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Why We Doubt

A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations
Buch | Hardcover
304 Seiten
2023
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-887196-5 (ISBN)
CHF 125,65 inkl. MwSt
N. Ángel Pinillos explores what is going on in our minds when we experience skeptical doubt. He suggests that there is a hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations; he gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of this rule; and he suggests that it may also lie behind certain pathologies.
This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, he shows how we can give a new response to the traditional problem of global skepticism. He also argues that philosophical skepticism is not just something that comes up during philosophical reflection, as David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce and other philosophers have urged. Instead, it is of great practical significance. The rule which produces skepticism may itself be operative in certain pathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, in creative endeavors, and in conspiratorial thinking. The rule can also explain some of our reluctance to trust statistical evidence, especially in legal settings. More broadly, this volume aims to breathe new life into a classic problem in philosophy by tackling it from a new perspective and exploring new areas of application. The book will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists and anyone interested in the human capacity to doubt and to question our beliefs.

N. Ángel Pinillos is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University in Tempe, AZ. He earned a BS in Mathematics from Tufts University and a PhD in Philosophy from Rutgers University. He has authored numerous scholarly articles on cognitive science and epistemology as well as on the philosophy of language. Pinillos has presented his work in over a dozen countries and has also written for public venues, including the New York Times.

Introduction and Book Summary
Part I: Skeptical Tension
1: The Need for an Explanation
Part II: The Positive Account
2: The Skeptical Rule
3: Broad Function (Part 1)
4: Broad Function (Part 2)
5: Narrow Function
Part III: Applications
6: Solving the Skeptical Paradox
7: Skepticism in Society
8: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
9: Varieties of Doubt
Part IB: Competing Views and Objections
10: Philosophically Accommodating Accounts
11: Psychological Accounts
12: Objections to Sensitivity
Bibliography

Erscheinungsdatum
Verlagsort Oxford
Sprache englisch
Maße 164 x 242 mm
Gewicht 616 g
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie
Geisteswissenschaften Psychologie Verhaltenstherapie
ISBN-10 0-19-887196-1 / 0198871961
ISBN-13 978-0-19-887196-5 / 9780198871965
Zustand Neuware
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