Competition Policy and Price Fixing (eBook)

Louis KAPLOW (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF | EPUB

2013
512 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-1-4008-4607-8 (ISBN)

Infos

Louis Kaplow is the Finn M. W. Caspersen and Household International Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard University and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His books include The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (Princeton).

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Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 30.6.2013
• Zusatzinfo: 25 line illus.
• Verlagsort: Princeton
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Wirtschaftsrecht ► Wettbewerbsrecht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Finanzwissenschaft
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Makroökonomie
• Schlagworte: Adjudication • Adjudicator • agreement requirement • Allegation • Allocative Efficiency • alternative rule • Ambiguity • Ambiguity (law) • attempt • Auction • bidding • Bid Rigging • bribery • Burden of Proof • Calculation • cheating • Chilling Effect • Chilling Effects • circumstantial evidence • classic cartels • collusion • Commodity • communication-based prohibition • communications • communications-based prohibition • Communications technology • Competition • Competition Law • Competition Policy • Competition rules • Competitive equilibrium • Conscious Parallelism • Consideration • consumer • Consumer Welfare • Contract • contrasting approaches • conventional prohibition • coordinated behavior • coordinated oligopoly pricing • coordinated price elevation • Corporate Strategy • credibility • Customer • Deadweight loss • Decision-Making • decision-making framework • decision-theoretic approach • defendant • detection • Determination • Deterrence • deterrence benefits • Deterrence (legal) • differentiated products • Differentiation • direct approach • Direct evidence • Economic equilibrium • Economics • economic surplus • economist • EU Article 101 • European Union • Expense • Explanation • Game Theory • Guarantee • homogeneous goods • horizontal agreements • horizontal-restraints cases • Imprisonment • Incentive • indirect approach • Industrial Organization • industry conditions • inefficiency • inference • Informant • injunction • Injunctions • Institutional issues • interdependence • interdependent coordination • interfirm communication • interfirm communications • internal evidence • investigation • Investment • Judgment proof • Jurisdiction • jury instructions • language • Law enforcement • Law in Action • lawyer • Legal burden of proof • Liability • liability assessment • lower courts • Marginal cost • market-based evidence • market-based techniques • market behavior • market conditions • Market power • Market Price • Meeting of the minds • modern competition policy • modern oligopoly theory • monetary sanctions • Monopoly price • Monopoly profit • Motion in United States law • negative behavioral effects • Negotiation • No liability • nonprice coordination • nonprice terms • Oligopolies • oligopolistic coordination • oligopolistic industries • oligopolistic price elevation • Oligopoly • oligopoly behavior • Oligopoly Theory • orthodox prohibition • paradox of proof • plaintiff • polar-opposite cases • policy analysis • Prediction • price change • price coordination • price cutting • Price Discrimination • price elevation • Price Fixing • price-fixing cases • price-fixing prohibition • Price war • Pricing • Principal–agent problem • prior scholarship • Probability • Product Differentiation • Production Efficiency • Prosecutor • Provision (accounting) • pure interdependence • Quantity • remedies • Requirement • Restraint of trade • result • rule of reason • Sanctions • Sherman Act Section 1 • Sherman Antitrust Act • Sign Language • Social Cost • Social Welfare • social welfare consequences • State of affairs (sociology) • Statute • Suggestion • Summary judgment • Supracompetitive pricing • Supreme Court precedents • Symptom • Tort • Trade association • Trade-off • Treble damages • Uncertainty • unilateral market power • United States antitrust law • U.S. antitrust law • U.S. lower court • Writing
• ISBN-10: 1-4008-4607-2 / 1400846072
• ISBN-13: 978-1-4008-4607-8 / 9781400846078