Verifying Treaty Compliance (eBook)

Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions

Rudolf Avenhaus, Nicholas Kyriakopoulos, Michel Richard, Gotthard Stein (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

2007 | 2006
XIV, 629 Seiten
Springer Berlin (Verlag)
978-3-540-33854-3 (ISBN)

Infos

This book presents an interdisciplinary collection of expert analyses and views of existing verification systems. It provides guidelines and advice for the improvement of those systems as well as for new challenges in the field.

Inhalt

Preface 5
Foreword 7
Acknowledgement 9
Contents 10
Introduction 14
A new perspective 16
Organization of the material 19
Audience 21
I Conceptual Framework 24
Conceptual Framework 25
II Treaties and their Requirements 50
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Treaties: An Ontology of Concepts and Characteristics 51
Non-Proliferation Treaty 53
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 53
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 53
Destruction 53
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 54
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 54
Weapons and on their Destruction 54
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 54
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 54
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 54
(Ottawa Convention) 54
INF and START Treaties 55
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 55
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 55
Treaty on Open Skies 55
Export Control Regimes 56
3.1 Elements of the veri.cation process 56
3.2 Legal experience and practices 57
4.1 Characteristic attributes of the veri.cation process 59
The object of veri.cation 59
The directness of the veri.cation 60
The control strategies 60
The type of reporting 61
The information used in the veri.cation 61
5.1 On-site inspections 62
5.2 Technical Monitoring systems 63
5.3 Veri.cation tools in safeguards 64
5.4 Preparatory technical work 65
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges in Implementation 71
all 73
4.1 State-declared information 75
4.2 Open source information 76
other 76
4.3 Other information 77
5.1 Environmental sampling 78
5.2 Equipment 79
6.1 Approaches, guidelines and procedures 81
6.2 Information technology 81
6.3 Training 82
6.4 Resources 83
only 84
Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention 87
4.1 Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities 100
4.2 Schedule 2 chemicals and facilities 102
4.3 Schedule 3 chemicals and facilities 105
4.4 Other Chemical Production Facilities 106
4.5 Crosscutting issues in inspections in the chemical industry 107
Facility agreements 108
Sampling and analysis 108
Access 109
Biological Weapons Convention 117
1.1 Veri.cation mechanisms within the BWC 119
Article V mechanisms: Consultations 119
Article VI mechanisms 120
1.2 E.orts to strengthen the BWC 120
2.1 Antibodies as diagnostic reagents 125
Hybridoma Technology 125
Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assays (ELISA) 126
2.2 Nucleic Acid Hybridization Techniques 128
2.3 The Polymerase Chain Reaction 130
2.4 Genetic pro.les of microorganisms using molecular typing 133
with nucleotide sequence information 133
2.5 Beyond genomics 134
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Verification 145
3.4 Hydroacoustic monitoring 152
3.5 Infrasound monitoring 153
3.6 Radionuclide monitoring 153
3.7 Radionuclide laboratories 154
4.1 Overview 155
4.2 The global communication infrastructure 155
4.3 International Data analysis and products 155
4.4 Data fusion 156
4.5 Atmospheric transport modelling 156
4.6 National Data Centers 157
5.1 Introduction 158
5.2 Con.dence building measures 158
5.3 Consultation and clari.cation 158
5.4 On–site inspection 159
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 163
1.1 General information 163
1.2 What covers the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty? 165
The symmetrical limitation of the CAEST on an identical level on 166
both sides of the former iron curtain 166
Exchange of information on CAEST 166
Limitation and reduction of the armament stockpiles in Europe 168
Veri.cation 169
2.1 A persisting two-blocks logic 172
2.2 Unilateral withdrawal of the Baltic States 173
2.3 The Wall collapses, the threat disappears, but the 173
Treaty remains 173
3.1 E.ects in the psychological domain 174
3.2 E.ects on volume of the armaments 174
3.3 The adaptation of the CFE Treaty 175
4.1 Updating the POET 177
4.2 Military tourism 178
Developing the Climate Change Regime: The Role of Veri.cation 180
2.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 182
Change 182
2.2 The monitoring and reporting processes4 183
2.3 The review process 187
3.1 The Kyoto Protocol 189
3.2 The monitoring and reporting processes 190
3.3 The compliance system 191
Compliance theory 192
Evolution of the compliance system 192
Kyoto Protocol compliance system 194
3.4 Compliance system problems 196
Legal nature 196
Credibility 197
Problems with uncertainties 197
External Factors 198
Deeper Problems 199
Trade measures 200
4.1 Remote sensing systems 206
5.1 Future climate change regime proposals 209
A long-term target? 209
Types of target33 210
Alternatives to targets 211
Di.erentiation 212
Acknowledgements 215
III Field Experience 219
Experience and Challenges in Weapons of Mass Destruction Treaty Verification: A Comparative View 220
5.1 NPT comprehensive safeguards 224
5.2 Some factors in.uencing the operation 224
of the safeguards system 224
5.3 Major safeguards violations 226
Reprocessing or enrichment experiments at declared (i.e. 226
safeguarded) nuclear sites 226
Reprocessing or enrichment activities at undeclared sites 226
Obstruction of or refusal to cooperate with IAEA inspectors 227
5.4 Implications for safeguards e.ectiveness 227
additional protocol 228
5.5 Strengthening the safeguards system 228
5.6 Integrated safeguards 229
5.7 Detection of undeclared nuclear activities 229
Undeclared activities at declared sites 229
Undeclared nuclear sites 229
5.8 Further steps in strengthening safeguards 230
Enhancing the IAEA’s technical capabilities 230
Increased sharing of information 231
Constraining the spread of proliferation-sensitive nuclear 231
technology 231
6.1 Routine inspections 232
6.2 Challenge inspections 232
7.1 International Monitoring System 233
7.2 On-Site Inspections 234
7.3 E.ectiveness of CTBT veri.cation 234
8.1 Detection of undeclared activities 235
8.2 The problem of non-state actors 236
8.3 How to focus veri.cation e.ort to best e.ect 237
8.4 Transparency of the veri.cation system 237
8.5 Compliance issues 238
undeclared 239
9.1 Centrality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 239
Weapons 239
9.2 E.ectiveness of veri.cation 240
9.3 Multilateral and national collaboration 240
A Concrete Experience: The Iraq Case 242
2.1 The United Nations Security Council mandate 243
2.2 The implementation mode and achievements 244
2.3 93 +2 and the Additional Protocol 245
2.4 Relevance to other veri.cation regimes 246
3.1 Setting up a team 247
Size and composition 247
Time scale and its implications 248
3.2 Field activities 249
3.3 Sources of information and its adequate processing 249
Declarations 250
Original Iraqi documents 250
Field operations results 251
Member State information 251
Other independent Agency collection means 252
Information handling 253
4.1 Patterns of behaviour 254
4.2 The coherent picture of Iraq’s nuclear programme 256
4.3 What is the meaning of ’coherent picture’? 256
4.4 The power of all-sources advanced analysis 258
5.1 When the international community is almost blind 259
Imagery and its limitation 260
Export-Import information analysis 260
Outreach 261
5.2 In the spotlight: inspections under world scrutiny 262
Impatience and distortions of the modern communication world 262
The knowledge management challenge 263
Beyond Iraq: The New Challenges to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime 265
2.1 Awareness of an arms control and non proliferation policy 268
2.2 The milestone of the NPT as the birth of veri.cation 269
2.3 Thirty years of progress in nuclear disarmament, 270
arms control and non-proliferation 270
2.4 Early nineties: multilateral arm control disarmament 271
and non-proliferation 271
2.5 Iraq: the non proliferation regime challenged 273
and strengthened 273
1992: A milestone for compliance monitoring and veri.cation 273
Value of the Iraqi and North Korean experience 274
3.1 Dawn of the century: Resuming the challenges 275
3.2 Prospects: A blurred vision of the future 277
3.3 Current situation: Overview of concerns 277
Iraq: no longer a proliferation threat, but? 277
North Korea: The present threat? 278
Iran: the threat for years to come? 279
Pakistan and the proliferation bazaar 284
Other compliance problems: Korea, Brazil, Egypt 284
The threat of nuclear terrorism 285
4.1 New tools for nuclear security? Why and for what? 285
Addressing the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and the 285
nuclear disarmament 285
Addressing the tra.c of sensitive technologies 286
Addressing the Security of nuclear and radioactive materials 286
Addressing the proliferation of means of delivery 286
4.2 How advanced technologies can contribute to 287
tackle the threats? 287
4.3 A focus on nuclear fuel cycle and materials [37] 288
4.4 An European Union security prospective 289
5.1 Compliance 289
5.2 Verifying compliance / the needed authority [42] 290
5.3 Verifying compliance / the needed resources 290
5.4 Enforcing compliance / a renewed role of the 291
UN Security Council 291
by promoting universal adherence 293
veri.cation system based on the best technological 293
means 293
political and technical 293

Formal Models of Verification 299
1 Introduction 299
2 A conceptual model: To sign or not to sign? 300
3 Structural models: Randomized unannounced inspections 306
3.1 Meeting timeliness goals 307
3.2 Minimizing time to detection 310
4 An operational model: Strati.ed random sampling 314
4.1 One class of data 314
4.2 Several classes of data 316
V Systems and Linkages - Crosscutting 324
Civil Reconnaissance Satellites: Opportunities and Challenges 325
The Non-Proliferation Treaty 327
A, C 327
B 327
A. 329
B 329
C. 329
D. 329
E. 329
A missile test complex 329
C, D, E 330
A 331
A’ 331
A 331
B. 331
Change Detection: The Potential for Nuclear Safeguards 337
2.1 Data Pre-Processing 338
Geometric Correction: 338
Atmospheric Correction: 339
2.2 Change Detection Techniques 339
2.3 Pixel-based change detection 340
2.4 Object-based change detection and analysis 341
Aspects of Networking: Experience from Global Monitoring for Security and Stability 351
2.1 Organization of GMOSS 352
2.2 Progress after one year 354
3.1 Perceptions of security 355
3.2 EU Security Strategy 355
3.3 Comparison of the EU and US strategy on proliferation 356
3.4 Responding to crises 356
3.5 Gaming 357
3.6 Focus for the second year of GMOSS 358
4.1 Feature recognition 359
Identifying changes 362
Environmental Sample Analysis 368
3.1 Early applications 370
3.2 UNSCOM/UNMOVIC 371
3.3 From Program 93+2 to the Additional Protocol to the NPT 372
3.4 CTBT 373
3.5 Future opportunities 374
3.6 Examples for non-radioactive tracers 374
4.1 Radioactive particles 375
4.2 Radioactive noble gases 377
5.1 Introduction 378
5.2 Atmospheric transport processes and characteristic time scales 379
5.3 Methods for global atmospheric transport modelling 380
v. 380
v 380
5.4 Methods for atmospheric chemistry modelling 381
5.5 Downscaling 382
5.6 Use of radionuclides as tracers to test atmospheric transport 382
5.7 Determining optimal station placement and procedures 383
5.8 Source localisation 384
Tracing the Origin of Diverted or Stolen Nuclear Material through Nuclear Forensic Investigations 389
3.1 Classical Forensic Investigations 391
3.2 Nuclear Forensic Investigations 393
Radiometric Methods 394
Mass Spectrometric Methods 396
Microstructural techniques 398
Recent Developments 400
4.1 Reference Data 402
4.2 Reactor type determination (Pu production) 402
Acknowledgement 405
VI Information Collection and Analysis 409
The Information Infrastructure of a Treaty Monitoring System 410
4.1 A networking framework 417
4.2 Some common topologies 418
4.3 The role of the Internet 422
The International Level 433
2.1 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements: 434
INFCIRC/153 Requirements 434
2.2 Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards 435
2.3 The Additional Protocol: INFCIRC/540 Requirements 435
2.4 Integrated Safeguards 437
3.1 Information on States-as-a-Whole and Its Evaluation 438
3.2 Proliferation Indicators and the Physical Model 441
3.3 Tra.cking in Nuclear Material 442
4.1 Types of Information 444
4.2 Collecting Information 445
4.3 Analysis and Presentation of Open Source Information 447
Open Source Information Collection, Processing and Applications 452
2.1 Accessibility 454
2.2 Features of today’s open-source information collection 455
and processing 455
3.1 Data Collection 457
3.2 Data Validation 457
3.3 Satellite Imagery 458
3.4 Multi-lingual Information Collection 459
4.1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 459
4.2 Export Control of Goods and Technologies 460
4.3 Nuclear Pro.les and Studies 461
5.1 Data Collection Keywords 462
5.2 Data Indexing 463
5.3 Document Augmentation 463
5.4 Dealing with other languages 464
5.5 Research at JRC-IPSC 464
Data Collection - EMM 465
Language Engineering 465
Data Indexing: Topic Trees 467
Integration of data from multiple sources 467
NUMAS Geo-Database 468
6.1 Monitoring who accesses the information 470
6.2 Future Research 471
6.3 Final Considerations 471
Acknowledgment 472
The National Level 474
open and con.dential 476
information. 476
2.1 National information supporting multinational treaties 477
implementation 477
2.2 The age of veri.cation and monitoring: global security calls 479
for more information 479
2.3 Are the strengthened safeguards strengthen enough? 479
More information needed 479
3.1 The motivation for an independent national evaluation 481
of information relative to security issues 481
3.2 The particularity of France’s status regarding nuclear issues 482
A political particularity 483
A technical speci.city 483
3.3 Data collection and analysis process 484
Type of collected information 484
origin of data: 485
nature of the data 485
3.4 Analysis and assessment methodology 486
Validation & Assessment principles
credibility 486
coherence 486
Credibility: 486
Coherence: 486
Validation & Assessment framework
3.5 Importance of analysis and assessment 490
Open sources data analysis 490
from the classic media: 490
News from scienti.c media: 491
Data from Non Governmental Organizations (NGO): 491
Data from technical sources: 491
Expertise 491
Cross-correlation and data fusion 492
3.6 Evaluation and Assessment process: national organisation 492
National organisation 492
Who bene.ts from the analysis and evaluation of collected 493
information? 493
The con.dentiality issue 494
3.7 Some examples 495
VII Emerging Verification Technologies 500
Advanced Sensor Technologies 501
Monitoring Reactors with Cubic Meter Scale Antineutrino Detectors 517
2.1 Production of Antineutrinos in Reactor Cores 518
Measurement Scenarios 519
2.2 Detection of Reactor Antineutrinos 520
3.1 Results 523
Antineutrino Count Rate and Detection E.ciencies 523
Operational Considerations 524
Digital Verification Techniques in the Nuclear Safeguards System: Status and Perspectives 527
Sensors and Data Generators 530
Data Collection System 530
Network Interfacing Equipment 531
Commercial-O.-The-Shelf (COTS) Components 531
Approval for Routine Inspection Use 531
Featuring Digital Safeguards Instrumentation 532
Optical Surveillance 533
Radiation Monitoring 535
Electronic Sealing 537
Emerging Veri.cation Technologies 542
A Sustainable Approach for Developing Treaty Enforcement Instrumentation 553
3.1 IAEA 556
3.2 Member States Support Programs 557
3.3 Commercial Entities and Research and Development 559
Institutions 559
Large Companies 559
Mid-sized Companies 560
Small Companies 561
Research and Development Institutions 561
VIII Perspectives and Conclusions 566
Continuity and Change in International Verification Regimes 567
Improving Veri.cation: Trends and Perspectives for Research 581
2.1 Bulk handling facilities 582
2.2 Increasing inventories of nuclear materials 583
2.3 New technologies, new generation of reactors and fuel cycles 583
2.4 Detection of undeclared activities 583
2.5 Terrorism and illicit tra.cking 584
2.6 Dual use materials, proliferation of technology 584
2.7 Proliferation resistance 584
2.8 Veri.cation of excess material and Fissile Material 585
Cut-o. Treaty (FMCT) 585
3.1 Bulk handling facilities 585
3.2 Increasing inventories of nuclear materials/ spent fuel 586
management 586
3.3 New nuclear technologies, new generation of reactors 587
and fuel cycles 587
3.4 Detection of undeclared activities 588
Open Source information - satellite imagery 588
Open source information - electronic searching 588
Environmental sampling 590
Wide-area environmental monitoring 591
3.5 Terrorism and illicit tra.cking 591
3.6 Dual use materials, proliferation of technology 592
3.7 Proliferation resistance 593
3.8 Veri.cation of excess material and Fissile Material 593
Cut- o. Treaty (FMCT) 593
Concluding Remarks 596
List of Authors 611
Altmann, J ¨ urgen 611
Avenhaus, Rudolf 611
Baute, Jacques G. 611
Bernstein, Adam 611
Bril, Louis-Victor 611
Bowden, Nathaniel 611
Canty, Morton 611
Carlson, John 612
Chartier, Bernard 612
Cooley, Jill N. 612
Daoudi, Mohamed 612
Feichter, Johann 612
Gon¸ calves, Jo˜ ao G.M. 612
H¨ ackel, Erwin 612
Jasani, Bhupendra 612
Kalinowski, Martin B. 612
Kyriakopoulos, Nicholas 612
MacFaul, Larry 613
Mayer, Klaus 613
Nixdor., Kathryn 613
Niemeyer, Irmgard 613
Nikkinen, Mika 613
Nussbaum, Sven 613
Poucet, Andre 613
Ray, Ian 613
Richard, Michel 613
Richter, Bernd 614
Rosenstock, Wolfgang 614
Schenkel, Roland 614
Schlosser, Clemens 614
Schriefer, Dirk 614
Shepherd, Iain 614
Stein, Gotthard 614
Stein, Marius 614
Trapp, Ralf 614
Wallenius, Maria 614
Zwilling, Marc 615
Index 616

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 21.4.2007
• Zusatzinfo: XIV, 629 p.
• Verlagsort: Berlin
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Öffentliches Recht ► Umweltrecht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Technik
• Schlagworte: Chemical Weapons Convention • Kyoto Protocol Verification • Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction • Nuclear Nonproliferation • Nuclear Safeguards • Treaty Verification
• ISBN-10: 3-540-33854-3 / 3540338543
• ISBN-13: 978-3-540-33854-3 / 9783540338543