An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-973402-3 (ISBN)
What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game.
A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Tilman Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics.; Daniel Krähmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Universität Bonn, Germany.; Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany.
1. Introduction ; 2. Screening ; 3. Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples ; 4. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: Examples ; 5. Incentive Compatibility ; 6. Bayesian Mechanism Design ; 7. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms ; 8. Non-Transferrable Utility ; 9. Informational Interdependence ; 10. Robust Mechanism Design ; 11. Dynamic Mechanism Design
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 13.8.2015 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 157 x 236 mm |
| Gewicht | 476 g |
| Themenwelt | Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik | |
| Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika | |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Ökonometrie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-973402-X / 019973402X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-973402-3 / 9780199734023 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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