Transcendental Arguments
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-926156-7 (ISBN)
Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examination of transcendental arguments. This is the philosophical method of arguing that what is doubted or denied by the opponent must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought.
The line-up of contributors features leading figures in the field from both sides of the Atlantic; they discuss the nature of transcendental arguments, and consider their role and value. In particular, they consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems. The editor's introduction provides historical context and philosophical orientation for the discussions.
This is the first major appraisal of transcendental arguments since the 1970s; they have continued to play a significant role in philosophy, and recent developments in epistemology and metaphysics have raised new questions and challenges for them. Transcendental Arguments will be essential reading for anyone interested in this area of philosophy, and the starting-point for future work.
1. Introduction ; 2. Induction and Transcendental Argument ; 3. Kant and the Problem of Induction: A Reply to Walker ; 4. On Kant's Response to Hume: The Second Analogy as Transcendental Argument ; 5. Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality: A Reply to Stern ; 6. Self-Directed Transcendental Arguments ; 7. Transcendental Arguments, Reason, and Scepticism: Contemporary Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantianism ; 8. From Kant to Fichte: A Reply to Franks ; 9. The Goal of Transcendental Arguments ; 10. Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts: A Reply to Stroud ; 11. Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalist Anti-Realism ; 12. Causation and Subjectivity ; 13. Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism ; 14. Content Externalism and Cartesian Scepticism: A Reply to Brueckner ; 15. Conative Transcendental Arguments and the Question Whether There Can Be External Reasons ; References ; Bibliography ; Index
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 1.2.2003 |
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Reihe/Serie | Mind Association Occasional Series |
Verlagsort | Oxford |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 157 x 233 mm |
Gewicht | 495 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik | |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-926156-3 / 0199261563 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-926156-7 / 9780199261567 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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