Why Delegate?
Seiten
2021
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-090420-3 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-090420-3 (ISBN)
Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society.
From mundane tasks like choosing a plumber to weightier ones like running a country, the world turns on delegation. We delegate particular tasks to people we believe have more expertise than we do. When it is successful, delegation improves efficiency, expands the range of responsible actors, and even increases happiness. When delegation fails, though, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability.
In Why Delegate?, Neil J. Mitchell investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks we take in doing so. He demonstrates how a new, modified understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship-the principal-agent relationship, as economists have described it-simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Using real-world case studies including child abuse in the Catholic Church, the Volkswagen pollution scandal, and FIFA corruption, Mitchell illustrates the broad functionality of delegation logic and the wide range of incentives at work in these relationships. Diverse examples reveal the opportunism of both the leaders and the led and show how accepted accounts of the principal-agent relationship are incomplete. By drawing on multidisciplinary research to address complex questions of motivation, control, responsibility, and accountability, the book builds a broader, more useful logic of delegation.
Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. Mitchell's comprehensive account of the contexts, causes, and effects of delegation develops a new way to understand both the theory and practice of this critical relationship.
From mundane tasks like choosing a plumber to weightier ones like running a country, the world turns on delegation. We delegate particular tasks to people we believe have more expertise than we do. When it is successful, delegation improves efficiency, expands the range of responsible actors, and even increases happiness. When delegation fails, though, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability.
In Why Delegate?, Neil J. Mitchell investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks we take in doing so. He demonstrates how a new, modified understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship-the principal-agent relationship, as economists have described it-simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Using real-world case studies including child abuse in the Catholic Church, the Volkswagen pollution scandal, and FIFA corruption, Mitchell illustrates the broad functionality of delegation logic and the wide range of incentives at work in these relationships. Diverse examples reveal the opportunism of both the leaders and the led and show how accepted accounts of the principal-agent relationship are incomplete. By drawing on multidisciplinary research to address complex questions of motivation, control, responsibility, and accountability, the book builds a broader, more useful logic of delegation.
Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. Mitchell's comprehensive account of the contexts, causes, and effects of delegation develops a new way to understand both the theory and practice of this critical relationship.
Neil J. Mitchell is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at University College London.
Acknowledgements
Chapter One: Why Delegate?
Chapter Two: Time and Effort
Chapter Three: Expertise
Chapter Four: Agreement
Chapter Five: Commitment
Chapter Six: Blame
Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
| Erscheinungsdatum | 28.04.2021 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 231 x 155 mm |
| Gewicht | 431 g |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Theorie |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Mikroökonomie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-090420-8 / 0190904208 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-090420-3 / 9780190904203 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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