Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
Wiley-Blackwell (Verlag)
978-1-119-75544-9 (ISBN)
In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today’s most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts.
Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more.
Presents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology
Contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances
Focuses on core areas of epistemology
Uses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion
All-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemology
Part of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.
The Editors BLAKE ROEBER is Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and has published in Nous, PPR, Mind, and other leading journals. ERNEST SOSA is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of numerous papers and books on epistemology and is the editor of Nous, Philosophical Issues, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. MATTHIAS STEUP is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and numerous articles on epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty and the co-editor of A Companion to Epistemology. JOHN TURRI is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo, where he directs the Philosophical Science Lab. He has published research in many leading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science journals.
Notes on Contributors vii
Preface to the Third Edition xiii
Preface to the Second Edition xiv
Preface to the First Edition xv
Introduction xvii
1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1
Knowledge Comes First 1
Mona Simion
Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7
Aidan McGlynn
Knowledge Still Comes First 14
Mona Simion
Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16
Aidan McGlynn
2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23
Is Justification Just in the Head? 23
Clayton Littlejohn
The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36
Kurt L. Sylvan
3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55
Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55
Matthew McGrath
Suspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66
Jane Friedman
4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79
There Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79
Susanna Rinard
There Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81
Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen
Reply to and Kelly and Cohen 93
Susanna Rinard
5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103
Introductions and Stage-Setting 103
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
A Permissive Notion of Rationality 105
Miriam Schoenfield
We Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Is the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116
Miriam Schoenfield
A Final Plea for Impermissivism 121
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Some Final Thoughts 123
Miriam Schoenfield
Permissivism and Metaepistemology 124
Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield
6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127
Evidence Is Seemings 127
Michael Huemer
Evidence Is Not Seemings 134
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142
Michael Huemer
Preservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151
Knowing Can Include Luck 151
Stephen Hetherington
There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159
Duncan Pritchard
On Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169
Stephen Hetherington
Reply to Hetherington 171
Duncan Pritchard
8 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175
Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175
Timothy Williamson
The Significance of A Priori Justification 183
Paul Boghossian
Response to Boghossian 191
Timothy Williamson
Reply to Williamson 194
Paul Boghossian
9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201
How to Use Thought Experiments 201
Elijah Chudnoff
A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209
Wesley Buckwalter
How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218
Elijah Chudnoff
Thinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222
Wesley Buckwalter
10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229
Credences Are Degrees of Belief 229
Roger Clarke
Is Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237
Julia Staffel
Two in the Model, One in the Head 247
Roger Clarke
11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253
Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253
Alex Worsnip
Epistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263
J. Adam Carter
A Brief Reply to Carter 274
Alex Worsnip
12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279
A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279
Elizabeth Fricker
Anti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290
Sanford C. Goldberg
Comments on Sanford Goldberg’s “Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony” 300
Elizabeth Fricker
Comments on Elizabeth Fricker’s “A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony” 301
Sanford C. Goldberg
13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305
Skepticism Is Common Sense 305
Allan Hazlett
Skepticism Is Not Common Sense 311
Krista Lawlor
Reply to Lawlor 318
Allan Hazlett
Reply to Hazlett 323
Krista Lawlor
14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329
Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329
Matthew A. Benton
Knowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339
Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Index 355
| Erscheinungsdatum | 12.03.2024 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Contemporary Debates in Philosophy |
| Verlagsort | Hoboken |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 175 x 249 mm |
| Gewicht | 544 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| ISBN-10 | 1-119-75544-1 / 1119755441 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-119-75544-9 / 9781119755449 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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