4 Robust Control and Problem Avoidance 320
7.1.1.5 Iterative Convergence 321
7.1.2 Goals and Effects of DHR 321
7.1.2.1 Killing Four Birds with One Stone 322
7.1.2.2 Dynamic Variability of the Apparent Structure 322
7.1.2.3 Equivalent to TRA with the Superposed-State Authentication Function 323
7.1.2.4 Metastable Scenarios and DRS Isomorphism 324
7.1.2.5 The Uncertainty Attribute 325
7.1.2.6 Coding Theory and Security Measurement 325
7.1.2.7 Endogenous Security Mechanism and Integrated Defense 326
7.1.2.8 Problem Avoidance and Problem Zeroing 327
7.1.3 Typical DHR Architecture 328
7.1.4 Atypical DHR Architecture 332
7.2 The Attack Surface of DHR 334
7.3 Functionality and Effectiveness 336
7.3.1 Creating a Cognition Dilemma for the Target Object 336
7.3.2 DFI to Present Uncertainty 337
7.3.3 Making It Difficult to Exploit the Loopholes of the Target Object 337
7.3.4 Increasing the Uncertainty for an Attack Chain 338
7.3.5 Increasing the Difficulty for MR Escape 339
7.3.6 Independent Security Gain 340
7.3.7 Strong Correlation Between the Vulnerability Value and the Environment 340
7.3.8 Making It Difficult to Create a Multi-target Attack Sequence 341
7.3.9 Measurable Generalized Dynamization 342
7.3.10 Weakening the Impact of Homologous Backdoors 342
7.4 Reflections on the Issues Concerned 343
7.4.1 Addressing Uncertain Threats with Endogenous Mechanisms 343
7.4.2 Reliability and Credibility Guaranteed by the Structural Gain 345
7.4.3 New Security-Trustable Methods and Approaches 345
7.4.4 Creating a New Demand in a Diversified Market 346
7.4.5 The Problem of Super Escape and Information Leaking 347
7.5 Uncertainty: An Influencing Factor 348
7.5.1 DHR Endogenous Factors 348
7.5.2 DHR-Introduced Factors 351
7.5.3 DHR-Combined Factors 351
7.5.4 Challenges to a Forced Breakthrough 352
7.6 Analogical Analysis Based on the Coding Theory 353
7.6.1 Coding Theory and Turbo Codes 353
7.6.2 Analogic Analysis Based on Turbo Encoding 356
7.6.2.1 Coding Heterogeneity 357
7.6.2.2 Coding Redundancy 359
7.6.2.3 Coding OV 361
7.6.2.4 Decoding and Ruling 361
7.6.2.5 Codec Dynamics 364
7.6.3 Some Insights 367
7.6.3.1 Randomness and Redundancy Serving as the Core Elements for Solving Cyberspace Security Problems 367
7.6.3.2 Uncertainty Effect Brought by DHRA 367
7.6.3.3 Flexibility and Self-restoring Capability of DHRA 368
7.6.3.4 Insufficiency in Analogical Analysis Using the Turbo Code Model 368
7.7 DHR-Related Effects 369
7.7.1 Ability to Perceive Unidentified Threats 369
7.7.2 Distributed Environmental Effect 369
7.7.3 Integrated Effect 370
7.7.4 Architecture-Determined Safety 370
7.7.5 Changing the Attack and Defense Game Rules in Cyberspace 371
7.7.6 Creating a Loose Ecological Environment 372
7.7.6.1 “Isomeric and Diversified” Ecology 373
7.7.6.2 New Ways to Accelerate Product Maturity 373
7.7.6.3 Self-controllable Complementary Form 373
7.7.6.4 Creating an Integrated Operating Environment 374
7.7.7 Restricted Application 374
7.7.7.1 Micro-synchronous Low-Time-Delay Operating Environment 375
7.7.7.2 Time-Delay-Constrained Scenarios That Cannot Be Corrected 375
7.7.7.3 Lack of a Normalizable Input/Output Interface 375
7.7.7.4 Lack of Heterogeneous Hardware/Software Resources 376
7.7.7.5 “Blackout” in Software Update 376
7.7.7.6 Cost-Sensitive Area 376
7.7.7.7 Concerns Regarding the Highly Robust Software Architecture 377
7.7.7.8 Issue of Ruling 377
References 378
Part II 379
Chapter 8: Original Meaning and Vision of Mimic Defense 380
8.1 Mimic Disguise and Mimic Defense 380
8.1.1 Biological Mimicry 380
8.1.2 Mimic Disguise 382
8.1.3 Two Basic Security Problems and Two Severe Challenges 384
8.1.4 An Entry Point: The Vulnerability of an Attack Chain 386
8.1.5 Build the Mimic Defense 387
8.1.6 Original Meaning of Mimic Defense 391
8.2 Mimic Computing and Endogenous Security 393
8.2.1 The Plight of HPC Power Consumption 393
8.2.2 Original Purpose of Mimic Calculation 394
8.2.3 Vision of Mimic Calculation 395
8.2.4 Variable Structure Calculation and Endogenous Security 399
8.3 Vision of Mimic Defense 400
8.3.1 Reversing the Easy-to-Attack and Hard-to-Defend Status 401
8.3.2 A Universal Structure and Mechanism 403
8.3.3 Separation of Robust Control and Service Functions 403
8.3.4 Unknown Threat Perception 404
8.3.5 A Diversified Eco-environment 405
8.3.6 Achievement of Multi-dimensional Goals 406
8.3.7 Reduce the Complexity of Security Maintenance 407
References 408
Chapter 9: The Principle of Cyberspace Mimic Defense 409
9.1 Overview 409
9.1.1 Core Ideology 410
9.1.2 Eradicating the Root Cause for Cyber Security Problems 411
9.1.3 Biological Immunity and Endogenous Security 412
9.1.3.1 Non-specific Immunity 413
9.1.3.2 Specific Immunity 414
9.1.3.3 Non-prior-Knowledge-Reliant Defense 415
9.1.3.4 Endogenous Security 415
9.1.4 Non-specific Surface Defense 417
9.1.5 Integrated Defense 417
9.1.6 GRC and the Mimic Structure 418
9.1.7 Goals and Expectations 419
9.1.7.1 Development Goals 419
9.1.7.2 Technical Expectations 423
9.1.8 Potential Application Targets 424
9.2 Cyberspace Mimic Defense 426
9.2.1 Underlying Theories and Basic Principles 428
9.2.1.1 FE Common Sense and the TRA 431
9.2.1.2 DHR Architecture 431
9.2.1.3 Security Effects Brought About by Endogenous Mechanisms 433
9.2.2 Mimic Defense System 434
9.2.2.1 The Main Concepts and Core Mechanisms of CMD 436
9.2.2.2 CMD Model 448
9.2.3 Basic Features and Core Processes 449
9.2.4 Connotation and Extension Technologies 455
9.2.4.1 Connotation Technologies 455
9.2.4.2 Extension Technologies 456
9.2.5 Summary and Induction 457
9.2.6 Discussions of the Related Issues 459
9.2.6.1 CMD Level Based on the Attack Effect 459
9.2.6.2 Measurement Based on Reliability Theories and Test Methods 460
9.2.6.3 Security Situation Monitoring of the Target System 461
9.2.6.4 Contrast Verification 462
9.2.6.5 Information Security Effect 462
9.2.6.6 Mimic Defense and Mimic Computation 463
9.2.6.7 Unknown Threat Detection Devices 464
9.2.6.8 “Halt-Restart” Bumps 465
9.2.6.9 Standby Cooperative Attacks and External Command Disturbances 465
9.2.6.10 Superimposable and Iterative 466
9.2.6.11 Granularity of the Target Object 466
9.2.6.12 Natural Scenarios of DHR 467
9.2.6.13 About the Side Channel Attack 467
9.3 Structural Representation and Mimic Scenarios 468
9.3.1 Uncertain Characterization of the Structure 468
9.3.2 Mimic Scenario Creation 470
9.3.3 Typical Mimic Scenarios 471
9.4 Mimic Display 473
9.4.1 Typical Modes of Mimic Display 473
9.4.2 Considerations of the MB Credibility 476
9.5 Anti-attack and Reliability Analysis 478
9.5.1 Overview 478
9.5.2 Anti-attack and Reliability Models 479
9.5.3 Anti-attack Analysis 483
9.5.3.1 Analysis of CMD’s Resistance Against the General DM/CM Attacks 501
9.5.3.2 Anti-special Attack Analysis of the CMD System 505
9.5.3.3 Summary of the Anti-attack Analysis 514
9.5.4 Reliability Analysis 518
9.5.5 Conclusion 525
9.6 Differences Between CMD and HIT (Heterogeneous Intrusion Tolerance) 526
9.6.1 Major Differences 526
9.6.2 Prerequisites and Functional Differences 528
9.6.3 Summary 529
References 530
Chapter 10: Engineering and Implementation of Mimic Defense 532
10.1 Basic Conditions and Constraints 532
10.1.1 Basic Conditions 532
10.1.2 Constraints 533
10.2 Main Realization Mechanisms 534
10.2.1 Structural Effect and Functional Convergence Mechanism 535
10.2.2 One-Way or Unidirectional Connection Mechanism 535
10.2.3 Policy and Schedule Mechanism 536
10.2.4 Mimic Ruling Mechanism 537
10.2.5 Negative Feedback Control Mechanism 537
10.2.6 Input Allocation and Adaptation Mechanism 538
10.2.7 Output Agency and Normalization Mechanism 538
10.2.8 Sharding/Fragmentation Mechanism 539
10.2.9 Randomization/Dynamization/Diversity Mechanism 539
10.2.10 Virtualization Mechanism 540
10.2.11 Iteration and Superposition Mechanism 541
10.2.12 Software Fault Tolerance Mechanism 542
10.2.13 Dissimilarity Mechanism 543
10.2.14 Reconfiguration Mechanism 544
10.2.15 Executor’s Cleaning and Recovery Mechanism 544
10.2.16 Diversified Compilation Mechanism 546
10.2.17 Mimic Structure Programming 547
10.3 Major Challenges to Engineering Implementation 548
10.3.1 Best Match of Function Intersection 548
10.3.2 Complexity of Multimode Ruling 549
10.3.3 Service Turbulence 550
10.3.4 The Use of Open Elements 551
10.3.5 Execution Efficiency of Mimic Software 552
10.3.6 Diversification of Application Programs 553
10.3.7 Mimic Defense Interface Configuration 555
10.3.7.1 Route Forwarding Based on Mimic Defense 555
10.3.7.2 Mimic Defense-Based Web Access Server 555
10.3.7.3 File Storage System Based on Mimic Defense 556
10.3.7.4 Mimic Defense-Based Domain Name Resolution 556
10.3.7.5 Mimic Defense-Based Gun Control System 557
10.3.8 Version Update 557
10.3.9 Loading of Non-cross-Platform Application 558
10.3.10 Re-synchronization and Environment Reconstruction 559
10.3.11 Simplifying Complexity of Heterogeneous Redundancy Realization 560
10.3.11.1 Commercial Obstacles to Heterogeneous Redundancy 560
10.3.11.2 Locking the Robustness of the Service 561
10.3.11.3 Achieving Layered Heterogeneous Redundancy 562
10.3.11.4 SGX and the Protection of Heterogeneous Redundant Code and Data 562
10.3.11.5 Avoiding the “Absolutely Trustworthy” Trap of SGX 563
10.4 Testing and Evaluation of Mimic Defense 564
10.4.1 Analysis of Mimic Defense Effects 564
10.4.1.1 Definitive Defense Effect Within the Interface 564
10.4.1.2 Uncertain Defense Effect on or Outside the Interface 565
10.4.1.3 Uncertain Defense Effect Against Front Door Problems 565
10.4.1.4 Uncertain Social Engineering Effects 566
10.4.2 Reference Perimeter of Mimic Defense Effects 567
10.4.2.1 Ideal Effects of Mimic Defense 568
10.4.2.2 Reference Range of Defense Effect 568
10.4.3 Factors to Be Considered in Mimic Defense Verification and Test 570
10.4.3.1 Background of Testing 571
10.4.3.2 Principles of Testing 572
10.4.3.3 Major Testing Indicators 574
10.4.3.4 Considerations of Test Methods 579
10.4.3.5 Qualitative Analysis of Defense Effectiveness 582
10.4.4 Reflections on Quasi-stealth Evaluation 582
10.4.5 Mimic Ruling-Based Measurable Review 583
10.4.6 Mimic Defense Benchmark Function Experiment 585
10.4.7 Attackers’ Perspective 593
10.4.7.1 Mining or Setting up Vulnerabilities/Backdoors in the Mimic Interface 593
10.4.7.2 Creating a Homologous Ecosystem with the Development Tools and the Open-Source Community Model 594
10.4.7.3 Black-Box Operations Using “Irreplaceable” Advantage 594
10.4.7.4 Developing Attack Codes that Are Not Dependent on the Environment 594
10.4.7.5 Coordinated Operation Under Non-cooperative Conditions Using Input Sequence 595
10.4.7.6 Trying to Bypass the Mimic Interface 595
10.4.7.7 Attacking the Mimic Control Aspect 595
10.4.7.8 DDoS Brute Force Attacks 596
10.4.7.9 Social Engineering-Based Attacks 596
10.4.7.10 Directly Cracking Access Command or Password 596
References 597
Chapter 11: Foundation and Cost of Mimic Defense 598
11.1 Foundation for Mimic Defense Realization 598
11.1.1 Era of Weak Correlation of Complexity to Cost 598
11.1.2 High Efficiency Computing and Heterogeneous Computing 599
11.1.3 Diversified Ecological Environment 601
11.1.4 Standardization and Open Architecture 602
11.1.5 Virtualization Technology 603
11.1.6 Reconfiguration and Reorganization 604
11.1.7 Distributed and Cloud Computing Service 605
11.1.8 Dynamic Scheduling 607
11.1.9 Feedback Control 608
11.1.10 Quasi-Trusted Computing 608
11.1.11 Robust Control 609
11.1.12 New Developments of System Structure Technologies 609
11.2 Analysis of Traditional Technology Compatibility 610
11.2.1 Naturally Accepting Traditional Security Technologies 610
11.2.2 Naturally Carrying Forward the Hardware Technological Advances 612
11.2.3 Strong Correlation to Software Technological Development 613
11.2.4 Depending on the Open and Plural Ecological Environment 613
11.3 Cost of Mimic Defense Implementation 613
11.3.1 Cost of Dynamicity 614
11.3.2 Cost of Heterogeneity 614
11.3.3 Cost of Redundancy 616
11.3.4 Cost of Cleanup and Reconfiguration 616
11.3.5 Cost of Virtualization 617
11.3.6 Cost of Synchronization 617
11.3.7 Cost of Ruling 618
11.3.7.1 Synchronous Judgment 619
11.3.7.2 Agreed Output 619
11.3.7.3 First Come, First Output 619
11.3.7.4 Regular Judgment 619
11.3.7.5 Mask Decision 620
11.3.7.6 Normalized Pretreatment 620
11.3.8 Cost of Input/Output Agency 620
11.3.9 Cost of One-Way Connection 621
11.4 Scientific and Technological Issues to Be Studied and Solved 622
11.4.1 Scientific Issues Needing Urgent Study in the CMD Field 622
11.4.2 Engineering and Technical Issues Needing Urgent Solution in the CMD Field 623
11.4.2.1 Dissimilarity Design and Screening Theory 623
11.4.2.2 Pluralistic and Diversified Engineering Issues 624
11.4.2.3 Assessing the Security Impact of the “Homologous” Component Vulnerability on the DHR Architecture 625
11.4.2.4 How to Establish a System Design Reference Model 625
11.4.2.5 How to Prevent Standby Attacks 625
11.4.2.6 Mimic Ruling 626
11.4.2.7 Protection of the Mimic Control 627
11.4.2.8 Mimic Structural Design Technology 628
11.4.2.9 Mimic Construction Implementation Technology 629
11.4.3 Defense Effect Test and Evaluation 630
11.4.4 Comprehensive Use of Defense Capability 631
11.4.5 Issues Needing Continuous Attention 632
11.4.6 Emphasizing the Natural and Inspired Solutions 632
References 633
Chapter 12: Examples of Mimic Defense Application 634
12.1 Mimic Router Verification System 634
12.1.1 Threat Design 634
12.1.2 Designing Idea 635
12.1.3 DHR-Based Router Mimic Defense Model 637
12.1.4 System Architecture Design 639
12.1.4.1 Overall Framework 639
12.1.4.2 Function Unit Design 640
12.1.5 Mimic Transformation of the Existing Network 645
12.1.6 Feasibility and Security Analysis 646
12.2 Network Storage Verification System 647
12.2.1 Overall Plan 647
12.2.2 Arbiter 649
12.2.3 Metadata Server Cluster 650
12.2.4 Distributed Data Server 650
12.2.5 The Client 651
12.2.6 System Security Test and Result Analysis 652
12.3 Mimic-Structured Web Server Verification System 654
12.3.1 Threat Analysis 654
12.3.2 Designing Idea 655
12.3.3 System Architecture Design 656
12.3.4 Functional Unit Design 658
12.3.4.1 Request Dispatching and Balancing (RDB) Module 658
12.3.4.2 Dissimilar Redundant Response Voter 660
12.3.4.3 Dynamically Executing Scheduler 660
12.3.4.4 Dissimilar Virtual Web Server Pool 662
12.3.4.5 Primary Controller 662
12.3.4.6 Database Instruction Labelling (DIL) Module 663
12.3.5 Prototype Design and Realization 665
12.3.6 Attack Difficulty Evaluation 666
12.3.7 Cost Analysis 671
12.4 Cloud Computing and Virtualization Mimic Construction 671
12.4.1 Basic Layers of Cloud Computing 672
12.4.2 Cloud Computing Architecture Layers 672
12.4.3 Virtualized DHR Construction 674
12.5 Application Consideration for Software Design 675
12.5.1 Effect of Randomly Invoking Mobile Attack Surface 676
12.5.2 Guard Against Hidden Security Threats from Third Parties 676
12.5.3 Typical Mimic Defense Effects 676
12.6 Commonality Induction of System-Level Applications 677
References 677
Chapter 13: Testing and Evaluation of the Mimic Defense Principle Verification System 679
13.1 Mimic Defense Principle Verification in the Router Environment 680
13.1.1 Design of Test Methods for Mimic-Structured Routers 680
13.1.2 Basic Router Function and Performance Test 682
13.1.2.1 Routing Protocol Functional Test 682
13.1.2.2 Forwarding Performance Comparison Test 683
13.1.3 Test of the Mimic Defense Mechanism and Result Analysis 684
13.1.3.1 Data Transformation Function Test 684
13.1.3.2 Data Stream Fingerprint Function Test 686
13.1.3.3 Protocol Executor Random Display Test 687
13.1.3.4 Protocol Executor Routing Abnormity Monitoring and Handling Test 688
13.1.3.5 Endogenous Flow Interception Test 689
13.1.4 Defense Effect Test and Result Analysis 690
13.1.4.1 Attack Models and Testing Scenarios 691
13.1.4.2 System Information Scanning Test 691
13.1.4.3 Mimic Interface Vulnerability Detection Test 693
13.1.4.4 Test of Difficulty in Vulnerability Exploitation Within Mimic Interface 693
13.1.4.5 Test of Difficulty in Utilizing Backdoors in the Mimic Interface 695
13.1.5 Test Summary of Mimic-Structured Router 698
13.2 Mimic Defense Principle Verification in the Web Server Environment 698
13.2.1 Design of Test Methods for Mimic-Structured Web Servers 698
13.2.1.1 Test Process Design 699
13.2.1.2 Test Environment Setting 700
13.2.2 Basic Functional Test and Compatibility Test for Web Servers 700
13.2.2.1 HTTP Protocol Function Test 701
13.2.2.2 Page Compatibility Comparison Test 702
13.2.3 Mimic Defense Mechanism Test and Result Analysis 703
13.2.4 Defense Effect Test and Result Analysis 704
13.2.4.1 Scanning Detection Test 704
13.2.4.2 Operating System Security Test 704
13.2.4.3 Data Security Test 707
13.2.4.4 Anti-Trojan Test 707
13.2.4.5 Web Application Attack Test 710
13.2.5 Web Server Performance Test 710
13.2.5.1 Benchmark Web Server Performance Testing 712
13.2.5.2 DIL Module Performance Test 713
13.2.5.3 System Overall Performance Test 713
13.2.6 Summary of the Web Principle Verification System Test 714
13.3 Test Conclusions and Prospects 714
References 717
Chapter 14: Application Demonstration and Current Network Testing of Mimic Defense 718
14.1 Overview 718
14.2 Application Demonstration of the Mimic-Structured Router 719
14.2.1 Status Quo of the Pilot Network 720
14.2.1.1 Threat Analysis 720
14.2.1.2 Application Scenario 720
14.2.1.3 Product Plan 721
14.2.1.4 Application Deployment 724
14.2.1.5 Cost Analysis 726
14.2.1.6 Application Outcome 728
14.2.2 Current Network Testing 728
14.2.2.1 Testing Purpose 728
14.2.2.2 Testing Plan 728
14.2.2.3 Testing and Evaluation Items 729
14.2.2.4 Current Network Testing 729
14.2.2.5 Testing and Evaluation 731
14.3 Mimic-Structured Web Server 731
14.3.1 Application Demonstration 731
14.3.1.1 Application of the Mimic-Structured Web Server (MSWS) in a Financial Enterprise 731
14.3.1.2 Application of the MSWS on a Government Website 734
14.3.1.3 Application of the Mimic-Structured Web Virtual Host (MSWVH) in Gianet Fast Cloud (GFC) 740
14.3.2 Current Network Testing 745
14.3.2.1 Testing of the MSWS 745
14.3.2.2 Testing of the MSWVH 752
14.4 Mimic-Structured Domain Name Server (MSDN Server) 756
14.4.1 Application Demonstration 756
14.4.1.1 Threat Analysis 756
14.4.1.2 Application Scenario 758
14.4.1.3 Product Plan 758
14.4.1.4 Application Deployment 761
14.4.1.5 Cost Analysis 762
14.4.1.6 Application Effect 763
14.4.2 Testing and Evaluation 764
14.4.2.1 CUHN 764
14.4.2.2 Gianet 767
14.5 Conclusions and Prospects 769

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 2.12.2019
• Reihe/Serie: Wireless Networks
• Reihe/Serie: Wireless Networks
• Zusatzinfo: L, 735 p. 306 illus., 241 illus. in color.
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik
• Themenwelt: Technik ► Nachrichtentechnik
• Schlagworte: cyber security • Dissimilar Redundancy Structure • Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy • Endogenous Security • Generalized Robustness • Heterogeneous Executor • Heterogeneous Functionally Equivalent • Mimic Brackets • Mimic Defense • Mimic Interface • Mimic Ruling • Mobile Attack Surface • Reconfigurable Executor • Specific Immunity
• ISBN-10: 3-030-29844-2 / 3030298442
• ISBN-13: 978-3-030-29844-9 / 9783030298449