Epistemic Modality

Andy Egan, Brian Weatherson (Herausgeber)

Buch | Softcover

352 Seiten

2011
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-959158-9 (ISBN)

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There is a lot that we don't know. That means there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. What are these epistemic possibilities? How do we understand the semantics of epistemic modals? Ten new essays explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.

There is a lot that we don't know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don't know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. What are these epistemic possibilities? They do not match up with metaphysical possibilities - there are various cases where something is epistemically possible but not metaphysically possible, and vice versa. How do we understand the semantics of statements of epistemic modality? The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.

Andy Egan is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University in New Brunswick. He grew up in Madison, Wisconsin. He received his BA from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, an MA from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has held positions at Western Washington University, the Australian National University, and the University of Michigan. Brian Weatherson is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published on a wide range of topics in philosophy, including decision theory, epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and aesthetics.

1. Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality ; 2. Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two-Space-ism vs. One-Space-ism ; 3. The Nature of Epistemic Space ; 4. Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions ; 5. Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals ; 6. 'Might' Made Right ; 7. Perspectives on Possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or What? ; 8. Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive ; 9. Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modals ; 10. How Not to Theorize about the Language of Subjective Uncertainty ; 11. A Problem about Permission and Possibility

Erscheint lt. Verlag	23.6.2011
Zusatzinfo	16 illustrations
Verlagsort	Oxford
Sprache	englisch
Maße	158 x 228 mm
Gewicht	543 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Sprachwissenschaft
ISBN-10	0-19-959158-X / 019959158X
ISBN-13	978-0-19-959158-9 / 9780199591589
Zustand	Neuware