The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism

Neuroethics and Seeming States

Hossein Dabbagh (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

264 Seiten

2024
Bloomsbury Academic (Verlag)
978-1-350-29761-6 (ISBN)

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Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.

His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.

Hossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: Mind

1. Philosophical Intuition’s Mental Ontology

2. Moral Intuition’s Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition

3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence

Part II: Epistemology

4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s Ideas

5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism

Part III: Neuroethics

6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists’ Position

7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s Position

Afterword

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Erscheinungsdatum	02.12.2022
Verlagsort	London
Sprache	englisch
Maße	156 x 234 mm
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik
ISBN-10	1-350-29761-5 / 1350297615
ISBN-13	978-1-350-29761-6 / 9781350297616
Zustand	Neuware