An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism (eBook)

Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation

John Wright (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2018 | 1st ed. 2018
VIII, 220 Seiten
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-030-02218-1 (ISBN)

Infos

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation.

Scientific Realism maintains that scientific theories and hypotheses refer to real entities, forces, and relations, even if one cannot examine them. But, there are those who doubt these claims. The author develops a novel way of defending Scientific Realism against a range of influential attacks. He argues that in some cases, at least, we can make probabilistically justifiable inferences from observed data to claims about unobservable, theoretical entities. He shows how this enables us to place some scientific realist claims on a firmer epistemological footing than has previously been the case. This also makes it possible to give a unified set of replies to the most common objections to Scientific Realism.

The final chapters apply the developed conceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

John Wright is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Newcastle, Australia. He has published books in philosophy of science, metaphysics and ethics and economics as well as numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals.

Inhalt

Chapter 1. Introduction: Realism and ReasonChapter 2. The Skeptical Arguments Against Realism– 1: Inductive SkepticismChapter 3. The Skeptical Arguments – 2: The Pessimistic Meta-InductionChapter 4. Realism and Inference to the Best ExplanationChapter 5. On the Inference to UnobservablesChapter 6. Underdetermination and Theory PreferenceChapter 7. Eddington Inferences in Science – 1: Atoms and MoleculesChapter 8. Eddington Inferences in Science – 2: The Size and Shape of the UniverseBibliography

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 2.11.2018
• Reihe/Serie: Synthese Library
• Reihe/Serie: Synthese Library
• Zusatzinfo: VIII, 220 p. 16 illus.
• Verlagsort: Cham
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Naturwissenschaften ► Chemie
• Themenwelt: Naturwissenschaften ► Physik / Astronomie
• Schlagworte: Eddington Inferences in Science • Inductive Skepticism • Inference to the Best Explanation • Jean Perrin • Justification of belief in atoms • Justification of induction • Justifying belief in theoretical entities • Pessimistic Meta-Induction • scientific realism • The shape of space • Underdetermination and Theory Preference • Unobservable entities
• ISBN-10: 3-030-02218-8 / 3030022188
• ISBN-13: 978-3-030-02218-1 / 9783030022181