Spontaneous Order
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-889290-8 (ISBN)
Young argues that equilibrium behaviors often coalesce from the interactions and experiences of many dispersed individuals acting with fragmentary knowledge of the world, rather than (as is often assumed in economics) from the actions of fully rational agents with commonly held beliefs. The author presents a unified and rigorous account of how such 'bottom-up' evolutionary processes work, using recent advances in stochastic dynamical systems theory. This analytical framework illuminates how social norms and institutions evolve, how social and technical innovations spread in society, and how these processes depend on adaptive learning behavior by human subjects.
H. Peyton Young is James Meade Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at the University of Oxford and Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. He has published widely in economics, game theory, political representation, finance, and mathematics and is particularly well-known for his research on evolutionary game theory and its application to the evolution of social norms and institutions. He has also made notable contributions to the theory of distributive justice and its applications to political representation and the allocation of common resources. A Fellow of the British Academy, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Peyton Young is also a former President of the Game Theory Society.
Part I: The Evolution of Norms and Institutions
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chatper 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutoinary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Prediciting the Behavior of Ratoinal Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
| Erscheinungsdatum | 03.10.2024 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 165 x 240 mm |
| Gewicht | 754 g |
| Themenwelt | Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik | |
| Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika | |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Mikroökonomie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-889290-X / 019889290X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-889290-8 / 9780198892908 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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