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Classics in Game Theory

Buch | Hardcover

328 Seiten

1997
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-01193-6 (ISBN)

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This text assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field of game theory that followed on from the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late-1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; is is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last 15 years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsany, John Nash and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honoured are also included in this volume. The editor, himself a major contributor to game theory, has chosen 18 essays which constitute the core of game theory as it exists today.

Harold W. Kuhn is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Economics at Princeton University and is internationally known for his joint paper with the late Albert W. Tucker that initiated the theory of "nonlinear programming." In 1994, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Prizes, he organized and chaired a historic Nobel Seminar on the work of John Nash in game theory; this seminar is published in Les Prix Nobel 1994 (Almquist & Wicksell, 1994).

Permissions Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games 2 The Bargaining Problem 3 Non-Cooperative Games 4 An Iterative Method of Solving a Game 5 Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form 6 Extensive Games and the Problem and Information 7 A Value for n-Person Games 8 Stochastic Games 9 Recursive Games 10 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments 11 A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy 12 The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games 13 Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders 14 The Core of an n-Person Game 15 Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 16 The Big Match 17 On Market Games 18 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games List of Contributors Index

Erscheint lt. Verlag	23.2.1997
Reihe/Serie	Frontiers of Economic Research
Zusatzinfo	25 line illus. 30 tables
Verlagsort	New Jersey
Sprache	englisch
Maße	197 x 254 mm
Gewicht	482 g
Themenwelt	Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik
	Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik
	Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
	Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre
ISBN-10	0-691-01193-1 / 0691011931
ISBN-13	978-0-691-01193-6 / 9780691011936
Zustand	Neuware