Für diesen Artikel ist leider kein Bild verfügbar.

Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

Inference, Testimony and Memory

Federico Luzzi (Autor)

Buch | Hardcover

210 Seiten

2019
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-108-49191-4 (ISBN)

Artikel merken

This is the first monograph devoted to the topic of knowledge from non-knowledge, arguing against the widespread view that knowledge of a conclusion without knowledge of essential premises is impossible. The book provides state-of-the-art discussion of memory, testimony and inference and will interest anyone working in contemporary epistemology.

According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible - that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.

Federico Luzzi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.

1. Knowledge from knowledge; 1.1 The default view; 1.2 Knowledge counter-closure; 1.3 A schema for KCC failures; 2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy; 2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF; 2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge; 2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy; 2.7. Schnee on KFF; 2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood; 2.9 Conclusion; 3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction; 3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge; 3.3. Agoraphobia; 3.4 The breadth of the challenge; 3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism; 3.6 Birthday; 3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism; 3.8 Coral; 3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?; 3.10 Conclusion; 4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?; 4.3 Replacing KCC; 4.4 Murphy on justification and belief; 4.5 Denying KCC: costs?; 4.6 Multi-premise inference; 4.7 Conclusion; 5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry; 5.4 Second-hand knowledge; 5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.6 Conclusion; 6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS; 6.3 Señor's objections; 6.4 Factual-defeater-based case; 7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory; 7.2 Conclusion.

Erscheinungsdatum	01.08.2019
Zusatzinfo	Worked examples or Exercises
Verlagsort	Cambridge
Sprache	englisch
Maße	157 x 234 mm
Gewicht	430 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Geschichte
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie
ISBN-10	1-108-49191-X / 110849191X
ISBN-13	978-1-108-49191-4 / 9781108491914
Zustand	Neuware