Mathematics and Democracy (eBook)

Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures

Steven J. Brams (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2009
392 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-1-4008-3559-1 (ISBN)

Infos

Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "e;approval voting,"e; which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.

Autor

Steven J. Brams is professor of politics at New York University. He is the author of Theory of Moves, among many other books, and the coauthor of The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody and Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution.

Produkt-Details

• Zusatzinfo: 2 line illus. 19 tables.
• Verlagsort: Princeton
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik
• Themenwelt: Naturwissenschaften ► Physik / Astronomie ► Quantenphysik
• Themenwelt: Naturwissenschaften ► Physik / Astronomie ► Relativitätstheorie
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Technik
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik
• Schlagworte: abstention • Almost surely • America Votes • Approval voting • arbitrariness • Arrow's Impossibility Theorem • At-large • Auction • Backward Induction • Baker v. Carr • ballot • Bargaining Power • birthday problem • Borda Count • Buckley v. Valeo • Calculation • Cardinal utility • Centre-left politics • Centre-right politics • Coalition Government • Competition (economics) • Condorcet method • consociationalism • constitutional amendment • Counting • Cumulative voting • Currency • Deliberation • Direct Democracy • Disapproval voting • Envy-freeness • Extrapolation • fair division • FairVote • Fiscal conservatism • Formateur • Free Soil Party • Full slate • hamming distance • inference • Insider • Instant-runoff voting • Integer Programming • INTRANSITIVITY • Jimmy Carter • Limited voting • Loss Function • Major party • marginal utility • Markov process • Marquis de Condorcet • Mechanism Design • Medium of exchange • minority government • Motion of no confidence • Multi-Party System • Nash Equilibrium • Negative Campaigning • Nonprofit Organization • North American Free Trade Agreement • null hypothesis • obscenity • Open border • Pairwise comparison • Paradox of Voting • Pareto Efficiency • Party System • Peace treaty • Preference Relation • Probability • Probability Theory • proportional representation • p-value • Ralph Nader • Rational Choice Theory • Referendum • Representative Democracy • result • Safe seat • Scoring rule • Simpson's paradox • Sincere voting • Single-member district • Single Transferable Vote • Social Choice and Individual Values • Straight-ticket voting • straw poll • Strong Nash equilibrium • supermajority • Tax • Term limit • Trade-off • two-party system • United States v. Nixon • Voter turnout • Vote trading • Voting • voting system • Weighted voting • weighting
• ISBN-10: 1-4008-3559-3 / 1400835593
• ISBN-13: 978-1-4008-3559-1 / 9781400835591