Epistemic Defeat
A Treatment of Defeat as an Independent Phenomenon
Seiten
2023
De Gruyter (Verlag)
978-3-11-126999-3 (ISBN)
De Gruyter (Verlag)
978-3-11-126999-3 (ISBN)
lt;p>This series is devoted to publishing books in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. It is an outstanding platform for state of the art contributions. The studies are carried out in an argumentative style and advance current debates in a significant manner. While the main publication language is English, we also welcome German language submissions. All books are peer-reviewed.
lt;p>A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat-when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.
lt;p>A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat-when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.
Jan Constantin, University of Cologne, Cologne.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 28.04.2023 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Epistemic Studies ; 47 |
| Zusatzinfo | 2 b/w tbl. |
| Verlagsort | Berlin/Boston |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 155 x 230 mm |
| Gewicht | 601 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie der Neuzeit | |
| Schlagworte | Disagreement • Epistemic defeat • epistemic justification • epistemische Niederlage • epistemische Rechtfertigung • Uneinigkeit |
| ISBN-10 | 3-11-126999-X / 311126999X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-11-126999-3 / 9783111269993 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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