Internet and Network Economics
Springer Berlin (Verlag)
978-3-540-68138-0 (ISBN)
Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract).- Dynamic Mechanism Design.- Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints.- Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit.- Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain.- Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games.- On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games.- Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games.- The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games.- First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction.- Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems.- Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice.- Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design.- Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves.- Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures.- Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case.- Selfish Service Installation in Networks.- Games of Connectivity.- Assignment Problems in Rental Markets.- On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas.- Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium.- New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets.- Making Economic Theory Operational.- Sparse Games Are Hard.- Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities.- Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games.- A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria.- Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem.- Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games.- Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck Games withSplittable Traffic.- A Worm Propagation Model Based on People's Email Acquaintance Profiles.- Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency.- The Sound of Silence: Mining Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation.- Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot.- Secretary Problems with Competing Employers.
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 27.11.2006 |
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Reihe/Serie | Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Zusatzinfo | XI, 404 p. |
Verlagsort | Berlin |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 155 x 235 mm |
Gewicht | 635 g |
Themenwelt | Sachbuch/Ratgeber ► Natur / Technik ► Naturwissenschaft |
Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Theorie / Studium | |
Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Web / Internet | |
Schlagworte | algorithmic game theory • approximation algorithms • competitive auctions • Computer • Computer Science • Decision Making • Dynamic Algorithms • E-Commerce • economic models • equilibria algorithms • Game Theory • grid computing • Internet • market analysis • marketing maodels • Multi-agent Systems • Network Management • online auctions • Parallel Computing • Peer-to-Peer Systems • pricing strategy • Scheduling • service-oriented computing • Social Networks • Web Services • Wireless Networking |
ISBN-10 | 3-540-68138-8 / 3540681388 |
ISBN-13 | 978-3-540-68138-0 / 9783540681380 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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