Incentives
Motivation and the Economics of Information
Seiten
1995
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-47264-7 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-47264-7 (ISBN)
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This book investigates situations in which incentives, contracts or other economic devices can be employed to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from being institutionally- or self-defeating. Campbell's treatment of the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory is suitable for single-variable calculus and microeconomic theory students.
This book investigates situations in which incentives, contracts or other economic devices can be employed in a wide range of settings to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from being institutionally- or self-defeating, including the operation of insurance markets, voting, auctions, general resource allocation, public goods, labor markets, higher education, the savings-and-loan crisis, and managers' and shareholders' behavior. Professor Campbell's treatment of these issues in the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory may be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and microeconomic theory. Readers learn by working carefully through examples to grasp economic principles, rather than by following proofs of general theorems. Upper-level undergraduates, master's-level students, and graduate students seeking supplementary reading in practice-oriented economic theory will find the material particularly useful.
This book investigates situations in which incentives, contracts or other economic devices can be employed in a wide range of settings to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from being institutionally- or self-defeating, including the operation of insurance markets, voting, auctions, general resource allocation, public goods, labor markets, higher education, the savings-and-loan crisis, and managers' and shareholders' behavior. Professor Campbell's treatment of these issues in the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory may be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and microeconomic theory. Readers learn by working carefully through examples to grasp economic principles, rather than by following proofs of general theorems. Upper-level undergraduates, master's-level students, and graduate students seeking supplementary reading in practice-oriented economic theory will find the material particularly useful.
1. Introduction; 2. Hidden action; 3. Hidden characteristics; 4. Reputation; 5. Resource allocation: private goods; 6. Resource allocation: public goods; 7. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; 8. Incentives, efficiency, and social cost.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 25.8.1995 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | 6 Tables, unspecified; 37 Line drawings, unspecified |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 185 x 260 mm |
| Gewicht | 857 g |
| Themenwelt | Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-47264-4 / 0521472644 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-47264-7 / 9780521472647 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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