The Expressive Self
The First Person in Speech and Thought
Seiten
2024
Lexington Books/Fortress Academic (Verlag)
978-1-6669-1675-1 (ISBN)
Lexington Books/Fortress Academic (Verlag)
978-1-6669-1675-1 (ISBN)
The Expressive Self argues the nature of the self lies in the fact that only in one’s own case are acts of expression actual episodes of one’s self-consciousness. The author provides novel accounts of Moore’s paradox, self-deception, and McKinsey’s paradox and addresses challenges from self-reference and first-person authority.
Expression is typically construed as a relation between two ontologically distinct items—namely, a vehicle and a content—but it is better construed non-relationally, since the content is an intrinsic aspect or quality of the expressive vehicle. Upon this basis, The Expressive Self: The First Person in Speech and Thought argues that the distinctive nature of the first-person perspective must be accounted for in expressive, rather than epistemic, terms. For though others can report on what one expresses, one alone is able to non-relationally express oneself; one alone is able to produce vehicles that are episodes of one’s self-consciousness.
According to Ángel García Rodríguez, the ensuing expressive model of the self provides clarity on some prominent contemporary puzzles, notably Moore’s paradox, self-deception, and McKinsey’s paradox, given the duality of non-relationally expressive and reporting uses of the underlying first-person claims. Moreover, the phenomena of self-reference and first-person authority, both psychological and bodily, pose no objection to the model.
Throughout, the author engages critically with alternative conceptions of the self, delivering a novel account that helps advance the debate about the nature of the self and of the first person.
Expression is typically construed as a relation between two ontologically distinct items—namely, a vehicle and a content—but it is better construed non-relationally, since the content is an intrinsic aspect or quality of the expressive vehicle. Upon this basis, The Expressive Self: The First Person in Speech and Thought argues that the distinctive nature of the first-person perspective must be accounted for in expressive, rather than epistemic, terms. For though others can report on what one expresses, one alone is able to non-relationally express oneself; one alone is able to produce vehicles that are episodes of one’s self-consciousness.
According to Ángel García Rodríguez, the ensuing expressive model of the self provides clarity on some prominent contemporary puzzles, notably Moore’s paradox, self-deception, and McKinsey’s paradox, given the duality of non-relationally expressive and reporting uses of the underlying first-person claims. Moreover, the phenomena of self-reference and first-person authority, both psychological and bodily, pose no objection to the model.
Throughout, the author engages critically with alternative conceptions of the self, delivering a novel account that helps advance the debate about the nature of the self and of the first person.
Ángel García Rodríguez is a philosophy lecturer at the University of Murcia.
Acknowledgment
Introduction
Part I: Models
1. Special Access
2. Expression
Part II: Puzzles
3. Moore’s Paradox
4. Self-Deception
5. McKinsey’s Paradox
Part III: Challenges
6. Self-Reference
7. First-Person Authority
Conclusion: The Expressive Self
References
About the Author
Erscheinungsdatum | 12.09.2024 |
---|---|
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 159 x 236 mm |
Gewicht | 503 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie | |
ISBN-10 | 1-6669-1675-7 / 1666916757 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-6669-1675-1 / 9781666916751 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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