Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (eBook)

Mark P. Zanna (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: EPUB

2011 | 1. Auflage
440 Seiten
Elsevier Science (Verlag)
978-0-08-049319-0 (ISBN)

Infos

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology continues to be one of the most sought after and most often cited series in this field. Containing contributions of major empirical and theoretical interest, this series represents the best and the brightest in new research, theory, and practice in social psychology.

This serial is part of the Social Sciences package on Science Direct. Visit www.info.sciencedirect.com for more information.

Advances Experimental Social Psychology is available online on ScienceDirect - full-text online of volumes 32 onwards.

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Inhalt

Front Cover 1
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 4
Copyright Page 5
Contents 6
Contributors 10
Chapter 1: Culture and the Structure of Personal Experience: Insider and Outsider Phenomenologies of the Self and Social World 12
I. Introduction 12
II. A Sociofunctional Account of Perception 14
A. How Form is Content 14
B. Perception in Cultural Context 15
C. The Impartial Spectator and the Generalized Other 19
D. Plan for the Paper 20
E. Notes on Terminology and Claims 22
III. Relational Versus Egocentric Projection 24
IV. Memory Imagery 27
V. Online Imagery 29
VI. Mental Models of the Self and Others in Narrative 32
A. Further Research on Mental Models 35
B. The Outsider Perspective and Insider Bias 39
VII. Confusing What Is in One's Own Head and What Is Out There 39
VIII. Confusing What Is in One's Own Head with What Is in Other People's Heads: The Illusion of One's Own Transparency and Empathy-as-Projection 42
IX. Projection-as-Empathy in a Group Setting 47
A. Discussion of Sections VIII and IX 48
X. Characterizing the World 49
A. Possible Future Studies 51
XI. General Discussion 52
A. Understanding Felt Experience 54
B. Phenomenology and Ideology: The Lessons of Experience 55
C. Other Examples of Micro-Level Experience and Macro-Level Ideology in Homeostasis 63
D. Phenomenology, Methodology, and Introspection: The Invisibility and the Strength of the Soft Embodiment of Culture 66
E. Generalization 68
F. Summary 69
Acknowledgments 70
References 70
Chapter 2: Uncertainty-Identity Theory 80
I. Historical Background 81
II. Uncertainty 84
A. Uncertainty As A Human Motivation 85
B. Uncertainty Reduction And The Pursuit Of Meaning 86
C. Types Of Uncertainty 88
III. Social Identity 90
A. Basic Hypothesis Tests 92
B. Relation Of Uncertainty To Self-Enhancement And Self-Esteem 96
C. Uncertainty Relevance And Group Relevance 98
IV. Entitativity 98
A. Studies Of The Role Of Entitativity In Uncertainty-Induced Identification 100
V. Social Extremism and Totalistic Groups 102
A. Studies Of Uncertainty, Identity, And Extremism 105
VI. Extensions, Applications, and Implications of Uncertainty-Identity Theory 108
A. Depersonalization And Projection 109
B. Central Members, Marginal Members, Leaders, And Deviants 110
C. Uncertainty, Identity, And Trust 113
D. Uncertainty, Identity, And Ideology 114
E. Uncertainty, Identity, And Social Mobilization 115
VII. Uncertainty-Identity Theory in Relation to Other Ideas 116
A. Context And Personality 116
B. Culture 118
C. Terror Management, Compensatory Conviction, Self-Verification, And System Justification 119
VIII. Concluding Comments 122
Acknowledgments 124
References 125
Chapter 3: Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns 138
I. Introduction 138
II. Metacognitive Experiences 140
A. Accessibility Experiences 140
B. Processing Fluency 142
C. Summary 143
III. Accessibility Experiences And The Emergence And Attenuation Of Bias 143
A. The Interplay Of Declarative And Experiential Information 146
B. Discrediting The Informational Value Of The Experience 151
IV. Fluency, Familiarity, and Truth: Implications for Public Information Campaigns 154
A. Fluency, Familiarity, And Bias 155
B. Fluency, Consensus, And Truth 156
C. Implications For Public Information Campaigns 157
D. Conclusions 163
V. Implications And Future Directions 164
A. Naive Theories 165
B. Temporal Changes 166
C. Metacognitive Experiences In Groups 167
Acknowledgments 167
References 168
Chapter 4: Multiple Social Categorization 174
I. Introduction 175
A. Social Categorization 176
B. Multiple Categorization 177
C. Social Structures and Psychological Process 178
D. Chapter Overview 179
II. First Principles and Assumptions 181
A. Assumption 1: People can Categorize along Multiple Dimensions Simultaneously 183
B. Assumption 2: Categorization Affects Intergroup Differentiation 187
III. Differentiation-Discrimination 188
A. Category Differentiation Models 189
B. The Common In-group Identity Model 190
C. The Crossed Categorization Model 192
D. Patterns of Evaluation 198
E. Affect and Cognition 201
F. Two Moderators, One Route 210
G. Motivation 214
H. Self-esteem 214
I. Distinctiveness Threat 215
J. In-group Identification 216
K. Motivation and Multiple Categorization 217
L. Identification and Multiple Categorization 218
M. Dual Identification 222
N. A Differentiation-Discrimination Model of Multiple Categorization Effects 223
O. Complexity 226
P. Subgrouping and Perceived Group Variability 226
Q. Social Identity Complexity 228
IV. Decategorization 229
A. Category Function 229
B. Dual Process Models of Impression Formation 230
C. Multiple Categorization and Decategorization 231
D. Category Conjunctions 239
E. Surprising Combinations 239
F. Skills Development 241
V. Conclusions 245
A. "Solitarist " Versus "Pluralist " Approaches to Human Identity 245
B. A Differentiation-Decategorization Model of Multiple Categorization Effects 246
C. Epilogue 249
Acknowledgments 250
References 250
Chapter 5: On The Parameters of Human Judgment 266
I. Introduction 266
II. The Role of Rules in Judgment Formation 268
A. The Implicational Structure of Reasoning 269
B. Conditioning Phenomena 269
C. Perception and Psychophysics 272
D. Awareness 273
E. Pattern Recognition 274
III. The Parameters of Human Judgment 276
A. Informational Relevance 277
B. Gleaning the Relevance of the Information Given 278
C. Task Demands 279
D. Cognitive Resources 280
E. Motivation: Nondirectional and Directional 282
F. Properties of the Judgmental Parameters 283
G. Multidimensional Parametric Space 285
IV. A Parametric Model of Social Judgment 286
A. The Role of Subjective Relevance 286
B. The Role of Task Demands and Processing Resources 294
C. Relative Informational Impact 300
V. Recapitulation and Conclusions 302
Acknowledgments 308
References 308
Chapter 6: Panglossian Ideology In The Service Of System Justification: How Complementary Stereotypes Help Us To Rationalize Inequality 316
I. Introduction 317
II. System Justification Theory 319
A. Motivation To Rationalize The Status Quo 319
B. Out-Group Favoritism and the Justification of Arbitrary Inequalities among Groups 320
C. Anticipatory Rationalization Of Likely Outcomes 320
III. The System-Justifying Function of Complementary Stereotypes 323
A. The Case Of Complementary Gender Stereotypes 324
B. Beyond Gender: Complementary Stereotypes Rationalize Status Differences in General 335
IV. Moderators of the Effect of Complementary Stereotypes on System Justification 346
A. Perceptions of A Causal Link Between Trait and Outcome 347
B. Political Orientation 352
C. Protestant Work Ethic 356
V. Implicit Complementary Versus Noncomplementary Stereotypical Associations 357
A. Implicit Associations Concerning Rich/Poor and Happiness/Honesty 358
B. Implicit Associations Concerning White/Black and Happiness/Honesty 359
VI. Concluding Remarks: SJT and Stereotyping as Rationalization 361
Acknowledgments 363
References 363
Chapter 7: Feeling The Anguish Of Others: A Theory Of Vicarious Dissonance 370
I. Introduction 371
II. Personal Cognitive Dissonance 372
A. Dissonance Theory Evolves 374
B. Dissonance Processes Within Groups 375
III. Social Identity and Vicarious Dissonance 376
IV. Evidence for Vicarious Dissonance 379
A. A First Study 379
B. Vicarious Dissonance Or Persuasion? 382
C. Is Vicarious Attitude Change Vicarious Dissonance? 383
D. The Affective Experience of Vicarious Dissonance 386
E. Group Prototypicality and Vicarious Dissonance 389
V. The Process of Vicarious Dissonance 392
VI. Vicarious Dissonance and the Collective 395
A. Personal Cognitive Dissonance in East and West 395
B. Vicarious Cognitive Dissonance in Interdependent Cultures 397
C. Priming Cultural Identities 399
VII. Vicarious Hypocrisy: Translating Dissonance into Actions and Attitudes to Improve Health 401
A. Hypocrisy: Saying What I Believe, But Not What I Did 401
B. From Hypocrisy to Vicarious Hypocrisy 403
VIII. Summary and Conclusions 406
Acknowledgments 408
References 408
Index 416
Contents of Other Volumes 430

Textauszug

Uncertainty–Identity Theory

Michael A. Hogg

Abstract

While I write this chapter, millions of people in the Darfur province of Sudan have been terrorized off their land; the entire population of Iraq has little idea what the future of their country will be; survivors of hurricane Katrina are dispersed across the United States; people in Britain are anxious about immigration and are toying with the idea of supporting the British National Party; people in a small town in Tasmania wait to hear if members of their community have been found alive in a mine collapse; air travelers the world over have no idea what new security arrangements await them when they get to the airport; and we all wonder about the consequences of further escalation in the price of oil and of the standoff over Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The world is an uncertain place, it always has been, and these uncertainties can make it very difficult to predict or plan our lives and to feel sure about the type of people we are.

In this chapter, I describe how feelings of uncertainty, particularly about or related to self, motivate people to identify with social groups and to choose new groups with, or configure existing groups to have, certain properties that best reduce, control, or protect from feelings of uncertainty. I consider this uncertainty–identity theory to be a development of the motivational component of social identity theory. It addresses why, when, and how strongly people identify with groups, and why groups may have particular generic properties in certain contexts. Of particular relevance to contemporary postmodern society, uncertainty reduction theory provides an account of zealotry and the cult of the “true believer” in the thrall of ideology and powerful leadership—an account of conditions that may spawn extremism, a silo mentality, and a loss of moral or ethical perspective.

In this chapter, I describe uncertainty–identity theory and some conceptual elaborations and applications, review direct and indirect empirical tests, and locate the theory in the context of related ideas and theories in social psychology. I start with a historical sketch of why, when, and how uncertainty–identity theory was developed, then go on to discuss uncertainty reduction as a motivation for human behavior. I then detail the process by which group identification reduces uncertainty and describe a program of studies showing that people who feel uncertain are more likely to identify and identify more strongly with groups. High‐entitativity groups are best equipped to reduce uncertainty through identification—entitativity moderates the uncertainty–identification relation. I discuss this idea and describe research that supports it, and then extend the analysis to deal with extremism and totalistic groups—describing how extreme uncertainty may encourage strong identification (zealotry, fanaticism, being a true believer) with groups that are structured in a totalistic fashion. Again I describe some research supporting this idea.

The next section deals with extensions, applications, and implications of uncertainty–identity theory. I discuss the relation between depersonalization and self‐projection processes in uncertainty‐motivated group identification, and then, in a subsection entitled central members, marginal members, leaders, and deviants, I focus on the role of group prototypicality in uncertainty reduction processes. The role of trust, the relation between uncertainty, identity, and ideology, and the role of uncertainty in social mobilization are also discussed. The final section, before concluding comments, discusses other theories, approaches, and topics that deal with constructs related to those discussed by uncertainty–identity theory. Specifically, I discuss uncertainty as a state versus a trait, with a focus on the constructs of need for cognitive closure and uncertainty orientation; the role played by culture in uncertainty; and the relevance of terror management, compensatory conviction, self‐verification, and system justification.

I Historical Background

Social identity theory has its origins in Tajfel’s early research on social categorization and his desire to provide a cognitive explanation of prejudice and discrimination (Tajfel, 1969)—an explanation that intentionally avoided attributing such behaviors to aberrant personality or interpersonal processes. Rather, Tajfel felt that prejudice and discrimination was a reflection of intergroup behavior in a particular social context on the part of people who identified with one of the groups. He famously defined social identity as “… the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 292), and then, in collaboration with Turner focused on the conditions that produced more or less intergroup conflict and particular forms of intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

This social identity theory of intergroup relations placed theoretical importance on the fact that groups compete over evaluatively positive distinctiveness because positive distinctiveness would be reflected in social identity and thus individual group members’ self‐concept. Ultimately, self‐enhancement was considered a key motivation for social identity processes (Turner, 1975)—a motivation that, according to Billig (1985), social identity theory needed in order to be able to account for social change. As the principal motivation for social identity processes, self‐enhancement and self‐esteem became a key focus of social identity research—prompting Abrams and Hogg (1988) to postulate the self‐esteem hypothesis as an attempt to formalize the idea. From the outset, Abrams and Hogg warned against too closely mapping the group level construct of positive social identity onto the individual level construct of self‐esteem—a warning endorsed and supported by many others subsequently (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Long & Spears, 1997; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

As the waters surrounding the role of self‐esteem in social identity processes became increasingly muddy and crowded, Hogg and Abrams (1993) wondered whether other motivations might play a key role in social identity processes. Given that the process of social categorization was fundamental to social identity processes—a point fully elaborated by self‐categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the social identity theory of the group—we felt that whatever motivated people to categorize was probably also a central motivation for social identity processes. This prompted us to suggest that because categorization reduces uncertainty by engaging schematic knowledge structures, uncertainty reduction might be that motivation (Hogg & Abrams, 1993).

An epistemic motivation related to uncertainty was implicit in Tajfel’s early discussion of social categorization (Tajfel, 1972, 1974). Tajfel (1969, p. 92) believed that people engage in a “search for coherence” to preserve the integrity of the self‐image and that “This need to preserve the integrity of the self‐image is the only motivational assumption that we need to make in order to understand the direction that the search for coherence will take.”Tajfel and Billig (1974) suggested that one reason why people identify with minimal groups might be to impose structure on intrinsically uncertain circumstances. This idea was not pursued further—the motivational focus shifted to positive distinctiveness.

A motivational role for uncertainty is also implicit in Turner and colleagues' later self‐categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987)—but again not elaborated. More recently, social identity researchers have noted that disagreement with fellow group members would raise uncertainty and that conformity to group norms would reduce uncertainty by increasing consensus (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993; Turner, 1991). This analysis was restricted to social influence in groups and has not been elaborated to theorize uncertainty reduction as a basic motive for social identification itself and for forms of group and intergroup behavior as a whole (Smith, Hogg, Martin, & Terry, in press).

Research and concepts relating to the basic motivational role of uncertainty reduction in social identity processes were formally integrated and finally published by Hogg (2000a; also see Hogg, 2001a; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Two subsequent chapters touched on cultural dimensions (Hogg, 2006a) and implications of uncertainty reduction theory for organizations and corporate leadership (Hogg, 2007). More substantial developments focused on the types of groups and identities best suited to uncertainty reduction through group identification—discussing the role of entitativity and some implications for zealotry, ideology, and group extremism (Hogg, 2004, 2005a). Integrative statements and reviews of contemporary social identity theory incorporate uncertainty reduction as a motivational component,...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 29.7.2011
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Sachbuch/Ratgeber
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Psychoanalyse / Tiefenpsychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Sozialpsychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Test in der Psychologie
• ISBN-10: 0-08-049319-X / 008049319X
• ISBN-13: 978-0-08-049319-0 / 9780080493190