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Construction Microeconomics - Christian Brockmann

Construction Microeconomics

Buch | Hardcover
416 Seiten
2023
Wiley-Blackwell (Verlag)
978-1-119-82878-5 (ISBN)
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CONSTRUCTION MICROECONOMICS Unique and comprehensive reference describing microeconomic approaches, theories, and models adapted to and developed for the construction industry

Construction Microeconomics provides comprehensive coverage of microeconomics applied to the construction industry, focusing on construction clients, who initiate construction projects, and on contractors who transform the ideas and plans of clients into infrastructure and buildings. With the help of microeconomic theory, it tries to answer questions about decision-making by clients, contractors, and governments with respect to projects in the built environment. It includes discussions of alternative theories to mainstream microeconomics, such as new institutional economics, behavioral economics, and the capability approach. Applications from the construction sector including land supply, sustainability, industrialization, and lean construction are provided to ground the theory in practical construction.

In Construction Microeconomics, readers will learn:



How microeconomic theory relies heavily on assumptions for modeling and the nuances of adjusting those assumptions
How heterogenous contract goods affect supply and demand, markets, information, technology, and accordingly, the theories of contractors and owners
How interaction influences the production process and how land as a production factor changes the production function
How ex-ante costs determine the cost theory of the contractor and why contracting is more akin to the service sector than the goods sector

Advanced undergraduate and masters students, lecturers and academics in ­construction and related disciplines, and professionals in the construction industry looking for expert analysis into a unique facet of the field will find Construction Microeconomics to be a valuable, complete, and authoritative reference on the subject.

Christian Brockmann is Professor (Lecturer) of Construction Engineering at the University of Utah, USA. He holds a PhD in construction management from ETH Zurich (Switzerland) and a PhD in Economics from TU Freiberg (Germany). With over 20 years’ experience in the management of major infrastructure projects as a contractor and consultant, Christian was Project Director for the BangNa Expressway in Thailand and the Port Said Tunnels in Egypt, (both $2b+ projects), and was part of the Owner’s Project Management Team for the Qatar Integrated Railway Project (a $40b+ project).

Foreword by Gerard de Valence xix

Preface xxi

References xxvi

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Navigating the Maze of Economic Literature 2

1.1.1 Economics 2

1.1.2 Microeconomics 3

1.1.3 Macroeconomics 4

1.1.4 Construction Economics 4

1.2 Tools and Presentations 5

1.2.1 Definitions 5

1.2.2 Economic Scholars 6

1.2.3 Assumptions 6

1.2.4 Case Studies 6

1.2.5 Observations 7

1.2.6 Summaries 7

1.3 Methodological Approach 8

1.3.1 Laws and Regularities 8

1.3.2 Focus and Goals 11

1.3.3 Descriptive and Normative Economics 12

1.4 Theoretical Background 13

1.4.1 Industrial Economics 13 

1.4.2 New Institutional Economics 14

1.4.3 Game Theory 15

1.4.4 Auction Theory 16

1.4.5 Behavioral Economics 16

1.4.6 Economics of Information 17

1.4.7 Law and Economics 17

1.5 What You Can and Cannot Expect 17

1.6 Audience 19

1.6.1 Students 19

1.6.2 Lecturers 19 1.6.3 Academics 19

1.6.4 Contractors 19

1.6.5 Owners 20

1.6.6 Policymakers 20

1.7 Structure of the Text 20

1.7.1 Basic Economic Principles 20

1.7.2 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21

1.7.3 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21

1.7.4 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21

1.7.5 Imperfect Markets 22

1.7.6 Factor Markets 22

1.7.7 Information, Risk, and Uncertainty 22

1.7.8 Game Theory and Auctions 23

1.7.9 Construction Sector 23

1.7.10 Theory of the Owner 23

1.7.11 Theory of the Contractor 24

1.7.12 Construction Goods 24

1.7.13 Construction Markets 24

1.7.14 Contracting 25

1.7.15 Market Imperfections 25

1.7.16 Government 25

1.7.17 Public Construction Goods 26

1.7.18 Conclusion 26

1.7.19 Synopsis 26

References 27

Part I Microeconomics 31

2 Basic Economic Principles 33

2.1 Consensual Ideas 35

2.2 Scarcity and Choice 36

2.3 Decision-Making 39

2.3.1 Opportunity Costs 39

2.3.2 Incentives 40

2.3.3 Marginal Decisions 41

2.4 Markets 41

2.5 Trade and Comparative Advantage 44  

2.6 Government 47

References 48

3 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 51

3.1 Perfectly Competitive Markets 53

3.2 Consumer Behavior 55

3.2.1 Budget Constraint 55

3.2.2 Preferences and Utility Functions 56

3.2.3 Utility Maximization 60

3.3 Demand Curve 62

3.4 Further Reading 64

References 65

4 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 67

4.1 Producer Behavior 68

4.2 Production Theory 70

4.2.1 Technology 71

4.2.2 Production Functions 75

4.2.2.1 Classical Production Function 77

4.2.2.2 Neoclassical Production Function 79

4.2.2.3 Limitational Production Function 82

4.2.2.4 Technological Change (Innovation) and Learning 83

4.3 Cost Theory 85

4.3.1 Cost Curves for Classical Production Functions 86

4.3.2 Cost Curves for Neoclassical Production Functions 88

4.3.3 Cost Curves for Limitational Production Functions 89

4.3.4 Simplified Cost Function with Constantly Increasing Variable Costs 89

4.3.5 Long-Run Cost Curves 91

4.4 Supply Curve 92

4.4.1 Short-Run Supply Curve of a Firm 92

4.4.2 Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm 94

4.4.3 Market Supply Curve 94

References 95

5 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets 97

5.1 Equilibrium Price and Quantity 99

5.2 Comparative Statics 101

5.3 Elasticities of Demand and Supply 102

5.4 Consumer and Producer Surplus 106

5.5 Time-Dependent Supply Curves and Market Outcomes 107

5.5.1 Very-Short-Run Supply Curve 108

5.5.2 Short-Run Supply Curve 108

5.5.3 Long-Run Supply Curve 109

5.6 Welfare 110

5.7 Efficiency and Equity 112

References 113

6 Imperfect Markets 115

6.1 Monopoly 117

6.1.1 Normal Monopolies 118

6.1.2 Natural Monopolies 120

6.2 Monopolistic Competition 121

6.3 Monopsony 124

6.4 Oligopoly 125

References 126

7 Factor Markets 129

7.1 Factor Supply of Households 131

7.1.1 Labor Supply 131

7.1.2 Capital Supply 133

7.2 Factor Demand of Firms 135

7.3 Demand and Supply on Factor Markets 137

References 137

8 Uncertainty, Risk, and Information 139

8.1 Uncertainty and Risk 140

8.1.1 Risk Attitudes 141

8.1.2 Risk Strategies 142

8.1.3 Transaction Cost Theory 144

8.2 Information 146

8.2.1 Satisficing Model of Decision-Making 146

8.2.2 Asymmetric Information 149

8.2.2.1 Principal–Agent Theory 149

8.2.2.2 Market Breakdown Due to Asymmetric Information 149

8.2.2.3 Hidden Characteristics and Adverse Selection 150

8.2.2.4 Hidden Intentions and Holdup 151

8.2.2.5 Hidden Action and Moral Hazard 152

8.2.3 Property Rights Theory 153

References 153

9 Game Theory and Auctions 155

9.1 Game Theory 156

9.1.1 Basics of Game Theory 157

9.1.2 Static Games with Complete Information 159

9.1.3 Dynamic Games with Complete Information 160

9.2 Auctions 161

9.2.1 Basics of Auctions 161

9.2.2 English and Vickrey Auctions 163

9.2.3 Dutch Auctions and Sealed-Bid Auctions 164

9.2.4 Competitive Bidding 164

References 167

Part II Applied Construction Microeconomics 169

10 Construction Sector 171

10.1 Definition 172

10.2 Economic Contribution 174

10.2.1 Value-Added Concept 174

10.2.2 Investment Concept 176

10.2.3 Multiplier Concept 177

10.3 Actors in the Construction Sector 179

10.3.1 Market Demand 181

10.3.2 Market Supply 183

10.4 Summary of the Construction Sector 185

References 186

11 Theory of the Owner 189

11.1 The Owner as an Entity 190

11.1.1 Terminology 190

11.1.2 Images and Prejudices 191

11.1.3 Organization 192

11.2 Tasks of the Owner 194

11.3 Behavior of the Owner 195

11.3.1 Consumers Buying Construction Goods 195

11.3.2 Producers Buying Construction Goods 196

11.4 Information of the Owner 197

11.5 Developing a Contract 198

11.6 Procurement of a Contractor 199

11.7 Supervision of the Construction Process 202

11.8 Summary 203

References 203

12 Theory of the Contractor 205

12.1 The Contractor as an Entity 205

12.1.1 Cooperation 206

12.1.2 Organization 207

12.2 Tasks of the Contractor 208

12.3 Behavior of the Contractor 209

12.3.1 Strategy 211

12.3.2 Legal Organization 212

12.3.3 Growth of the Firm 214

12.4 Information of the Contractor 215

12.5 Bidding 216

12.6 Contractor Pricing 217

12.7 Production 220

12.7.1 General Characteristics 220

12.7.2 Production Determinants 222

12.7.2.1 Production Line, Work Shop, Site Construction, Parallel, or Variable Production 222

12.7.2.2 Automatization 224

12.7.2.3 Mass or Single-Item Production 225

12.7.2.4 Continuous and Discontinuous Production 225

12.7.2.5 Summary of Production Types 226

12.7.3 Production Functions and Cost Curves 228

12.7.4 Production Decisions 233

12.8 Summary 234

References 234

13 Construction Goods 237

13.1 Goods and Services 237

13.1.1 Heterogeneity 238

13.1.2 Construction Goods as Transitional Performance Bundles 240

13.1.3 Construction Goods as Contract Goods 242

13.1.4 Construction Goods as Investment 244

13.1.5 Construction Goods as Services 244

13.1.6 Summary of the Characteristics of Construction Goods 246

13.2 Typology of Construction Goods 247

13.2.1 Approach to Developing a Typology 248

13.2.2 Conceptualization 248

13.2.2.1 Choice of Dimensions 249

13.2.2.2 Typical Cases 250

13.2.2.3 Typology 250

13.2.3 Applications 253

13.2.3.1 Market Entry 253

13.2.3.2 Optimum Firm Size 253

13.2.3.3 Strategic Planning 255

13.3 Summary 256

References 256

14 Construction Markets 259

14.1 Characteristics of Markets 259

14.2 Particularities of Construction Markets 261

14.2.1 Goods 261

14.2.2 Owners 262

14.2.3 Markets 262

14.2.4 Summary 263

14.3 Analysis of Construction Markets 263

14.3.1 Heterogeneity 265

14.3.1.1 Observation 266

14.3.1.2 Theory 266

14.3.1.3 Organization 266

14.3.1.4 Structure 266

14.3.1.5 Specialization 267

14.3.1.6 Law 267

14.4 Owners 268

14.5 Contractors 268

14.5.1 Supply 268

14.5.2 Information 269

14.6 Geography of Construction Markets 270

14.6.1 Regional Markets 271

14.6.2 National Markets 274

14.6.3 International Markets 279

14.6.4 Multinational Markets 280

14.6.5 Global Players and Global Markets 283

14.7 Entry and Exit Barriers 285

14.7.1 Effects of the Business Cycle 286

14.7.2 Number of Exits and Entries 290

14.8 Summary 292

References 293

15 Contracting 297

15.1 Construction Goods 298

15.2 Construction Markets 300

15.3 Owner’s Demand 301

15.4 Contractor’s Supply 302

15.5 Construction Contracts 303

15.6 Contracting Market Design 305

15.7 Pricing of Construction Contracts 307

15.7.1 Marginal Cost Decisions Versus Markup Pricing 308

15.7.2 Auctioning 310

15.7.2.1 Construction Goods and Auctions 310

15.7.2.2 Auction Designs 312

15.7.3 Sealed-Bid Auctions 315

15.7.3.1 Pricing in Sealed-Bid Auctions 316

15.7.3.2 Pricing bias 316

15.7.3.3 Information Bias 317

15.7.3.4 Uncertainty Bias 318

15.7.3.5 Technology Advance 319

15.8 Supply and Demand in Construction 319

15.9 The Owner as Monopsonist 320

15.10 Bargaining for the Contract Price 322

15.11 Change Orders and Claims 325

15.12 Summary 326

References 327

16 Market Imperfections 329

16.1 Imperfect Information 329

16.2 Externalities 331

16.3 Collusion and Corruption 334

16.3.1 Collusion 334

16.3.1.1 Naturally Caused Collusion 336

16.3.1.2 Artificially Caused Collusion 337

16.3.2 Corruption 338

16.4 Mechanics or Ethics of Collusion 340

16.5 Conclusion 341

References 342

17 Government 343

17.1 Government as Actor on Markets 344

17.2 Taxes and Subsidies 346

17.3 Regulations 348

17.4 Interest Rates 350

17.5 Inflation 353 References 354

18 Public Goods 355

18.1 Characteristics of Private Goods 356

18.1.1 Rivalry 357

18.1.2 Excludability 358

18.2 Theory of Public Goods 359

18.2.1 Demand of a Public Good Based on Utility 360

18.2.2 Demand for a Public Good Based on Willingness to Pay 361

18.3 Free Riding 362

18.4 Cost–Benefit Analysis 363

18.5 Construction Goods as Public Goods 363

18.6 Strategic Misrepresentation and Optimism Bias 364

References 365

19 Conclusion 367

19.1 Methodical Context 367

19.2 Owners 369

19.3 Contractors 370

19.4 Construction Goods 371

19.5 Construction Markets 371

19.6 Contracting 373

References 374

Index 375

Erscheinungsdatum
Verlagsort Hoboken
Sprache englisch
Maße 170 x 244 mm
Gewicht 851 g
Themenwelt Technik Bauwesen
Wirtschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre Mikroökonomie
ISBN-10 1-119-82878-3 / 1119828783
ISBN-13 978-1-119-82878-5 / 9781119828785
Zustand Neuware
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