Explaining Knowledge

New Essays on the Gettier Problem

Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, Peter D. Klein (Herausgeber)

Buch | Hardcover

432 Seiten

2017
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-872455-1 (ISBN)

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The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

The Gettier Problem has shaped most of the fundamental debates in epistemology for more than fifty years. Before Edmund Gettier published his famous 1963 paper, it was generally presumed that knowledge was equivalent to true belief supported by adequate evidence. Gettier presented a powerful challenge to that presumption. This led to the development and refinement of many prominent epistemological theories, for example, defeasibility theories, causal theories, conclusive-reasons theories, tracking theories, epistemic virtue theories, and knowledge-first theories. The debate about the appropriate use of intuition to provide evidence in all areas of philosophy began as a debate about the epistemic status of the 'Gettier intuition'. The differing accounts of epistemic luck are all rooted in responses to the Gettier Problem. The discussions about the role of false beliefs in the production of knowledge are directly traceable to Gettier's paper, as are the debates between fallibilists and infallibilists. Indeed, it is fair to say that providing a satisfactory response to the Gettier Problem has become a litmus test of any adequate account of knowledge even those accounts that hold that the Gettier Problem rests on mistakes of various sorts. This volume presents a collection of essays by twenty-six experts, including some of the most influential philosophers of our time, on the various issues that arise from Gettier's challenge to the analysis of knowledge. Explaining Knowledge sets the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Rodrigo Borges is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Claudio de Almeida is Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Peter D. Klein is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.

Preface
Introduction
Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
I: Solving the Gettier Problem
1: E. J. Coffman: Gettiered Belief
2: Peter D. Klein: The Nature of Knowledge
3: Duncan Pritchard: Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem
4: Susanna Schellenberg: Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases
5: Robert K. Shope: Chained to the Gettier Problem-a Useful Falsehood?
6: Jonathan Vogel: Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge
II: The Gettier Legacy
7: Risto Hilpinen: Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier
8: John L. Kvanvig: Lessons from Gettier
9: Keith Lehrer: Defeasible Reasoning and Representation: The Lesson of Gettier
10: Linda Zagzebski: The Lesson of Gettier
III: Gettier and Philosophical Methodology
11: Jessica Brown: The Gettier Case and Intuition
12: Alvin Goldman: Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition
13: Ernest Sosa: The Metaphysical Gettier Problem and the X-Phi Critique
14: Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter, and John Turri: Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy
15: Jonathan M. Weinberg: Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-fitting: A Methodological Argument for JTB?
IV: Gettier and Inferential Knowledge
16: Rodrigo Borges: Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture
17: Claudio de Almeida: Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem
18: Branden Fitelson: Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge
19: John Hawthorne and Dani Rabinowitz: Knowledge and False Belief
V: Dissolving the Gettier Problem
20: Fred Dretske: Golden Gettier: What We (Should Have) Learned
21: Richard Foley: The Value of Knowledge and the Gettier Game
22: Stephen Hetherington: Gettier Cases: Transworld Identity and Counterparts
23: Sherrilyn Roush: The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding

Erscheinungsdatum	01.12.2017
Verlagsort	Oxford
Sprache	englisch
Maße	165 x 241 mm
Gewicht	804 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
ISBN-10	0-19-872455-1 / 0198724551
ISBN-13	978-0-19-872455-1 / 9780198724551
Zustand	Neuware