Individual Strategy and Social Structure (eBook)

An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions

Hobart Peyton Young (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2020
208 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-21425-2 (ISBN)

Infos

Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 23.6.2020
• Zusatzinfo: 43 line illus., 1 table
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Unternehmensführung / Management
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Finanzwissenschaft
• Schlagworte: Adaptive Learning • aggregate behavior • Aggregate pattern • Almost surely • alternating offers model • Approximation Theory • Bargaining • Bargaining Problem • basin of attraction • Bayesian • Blume, Larry • Calculation • Chicken Game • Common knowledge (logic) • Computation • Conditional probability distribution • connectedness • Consideration • Coordination game • Cost curve • Cross-Sectional Data • Cumulative distribution function • Currency • Customer • customer base • Decision-Making • Decision problem • Decision Theory • Diagram (category theory) • Disequilibrium • Empirical distribution function • ergodic process • estimation • Etiquette • Expected utility hypothesis • Extensive-form game • fashion game • finite improvement path • Forecasting • Frequency distribution • Games and Economic Behavior • Gibbs distribution • Hofbauer, Josef • human behavior • Hurkens, Sjaak • Incentive • Initial Condition • Institution • Institutional Economics • Interaction (statistics) • interpersonal comparisons • Inverse demand function • Kandori, Michihiro • Kreps, David • learning rule • Levine, David • Likelihood Function • Lipschitz continuity • local conformity • Location model • Lyapunov function • Malouf, Michael • Markov Chain • Markov process • marriage game • mode of a distribution • Nash Equilibrium • Nash, John • network effect • noise models • Outcome (game theory) • Owen, Guillermo • Pareto Efficiency • Payoffs • Poisson Point Process • Population proportion • Potential Game • Precedent • Prediction • Predictive Modelling • Preference (economics) • principal-agent relationship • Prisoner's dilemma • Probability • Probability Distribution • proposal game • Punctuated equilibrium • Qualitative property • Quantity • Random Variable • Rational Choice Theory • Reinforcement • Reinforcement Learning • Representative Agent • result • risk factor • roles in a game • Rounding • Sample Size • Scale In • Schumpeter, Joseph • Significant figures • Social behavior • Social capital • Social equilibrium • Social Structure • solution concept • Special case • State Space • stationary distribution • stochastic • stochastic approximation • Strategy • Strategy (game theory) • Subgame Perfect Equilibrium • subsequence • Subset • successor state • Systems Theory • Theorem • theory • The Product Space • The Use of Knowledge in Society • transaction cost • Unit price • Utility • Value (economics) • Vector field • With high probability
• ISBN-10: 0-691-21425-5 / 0691214255
• ISBN-13: 978-0-691-21425-2 / 9780691214252