New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

Buch | Hardcover

392 Seiten

2009
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-928549-5 (ISBN)

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The knowability paradox suggests that wherever there is empirical ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. This volume presents the original papers in which this notorious problem was first set out, nineteen new papers seeking to resolve it, and a helpful introduction. It will be the definitive resource for study of the paradox.

In 1945 Alonzo Church issued a pair of referee reports in which he anonymously conveyed to Frederic Fitch a surprising proof showing that wherever there is (empirical) ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. Fitch published this and a generalization of the result in 1963. Ever since, philosophers have been attempting to understand the significance and address the counter-intuitiveness of this, the so-called paradox of knowability.
This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox. The contributors include logicians and philosophers from three continents, many of whom have already made important contributions to the discussion of the problem. The volume contains a general introduction to the paradox and the background literature, and is divided into seven sections that roughly mark the central points of debate. The sections include the history of the paradox, Michael Dummett's constructivism, issues of paraconsistency, developments of modal and temporal logics, Cartesian restricted theories of truth, modal and mathematical fictionalism, and reconsiderations about how, and whether, we ought to construe an anti-realist theory of truth.

Joe Salerno received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in 1999. He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at Australian National University, and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. He writes in epistemology and the philosophy of logic

Introduction ; I. EARLY HISTORY ; 1. Referee Reports on Fitch's "A Definition of Value" ; 2. A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts ; 3. Knowability Noir: 1945-1963 ; II. DUMMETT'S CONSTRUCTIVISM ; 4. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability ; 5. The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection ; 6. Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox ; III. PARACONSISTENCY AND PARACOMPLETENESS ; 7. Beyond the Limits of Knowledge ; 8. Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities ; IV. EPISTEMIC AND TEMPORAL OPERATORS: ACTIONS, TIMES AND TYPES ; 9. Actions That Make us Know ; 10. Can Truth Out? ; 11. Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief ; V. CARTESIAN RESTRICTED TRUTH ; 12. Tennant's Troubles ; 13. Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope ; 14. Revamping the Restriction Strategy ; VI. MODAL AND MATHEMATICAL FICTIONS ; 15. On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: a Case Study on Fitch's Paradox ; 16. Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics ; VII. KNOWABILITY RECONSIDERED ; 17. Performance and Paradox ; 18. The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond ; 19. Invincible Ignorance ; 20. Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning ; 21. Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)

Erscheint lt. Verlag	4.6.2009
Verlagsort	Oxford
Sprache	englisch
Maße	165 x 241 mm
Gewicht	759 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie
ISBN-10	0-19-928549-7 / 0199285497
ISBN-13	978-0-19-928549-5 / 9780199285495
Zustand	Neuware