Venture Capital.

The Impact of Asymmetric Information on Optimal Investments, Learning and Exit Outcomes.

Julius Tennert (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

152 Seiten

2019
Verlag Wissenschaft & Praxis
978-3-89673-753-3 (ISBN)

Infos

This book analyzes the VC's role as a monitoring agent and a certifying agent in the relationship with the entrepreneur. It is focused on the impact of asymmetric information on optimal investments, learning, and exit outcomes in this context.The research results show that agency costs of the VC are time-variant, the information rent earned by the VC in a funding relationship is biased under asymmetric Information and certification by the VC in the exit phase is most important if new investors face high search and screening costs.

Inhalt

1 Introduction

2 Moral Hazard in VC Finance

Introduction – Formal Model – Empirical Approach – Conclusion

3 Learning in Funding Relationships

Introduction – Learning and Comprehensiveness – Frictions in the Learning Process – Formal Hypotheses – Data and Methodology – Results – Conclusion

4 VCs as Intermediaries in Exits

Introduction – Agency Cost in IPO and Trade Sale Exits – Investor Characteristics – Firm Characteristics – Sample and Methodology – Results – Conclusion

5 Conclusion

Summary of the Main Results – Outlook

Bibliography

Produkt-Details

• Erscheinungsdatum: 19.03.2019
• Reihe/Serie: Studienreihe der Stiftung Kreditwirtschaft an der Universität Hohenheim ; 57
• Zusatzinfo: 21 Tab., 12 Abb. (darunter 2 farbige); S. 152, 10 schw.-w. Abb., 2 farb. Abb., 21 schw.-w. Tab.
• Verlagsort: Berlin
• Sprache: englisch
• Maße: 148 x 210 mm
• Gewicht: 239 g
• Themenwelt: Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Spezielle Betriebswirtschaftslehre ► Bankbetriebslehre
• Schlagworte: Agency Cost • Exit Outcome • Funding Relationships • Human Capital • IPO • learning • Moral Hazard • Trade Sale Exit
• ISBN-10: 3-89673-753-8 / 3896737538
• ISBN-13: 978-3-89673-753-3 / 9783896737533
• Zustand: Neuware