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Truth and Its Nature (if Any) -

Truth and Its Nature (if Any)

J. Peregrin (Herausgeber)

Buch | Softcover
221 Seiten
2010 | Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1999
Springer (Verlag)
978-90-481-5280-3 (ISBN)
CHF 149,75 inkl. MwSt
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The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition (or explication) of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski's famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising 'by-product' of Tarski's effort to bring truth under control was the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non­ trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language . This implied that truth (and consequently semantic concepts to which truth appeared to be reducible) proved itself to be strangely 'language-dependent': we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine (1969, p. 68) put it, that truth belongs to "transcendental metaphysics", and Tarski's 'scientific' investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some more traditional philosophical views on truth. 3. TARSKI'S THEORY AS A PARADIGM So far Tarski himself. Subsequent philosophers then had to find out what his considerations of the concept of truth really mean and what are their consequences; and this now seems to be an almost interminable task.

I. Past Masters on Truth.- Frege: Assertion, Truth and Meaning.- Carnap, Syntax, and Truth.- James’s Conception of Truth.- II. Tarski and Correspondence.- Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory.- Truth, Correspondence, Satisfaction.- Do We Need Correspondence Truth?.- Tarskian Truth as Correspondence — Replies to Some Objections.- III. The Substantiality of Truth.- The Centrality of Truth.- Mapping the Structure of Truth: Davidson Contra Rorty.- The Explanatory Value of Truth Theoriesembodying the Semantic Conception.- Negative Truth and Knowledge.- IV. The Insubstantiality of Truth: The Pros and Cons of Deflationism.- Deflationary Truth, Aboutness and Meaning.- The Substance of Deflation.- Does the Strategy of Austerity Work?.- Rethinking the Concept of Truth: A Critique of Deflationism.

Erscheint lt. Verlag 15.12.2010
Reihe/Serie Synthese Library ; 284
Zusatzinfo XVIII, 221 p.
Verlagsort Dordrecht
Sprache englisch
Maße 155 x 235 mm
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Philosophie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Logik
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Neuzeit
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
Geisteswissenschaften Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaft
ISBN-10 90-481-5280-1 / 9048152801
ISBN-13 978-90-481-5280-3 / 9789048152803
Zustand Neuware
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