The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Seiten
1999
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64164-7 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64164-7 (ISBN)
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. In providing the most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers.
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.
Preface; Introduction: a chance to reconsider; 1. Prudential rationality as expected utility maximization; 2. Decision problems; 3. Savage's theory; 4. Evidential decision theory; 5. Causal decision theory; 6. A general theory of conditional beliefs; 7. A representation theorem for causal decision theory; 8. Where things stand; Notes; References.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 13.4.1999 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 160 x 238 mm |
| Gewicht | 605 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik |
| Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Allgemeines / Lexika | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-64164-0 / 0521641640 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-64164-7 / 9780521641647 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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