The Ghost at the Feast (eBook)

America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941

Robert Kagan (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2024 | 1. Auflage
688 Seiten
Atlantic Books (Verlag)
978-1-80546-306-1 (ISBN)

Infos

An NPR Book of the Year At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States was one of the world's richest, most populous, most technologically advanced nations. It was also a nation divided along numerous fault lines, with conflicting aspirations and concerns pulling it in different directions. And it was a nation unsure about the role it wanted to play in the world, if any. Americans were the beneficiaries of a global order they had no responsibility for maintaining. Many preferred to avoid being drawn into what seemed an ever more competitive, conflictual, and militarized international environment. However, many also were eager to see the United States taking a share of international responsibility, working with others to preserve peace and advance civilization. The story of American foreign policy in the first four decades of the twentieth century is about the effort to do both - 'to adjust the nation to its new position without sacrificing the principles developed in the past,' as one contemporary put it. This would prove a difficult task. The collapse of British naval power, combined with the rise of Germany and Japan, suddenly placed the United States in a pivotal position. American military power helped defeat Germany in the First World War, and the peace that followed was significantly shaped by a U.S. president. But Americans recoiled from their deep involvement in world affairs, and for the next two decades, they sat by as fascism and tyranny spread unchecked, ultimately causing the liberal world order to fall apart. America's resulting intervention in the Second World War marked the beginning of a new era, for the United States and for the world. Brilliant and insightful, The Ghost at the Feast shows both the perils of American withdrawal from the world and the price of international responsibility.

ROBERT KAGAN served in the State Department from 1984 to 1998. He is the author of the international bestseller Paradise & Power and co-editor with William Kristol of Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defence Policy. He is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He lives in Brussels with his wife adn two children. Dangerous Nation was published by Atlantic Books in 2006.

Autor

Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for the Washington Post. He is also the author of The Jungle Grows Back, The World America Made, Dangerous Nation, and Of Paradise and Power. He served in the U.S. State Department from 1984 to 1988. He lives with his wife in Virginia.

Textauszug

CHAPTER ONE

A Tale of Two Wars

Now, we have fought a righteous war . . . and that is rare in history . . . but by the grace of that war we set Cuba free, and we joined her to those three or four free nations that exist on this earth; and we started out to set those poor Filipinos free too, and why, why, why that most righteous purpose of ours has apparently miscarried I suppose I never shall know.

—Mark Twain1

THE WAR with Spain that began in April 1898 is generally regarded as a great turning point in the history of American foreign policy, the moment when the United States became a “great power,” a “world power,” an “imperial” power. The great majority of Americans who supported the war, however, had no such ambitions. Intervention in Cuba did not seem to them a great deviation from their previous path. Cuba was an old issue, almost as old as the nation itself. Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and other American statesmen of the early republic saw Cuba as a natural appendage of the growing country and assumed the island would eventually fall “like ripe fruit” into American hands. In the 1850s, southerners tried to purchase Cuba from Spain and make it the heart of a new slave empire in the Caribbean. During the long Cuban rebellion of the 1860s and ’70s, known as the Ten Years’ War, the U.S. government winked as private American citizens, many of them naturalized Cubans, lent financial and military support to rebels fighting to liberate the island from Spanish colonial rule. In 1873 the United States almost went to war when Spanish forces captured a retired Confederate warship, the Virginius, running guns to Cuba. When the Spanish executed the American captain and dozens of passengers, the Grant administration assembled the Atlantic fleet in the waters around Florida. Eventually, the Spanish government apologized, and Grant was not eager to go to war with the decrepit, outgunned American fleet of the time. The memory of the Virginius lingered in the popular imagination, however.2 Failed Cuban rebellions in 1879, 1883, 1892, and 1893 ensured that the struggle made news with some regularity.

The fighting that erupted in Cuba in 1895 caught Americans’ attention because it was especially brutal and destructive. This time the rebels, seeking to shake the pillars of Spanish colonial rule, went after the island’s economy, burning plantations and factories and driving thousands out of work. The Spanish government, with little money and too few troops to crush the rebellion, responded with measures as harsh as they were ultimately unproductive. A new general, Valeriano Weyler, inaugurated a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at isolating the rebels from the rural population.3 Farmers and their families were driven from their homes and herded into fortified towns and “reconcentration” camps with only what they could carry on their backs. Anyone found outside the camps was presumed a subversive and arrested or shot. Spanish soldiers scoured the countryside, burning villages and fields, destroying food stocks, slaughtering livestock, and razing homes. Eventually Weyler decreed a halt to all sugar production to prevent producers from paying bribes to the rebels. The Cuban economy ground to a halt.

The worst was yet to come. By the end of 1896, as the Cleveland administration was ending, Weyler’s reconcentration policies created a humanitarian catastrophe. The influx of some 300,000 displaced persons into the designated towns and makeshift camps overwhelmed municipal authorities and camp operators who lacked the food, supplies, medicine, sanitation, and manpower to care for them. Thousands lived on daily rice rations meant to feed hundreds. Cubans began to starve and succumb to disease.4 Hospitals were overwhelmed, lacking adequate staff, beds, and medicines. In the cities, bodies lay unburied in the streets; small children with bloated stomachs died searching garbage heaps for food. Over the course of a year at least 300,000 Cubans died—about one-fifth of the island’s population—and the deaths continued to mount.5

Most Americans were on the rebels’ side from the beginning. From early 1896 on, Congress was flooded with petitions from peace groups, church groups, labor unions, and farmers’ associations calling for aid to the rebels and recognition of Cuban independence.6 When reports arrived of the mass starvation and disease, the popular outcry matched the response to the Armenian genocide two years before. Cuba was “our Armenia,” the editors at the San Francisco Examiner insisted.7 Even the conservative New York Times wrote that the “civilized world” had an interest in preventing such inhuman behavior “in Cuba as well as in Armenia.”8 Many Americans insisted that the United States must not “share the blood-guiltiness of Europe.”9

Some hoped the United States could end the suffering by mediating between Spain and the Cubans, but many were prepared to use force if diplomacy failed. The newspapers of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer competed for readers by stirring up outrage with lurid and sometimes fanciful stories of Spanish barbarity, but the call for intervention also came from religious publications with an even broader circulation than the “yellow press.”10 The Christian theologian and editor Lyman Abbott saw it as a necessary act of Christian charity, “the answer of America to the question of its own conscience: Am I my brother’s keeper?”11 The suffragist and social activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton observed, “Though I hate war per se, . . . I would like to see Spain . . . swept from the face of the earth.”12 An editorial in The Evangelist proclaimed that if it was the “will of Almighty God” that only war could sweep away “the last trace of this inhumanity of man to man,” then “let it come!”13 William Jennings Bryan, the choice of six million voters in the 1896 election and the closest thing to a pacifist ever chosen to lead a major national party, led the cry for intervention. War was “a terrible thing,” he declared, but sometimes it was necessary when “reason and diplomacy” have failed. “Humanity” demanded that the United States act.14

The popular response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Cuba did not fit the usual stereotypes. The foreign policy or establishment “elite” generally opposed intervention.15 The business community and its influential supporters in Congress worried that war would stall the economic recovery that had begun to gather steam at the end of 1896.16 The big investors in Cuban mines and plantations relied on the Spanish colonial authorities to protect their investments and rightly feared what the rebels would do to their investments if they won.17 President Cleveland himself regarded the rebels as “the most inhuman and barbarous cutthroats in the world.”18 The most enthusiastic support for intervention came from the “Bryan sections of the country,” from the populists and progressives who tended to view the Cuban conflict as a class war, akin to the struggle between workers and government-backed plutocrats in the United States. To them it made perfect sense that the Cleveland administration, which had ordered the U.S. Army to kill striking railroad employees during the Pullman strike in 1894, was now supporting the Spanish government as it killed farmers and workers in Cuba.19

In his last two years in office Cleveland maintained strict neutrality as the conflict exploded, coolly ignoring the pro-Cuban resolutions emanating from Congress. He was aware of the breadth and depth of popular sentiment, however. In his last days as president, he urged the Spanish government to get control of the situation, warning that American patience was not infinite and that if Spain did not either bring the war to an end or stop its brutal policies, America’s desire to remain neutral in the conflict could be “superseded by higher obligations.”20 His secretary of state, Richard Olney, advised the Spanish government to make good on its promises of reform and grant Cuba some form of autonomy; he offered to help mediate. When Spanish officials refused, insisting that talks could only begin after the rebels surrendered, Cleveland privately predicted that the United States would be at war within two years.21

This was the last thing the new president, William McKinley, wanted when he entered the White House in 1897. The long-serving member of Congress and, most recently, governor of Ohio had never taken a great interest in foreign policy except on matters of trade and had said little about it during his campaign. His overriding concern was the U.S. economy. He had run as the “advance agent of prosperity,” and, luckily for him, the economy had already begun to take off when he took office. In 1897 the stock market rose, business investment increased, farm prices climbed, farm exports rose, and iron and steel production reached new heights.22 War was a big risk to what still seemed a fragile recovery.23 In his inaugural address, McKinley said pointedly that “wars should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed.”24

As the full magnitude of the humanitarian disaster among the reconcentrados began to unfold in 1897, however, McKinley found himself...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 4.4.2024
• Verlagsort: London
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geschichte ► Allgemeine Geschichte ► Neuzeit (bis 1918)
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Geschichte ► Regional- / Ländergeschichte
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Europäische / Internationale Politik
• Schlagworte: America • american responsibility • Clinton • Cold War • Collapse • dangerous nation • foreign policy • global order • Henry Kissinger • History • International Relations • Japan • Nazi Germany • New World Order • Obama • Policy • Politics • Soviet Union • Spanish-American War • thomas meaney • Trump • UN • United States • US • USA • World War I • World War II
• ISBN-10: 1-80546-306-3 / 1805463063
• ISBN-13: 978-1-80546-306-1 / 9781805463061