Agents of Empire
English Imperial Governance and the Making of American Political Institutions
Seiten
2024
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-31692-7 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-31692-7 (ISBN)
Provides a new strategic logic of English imperial government in North American colonies, and why the crown was ultimately unable to control them. It shows how strategic dynamics in colonial institutions structured American state building. For readers in comparative state formation, imperial legacies, political economy, and American politics.
To understand the foundations of American political institutions, it's necessary to understand the rationale for British colonial institutions that survived the empire. Political institutions in England's American colonies were neither direct imports from England, nor home-grown creations of autonomous colonists. Instead, they emerged from efforts of the English Crown to assert control over their colonies amid limited English state and military capacity. Agents of Empire explores the strategic dilemmas facing a constrained crown in its attempts to assert control. The study argues that colonial institutions emerged from the crown's management of authority delegated to agents-first companies and proprietors establishing colonies; then imperial officials governing the polities they created. The institutions remaining from these strategic dynamics form the building blocks of federalism, legislative power, separation of powers, judicial review, and other institutions that comprise the American polity today.
To understand the foundations of American political institutions, it's necessary to understand the rationale for British colonial institutions that survived the empire. Political institutions in England's American colonies were neither direct imports from England, nor home-grown creations of autonomous colonists. Instead, they emerged from efforts of the English Crown to assert control over their colonies amid limited English state and military capacity. Agents of Empire explores the strategic dilemmas facing a constrained crown in its attempts to assert control. The study argues that colonial institutions emerged from the crown's management of authority delegated to agents-first companies and proprietors establishing colonies; then imperial officials governing the polities they created. The institutions remaining from these strategic dynamics form the building blocks of federalism, legislative power, separation of powers, judicial review, and other institutions that comprise the American polity today.
Sean Gailmard is a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on the development of American political institutions and strategic models of choice in politics.
Introduction; 1. Economic incentives: the origins of colonial autonomy; 2. Governance incentives: the balanced colonial constitution; 3. From incentives to institutions: contractual imperialism in practice; 4. The rise and fall of autocratic imperialism; 5. Economic regulation: imperial administration in the colonies; 6. Political regulation: legislative review and colonial autonomy; 7. Colonial assembly power under regulatory imperialism; 8. The institutional bequests of empire.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 20.04.2024 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Wirtschaftsgeschichte |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-009-31692-3 / 1009316923 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-31692-7 / 9781009316927 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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