Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil
Asia's Banking Crisis
Seiten
2009
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-10743-3 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-10743-3 (ISBN)
This book focuses on the role of miscommunication in the financial crises of developing nations. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997–8, it demonstrates why developing democracies are vulnerable to breakdowns in communication and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns.
In a world where capital moves freely across national borders, developing countries have increasingly been subjected to devastating financial crises caused by the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital. How do such crises come about? This book focuses on a novel causal path: that of miscommunication. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997–8, it demonstrates why developing democracies are exceptionally vulnerable to breakdowns in communication between financial officials and the chief executive and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns. The book offers a framework for predicting where chief executives are most likely to be ill informed about critical economic variables. It also considers those situations in which politicians are dependent on financial officials whom they cannot completely trust or in which multiple veto players damage the flow of information.
In a world where capital moves freely across national borders, developing countries have increasingly been subjected to devastating financial crises caused by the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital. How do such crises come about? This book focuses on a novel causal path: that of miscommunication. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997–8, it demonstrates why developing democracies are exceptionally vulnerable to breakdowns in communication between financial officials and the chief executive and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns. The book offers a framework for predicting where chief executives are most likely to be ill informed about critical economic variables. It also considers those situations in which politicians are dependent on financial officials whom they cannot completely trust or in which multiple veto players damage the flow of information.
Shanker Satyanath is currently as Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. He received his Masters in Management from Northwestern University and his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, New York.
1. Introduction; 2. Bank regulation in the debate over capital flow liberalization; 3. The signaling argument; 4. Incredible signaling in democracies: the cases of Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines; 5. Unorthodox solutions to the signaling problem: the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia; 6. Orthodox solutions to the signaling problem: the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong; 7. Some concluding remarks.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 2.4.2009 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| Zusatzinfo | 11 Tables, unspecified; 3 Line drawings, unspecified |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 270 g |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Spezielle Soziologien | |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-10743-1 / 0521107431 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-10743-3 / 9780521107433 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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