Public Finance (eBook)

A Normative Theory

Richard W. Tresch (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF | EPUB

2014 | 3. Auflage
534 Seiten
Elsevier Science (Verlag)
978-0-12-416033-0 (ISBN)

Infos

Public Finance remains the premier textbook on the normative theory of government policy, with the third edition propelling into the twenty-first century its examination of what government ought to be doing instead of what it is doing. The welfare aspects of public economics receive extensively renewed examination in this third edition. With four new chapters and other significant revisions, it presents detailed and comprehensive coverage of theoretical literature, empirical work, environmental issues, social insurance, behavioral economics, and international tax issues. With increased emphasis on the European Union, it is rigid enough for use by PhDs while being accessible to students less well trained in math. - Moves skillfully from explaining normative theory to applying it in mathematically compact and precise terms - Adds new chapters on social insurance, medical care, social security pensions, behavioral public economics, and international public finance - Includes new pedagogical supplements, including end-of-chapter questions and answers - Emphasizes European examples

Richard Tresch earned a bachelor's degree in 1965 from Williams College and a doctorate ineconomics in 1973 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he was a teaching assistantprior to joining Boston College. He joined the Boston College faculty in 1969, and during his49-year-long career in the college, Dr. Tresch has served as the Chairman of the Department ofEconomics, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of Undergraduate Studies. Currently, he isProfessor Emeritus of Economics at Boston College. In 1996, he was chosen as the MassachusettsProfessor of the Year by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He was oneof 585 national entrants in the foundation's U.S. Professors of the Year Program, which salutesoutstanding undergraduate instructors, with the award recognized as one of the most prestigioushonors to be bestowed on professors. Dr. Tresch, a member of the American Economic Association,has served on the board of editors of the American Economic Review and contributed to the NewEngland Journal of Business and Economics and Public Finance. Moreover, he is the editor of a fourvolumemajor reference work on public sector economics.

Inhalt

Front Cover 1
Public Finance 4
Copyright 5
Contents 6
Preface 16
Part 1 Introduction: The Content and Methodology of Public Sector Theory 18
Chapter 1 - Introduction to Normative Public Sector Theory 20
THE FUNDAMENTAL NORMATIVE QUESTIONS 21
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE THEORY: PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS 22
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE THEORY AND MARKET FAILURE 26
THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES 29
THE THEORY OF TAXATION 31
FISCAL FEDERALISM 32
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE 32
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 34
SUMMARY 35
REFERENCES 36
Chapter 2 - A General Equilibrium Model for Public Sector Analysis 38
A BASELINE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 39
EFFICIENCY: THE PARETO-OPTIMAL CONDITIONS 40
EQUITY: THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION AND THE OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 41
MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE 44
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 52
REFERENCES 53
Chapter 3 - First-Best and Second-Best Analyses and the Political Economy of Public Sector Economics 54
LUMP-SUM REDISTRIBUTIONS AND PUBLIC SECTOR THEORY 54
FIRST-BEST ANALYSIS 55
SECOND-BEST ANALYSIS 57
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FIRST-BEST AND SECOND-BEST ANALYSES 61
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION 62
CONCLUSION 70
REFERENCES 70
Part 2 The Theory of Public Expenditures and Taxation: First-Best Analysis 72
Chapter 4 - The Social Welfare Function in Policy Analysis 74
SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: THE ATKINSON FRAMEWORK 75
SOCIAL WELFARE AND CONSUMPTION: THE JORGENSON ANALYSIS 82
SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY 90
REFERENCES 94
Chapter 5 - The Problem of Externalities-An Overview 96
POLICY-RELEVANT EXTERNALITIES 96
THE ANALYSIS OF EXTERNALITIES: MODELING PRELIMINARIES 98
REFERENCES 99
Chapter 6 - Consumption Externalities 100
HOW BAD CAN EXTERNALITIES BE? 101
THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS-ALL GOODS (FACTORS) ARE PURE PUBLIC GOODS (FACTORS) 102
THE EXISTENCE OF AT LEAST ONE PURE PRIVATE GOOD 103
NONEXCLUSIVE GOODS-THE SAMUELSON MODEL 108
AGGREGATE EXTERNALITIES 119
REFERENCES 124
Chapter 7 - Production Externalities 126
THE CONDENSED MODEL FOR PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES 127
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES 128
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE PROBLEM OF NONCONVEX PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES 138
REFERENCES 139
Chapter 8 - An Application of Externality Theory: Global Warming 140
CONSUMPTION-PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES 140
LEGISLATING POLLUTION STANDARDS 143
DEFENSIVE ANTIPOLLUTION STRATEGIES 150
LONG-LIVED EXTERNALITIES 153
REFERENCES 155
Chapter 9 - The Theory of Decreasing Cost Production 156
DECREASING COST IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 157
REFLECTIONS ON U.S. POLICY REGARDING DECREASING COST SERVICES: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY 169
APPENDIX: RETURNS TO SCALE, HOMOGENEITY, AND DECREASING COST 172
REFERENCES 173
Chapter 10 - The First-Best Theory of Taxation and Transfers 174
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PARETO-OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION 175
ALTRUISM, FREE RIDING, AND CROWDING OUT OF PRIVATE CHARITY 181
OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE TRANSFERS 183
REFERENCES 185
Chapter 11 - Applying First-Best Principles of Taxation-What to Tax and How 188
DESIGNING BROAD-BASED TAXES: THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 188
ABILITY TO PAY: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 190
HORIZONTAL EQUITY 191
VERTICAL EQUITY 199
REFLECTIONS ON THE HAIG-SIMONS CRITERION IN PRACTICE: THE FEDERAL PERSONAL INCOME TAX 204
THE INFLATIONARY BIAS AGAINST INCOME FROM CAPITAL2020THE ANALYSIS IN THIS SECTION FOLLOWS DIAMOND (1975), PP. 228-230. 209
TAXING REALIZED GAINS: AUERBACH'S RETROSPECTIVE TAXATION PROPOSAL 210
THE TAXATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL 213
SUMMARY 214
REFERENCES 215
Part 3 The Theory of Public Expenditures and Taxation: Second-Best Analysis 216
Chapter 12 - Introduction to Second-Best Analysis 218
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECOND-BEST THEORY 219
PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS 223
PREVIEW OF PART III 223
REFERENCES 224
Chapter 13 - The Second-Best Theory of Taxation in One-Consumer Economies with Linear Production Technology 226
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM PRICE MODELS 227
THE MEASUREMENT OF LOSS FROM DISTORTING TAXES 228
THE OPTIMAL PATTERN OF COMMODITY TAXES 242
SUBSTITUTIONS AMONG TAXES: IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE LOSS 246
REFERENCES 249
Chapter 14 - The Second-Best Theory of Taxation with General Production Technologies and Many Consumers 250
A ONE-CONSUMER ECONOMY WITH GENERAL TECHNOLOGY 250
MANY-PERSON ECONOMIES: FIXED PRODUCER PRICES 257
MANY-PERSON ECONOMY WITH GENERAL TECHNOLOGY 263
THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY GIVEN CHANGE IN TAXES 265
REFERENCES 267
Chapter 15 - Taxation under Asymmetric Information 268
LUMP-SUM REDISTRIBUTIONS AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 269
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH COMMODITY TAXATIONS 270
OPTIMAL TAXATION, PRIVATE INFORMATION, AND SELF-SELECTION CONSTRAINTS 272
OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION 277
TAX EVASION 281
CONCLUDING REMARKS 285
REFERENCES 286
Chapter 16 - The Theory and Measurement of Tax Incidence 288
TAX INCIDENCE: A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 288
FIRST-BEST THEORY, SECOND-BEST THEORY, AND TAX INCIDENCE 289
METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF TAX INCIDENCE 290
THEORETICAL MEASURES OF TAX INCIDENCE 291
THE EQUIVALENCE OF GENERAL TAXES 297
MEASURING TAX INCIDENCE: A MANY-CONSUMER ECONOMY 299
THE HARBERGER ANALYSIS 301
IMPORTANT MODIFICATIONS OF THE HARBERGER MODEL 310
REFERENCES 312
Chapter 17 - Expenditure Incidence and Economy-Wide Incidence Studies 314
THE INCIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENTS 316
TAX AND EXPENDITURE INCIDENCE WITH DECREASING-COST SERVICES 317
SAMUELSONIAN NONEXCLUSIVE GOODS 317
ECONOMY-WIDE INCIDENCE STUDIES 320
THE SOURCES AND USES APPROACH 321
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS OF TAX INCIDENCE 330
DYNAMIC TAX INCIDENCE 331
APPENDIX 339
REFERENCES 344
Chapter 18 - The Second-Best Theory of Public Expenditures: Overview 348
REFERENCES 350
Chapter 19 - Transfer Payments and Private Information 352
FIRST-BEST INSIGHTS 352
CASH TRANSFERS: BROAD BASED OR TARGETED? 353
PRIVATE INFORMATION AND IN-KIND TRANSFERS 357
REFERENCES 365
Chapter 20 - Social Insurance: Medical Care 366
THE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE 366
WITHOUT INSURANCE 367
WITH INSURANCE 367
PRIVATE OR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 369
MORAL HAZARD 370
THE COMPETITIVE OUTCOME 371
THE PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSE 372
EX POST MORAL HAZARD44THE ANALYSIS OF EX POST MORAL HAZARD IS A VARIATION OF THE ANALYSIS IN PAULY (1968). 372
DEDUCTIBLES AND CO-PAYMENTS 373
THE VALUE OF ACCESS 373
ADVERSE SELECTION 374
EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE EFFICIENCY 374
THE NATURE OF ADVERSE SELECTION 375
ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION 376
A TWO-POLICY MODEL 377
IS AN EQUILIBRIUM POSSIBLE? 378
POLICY RESPONSE TO ADVERSE SELECTION 379
U.S. POLICIES 380
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 380
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 381
REFERENCES 382
Chapter 21 - Social Insurance: Social Security 384
THE U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 385
SOCIAL SECURITY AS SOCIAL INSURANCE 386
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 387
SOCIAL SECURITY AND SAVING 387
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY: CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION, AND MARKET CLEARANCE 388
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 398
REFERENCES 399
Chapter 22 - Externalities in a Second-Best Environment 402
THE SECOND-BEST ALLOCATION OF SAMUELSONIAN NONEXCLUSIVE GOODS 402
THE COASE THEOREM, BARGAINING, AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 406
REFERENCES 412
Chapter 23 - Decreasing Costs and the Theory of the Second-Best-The Boiteux Problem 414
THE BOITEUX PROBLEM: THE MULTIPRODUCT DECREASING-COST FIRM 414
CONSTRAINED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 419
REFERENCES 420
Chapter 24 - General Production Rules in a Second-Best Environment 422
THE DIAMOND-MIRRLEES PROBLEM: ONE-CONSUMER ECONOMY 423
PRODUCTION DECISIONS WITH NONOPTIMAL TAXES 426
SECOND-BEST PRODUCTION RULES WHEN EQUITY MATTERS 430
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 433
REFERENCES 433
Chapter 25 - Behavioral Public Sector Economics 434
THE BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES 434
PROSPECT THEORY: THE REJECTION OF EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 435
PRESENT-BIASED PREFERENCES: SELF-CONTROL ISSUES 435
SOCIAL PREFERENCES 435
FRAMING EFFECTS OR CONTEXT DEPENDENCE 436
MAINSTREAM REACTIONS 437
POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 439
PROSPECT THEORY 440
APPLYING PROSPECT THEORY 442
NUDGES AND STANDARD POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 443
STANDARD AGENTS ONLY 443
BEHAVIORAL AGENTS ONLY 444
A MIXTURE OF STANDARD AND BEHAVIORAL AGENTS 445
CAN MAINSTREAM AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC THEORY BE RECONCILED? 446
REFINEMENTS 447
REFERENCES 447
Part 4 Fiscal Federalism 450
Chapter 26 - Optimal Federalism: Sorting the Functions of Government within the Fiscal Hierarchy 452
THE POTENTIAL FOR INCOMPATIBILITIES AND DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION 452
SORTING THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE FISCAL HIERARCHY 454
OPTIMAL FEDERALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION 457
REFERENCES 463
Chapter 27 - Optimal Federalism: The Sorting of People within the Fiscal Hierarchy 464
THE MODELING DIMENSIONS 465
JURISDICTION FORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THEORY OF CLUBS 466
FIXED COMMUNITIES AND HOUSING SITES: ADDING THE HOUSING MARKET 470
ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE 474
MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 477
REFERENCES 482
Chapter 28 - The Role of Grants-in-Aid in a Federalist System of Governments 484
OPTIMAL FEDERALISM AND GRANTS-IN-AID: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 484
ALTERNATIVE DESIGN CRITERIA 487
ESTIMATING THE DEMAND FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES 490
THE RESPONSE TO GRANTS-IN-AID 498
REFERENCES 503
Chapter 29 - International Public Finance 504
THE TAXATION OF MOBILE CAPITAL 505
SUMMARY 512
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 512
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 517
REFERENCES 517
Appendix 518
THE INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE MARGINS 518
THE DISCRETE MODEL 518
THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN 519
THE INTENSIVE MARGIN 519
DESIGNING TAX/TRANSFER PROGRAMS 520
A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY? 521
REFERENCES 522
Index 524

Textauszug

Chapter 1

Introduction to Normative Public Sector Theory

Abstract

Chapter 1 describes the norms that underlie the mainstream economic theory of the public sector and then discusses how these norms dictate the fundamental normative questions within the theories of public expenditures, taxation, and fiscal federalism. The chapter also considers the competing perspectives of public choice and behavioral public finance.

Keywords

Asymmetric information; Behavioral economics; Consumer sovereignty; Decentralized policies; Decreasing cost production; End-results equity; Externalities; Fiscal federalism; Humanism; Pareto optimality; Process equity; Public choice; Two fundamental theorems of welfare economics

Chapter Outline

The Fundamental Normative Questions 4

Government Expenditure Theory: Philosophical Underpinnings 5

Humanism, Consumer Sovereignty, Capitalism, and the Government 5

The Legitimate Functions of Government 6

The Goals of Government Policy 6

Efficiency 6

Equity 6

Process Equity 6

End-Results Equity 7

The Government as Agent 8

Government Expenditure Theory and Market Failure 9

The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 9

The Distribution of Income 9

The Allocation of Resources 10

Private or Asymmetric Information 10

The Government Sector in the United States 12

The Theory of Taxation 14

Fiscal Federalism 15

The Theory of Public Choice 15

Behavioral Public Finance 17

Summary 18

References 19

Public sector economics is the study of government economic policy. Its primary goal is to determine whether government policies promote a society's economic objectives. This happens to be quite an ambitious goal. The advanced Western market economies experienced enormous growth in the size and influence of their government sectors during the last half of the twentieth century, and economic analysis of the public sector has reflected this growth. No single textbook on public sector economics can possibly hope to capture the variety and richness of the professional economic literature on government policy, even at an introductory level. Consequently, a public sector text must begin by defining its limits.

We have chosen to limit both the subject matter and the approach of this text. The text concentrates on the microeconomic theory of the public sector in the context of capitalist market economies. The macroeconomic theory of the public sector, commonly referred to as fiscal policy, receives little attention. In addition, the text focuses on the normative theory of the public sector rather than the positive theory. The normative theory considers what governments ought to be doing in accordance with norms that are broadly accepted by a society. In contrast, the positive theory of the public sector emphasizes the incentives generated by existing governmental institutions and policies and their resulting economic effects, without necessarily judging their effectiveness in terms of some accepted norms. A complete separation of normative and positive theory is impossible, of course. A normative analysis must make assumptions about how agents will respond to various government polices; otherwise, it cannot predict whether a given policy will achieve particular norms. Therefore, the text pays some attention to the empirical literature on the responses to government policies, for example, how the supply of labor responds to income taxation. In every chapter, though, our primary emphasis is on the normative theory of government policy under standard assumptions about economic behavior, such as utility maximization by consumers and profit maximization by producers.

That a consensus, mainstream, normative theory of the public sector should have evolved at all in Western economic thought is perhaps surprising, yet there is remarkable agreement on the problems the government ought to address and the appropriate course of government action in solving them. The consensus has arisen in part because the vast majority of Western public sector economists embrace the same set of policy norms, even though their political tastes may vary along the entire liberal–conservative spectrum. In addition, most public sector economists have chosen the same basic model to analyze all public sector economic problems. Given the same norms and a common analytical framework, consensus was inevitable.

The only serious competitors to the mainstream view of the public sector are the theory of public choice and behavioral economics. James Buchanan was the founding father of the theory of public choice, for which he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He garnered an enthusiastic following, and his public choice perspective has been influential in policy analysis. Public choice remains a distinctly minority view, however, and its approach is more positive than normative. For these reasons, this text considers the public choice perspective only when it has been especially influential in challenging mainstream positions.

Behavioral economics is a newer competitor to the mainstream theory. It attempts to apply psychological principles to help understand behavior that is otherwise at odds with the mainstream assumption that people act to maximize their own self-interests. It is gaining momentum within the profession in all areas of economics, enough so that we have devoted a chapter to explore some of its positive and normative implications for public sector theory. It is far from ready to supplant the mainstream economic theory of the public sector, however.

The first three chapters introduce the mainstream normative theory of the public sector. Chapter 1 begins by describing the four fundamental questions that a normative analysis must address and shows how a particular set of values or norms shared by virtually all Western economists has produced a consensus on how to answer them. The chapter also introduces the public choice perspective on the appropriate economic role of the government.

Chapter 2 presents a baseline “textbook” version of the basic general equilibrium model that is used to develop normative public sector decision rules. The chapter emphasizes how the norms described in Chapter 1 are incorporated into the formal model.

Chapter 3 concludes the introductory material with two methodological points. The first point is the distinction between first-best and second-best analyses. First-best analysis assumes that a government is free to pursue whatever policies are necessary to reach society's economic goals. It is restricted only by the two natural fundamentals inherent in any economy: individuals' preferences over goods and factor supplies and the available production technologies for turning inputs into outputs. Second-best theory assumes, more realistically, that a government is constrained beyond the two fundamentals in pursuing society's goals. For example, a government may lack the information it needs about individuals' preferences or production technologies to design first-best policies, or it may be forced to use certain kinds of taxes that distort economic decisions.

The second methodological point relates to the political content of the baseline general equilibrium model developed in Chapter 2. The discussion centers on the general impossibility theorem of Kenneth Arrow, another Nobel Laureate in economics. Arrow's theorem, which he published in 1951, stands as one of the landmark results of twentieth-century political philosophy (Arrow, 1951). He proved that, in general, the political decisions needed to achieve any social objective, economic or otherwise, cannot be made in a manner that would be acceptable to a democratic society. This was a devastating blow to the concept of a democratic or representative government. Any normative economic theory of the public sector must acknowledge the huge political shadow cast over it by Arrow's theorem.

The Fundamental Normative Questions

A normative economic theory of the public sector addresses four fundamental questions:

1. The primary normative question, upon which all others turn, is the question of legitimacy: In what areas of economic activity can the government legitimately become involved? The legitimacy question points to the expenditure side of government budgets, asking what items we should expect to find there and why.

2. Once the appropriate sphere of government activity has been determined, the next question concerns how the government should proceed. What decision rules should the government follow in each area?

Taken together, these two questions comprise the heart of normative public sector theory, commonly referred to as the theory of government expenditures.

3. The theory of government expenditures in turn suggests a third normative question: How should the government finance these expenditures? Analysis of this question provides the basis for a comprehensive normative theory of taxation (more generally, a theory of government revenues). The theory of taxation is not necessarily distinct from the theory of government expenditures, however. Frequently, the decision rules for government expenditures incorporate taxes as part of the solution. When this occurs, the theory of taxation is effectively subsumed within the theory of government expenditures. A common example...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 10.11.2014
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Steuern / Steuerrecht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Wirtschaftsrecht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Finanzierung
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik
• ISBN-10: 0-12-416033-6 / 0124160336
• ISBN-13: 978-0-12-416033-0 / 9780124160330