‘I Made Mistakes’
Robert McNamara's Vietnam War Policy, 1960–1968
Seiten
2019
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-108-41553-8 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-108-41553-8 (ISBN)
Drawing on recently declassified personal papers and interview material, Aurélie Basha i Novosejt provides a new analysis of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's decisions during the Vietnam War, revealing little-known misgivings he held toward the direction, strategy, and politics of the conflict.
Speaking to an advisor in 1966 about America's escalation of forces in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara confessed: 'We've made mistakes in Vietnam … I've made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made'. In 'I Made Mistakes', Aurélie Basha i Novosejt provides a fresh and controversial examination of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's decisions during the Vietnam War. Although McNamara is remembered as the architect of the Vietnam War, Novosejt draws on new sources - including the diaries of his advisor and confidant John T. McNaughton - to reveal a man who resisted the war more than most. As Secretary of Defense, he did not want the costs of the war associated with a new international commitment in Vietnam, but he sacrificed these misgivings to instead become the public face of the war out of a sense of loyalty to the President.
Speaking to an advisor in 1966 about America's escalation of forces in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara confessed: 'We've made mistakes in Vietnam … I've made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made'. In 'I Made Mistakes', Aurélie Basha i Novosejt provides a fresh and controversial examination of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's decisions during the Vietnam War. Although McNamara is remembered as the architect of the Vietnam War, Novosejt draws on new sources - including the diaries of his advisor and confidant John T. McNaughton - to reveal a man who resisted the war more than most. As Secretary of Defense, he did not want the costs of the war associated with a new international commitment in Vietnam, but he sacrificed these misgivings to instead become the public face of the war out of a sense of loyalty to the President.
Aurélie Basha i Novosejt is a Lecturer in American History at the University of Kent, Canterbury.
List of figures; Acknowledgments; List of abbreviations; Introduction; 1. The history of the OSD, 1947–1961; 2. Civilian control; 3. Continuity and change; 4. Taking charge of Vietnam policy; 5. When military problems become economic problems; 6. The fall of 1963; 7. McNamara's transition into the Johnson administration; 8. Decisions, indecisions, visions and revisions; 9. McNamara in crisis, 1966–1968; Conclusion; Appendix 1: Cast of characters; Bibliography; Index.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 09.05.2019 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises; 16 Halftones, black and white |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 158 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 620 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Geschichte ► Regional- / Ländergeschichte |
| Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Militärgeschichte | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Europäische / Internationale Politik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-108-41553-9 / 1108415539 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-108-41553-8 / 9781108415538 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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