Game Theory
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-031-37576-7 (ISBN)
An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples.
This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides "tools" or "recipes" to solve different classes of games.
Game Theory presents the information as plainly and clearly as possible. Every chapter begins with the main definitions and concepts before diving into the applications to different settings across economics, business, and other social sciences. Chapters walk readers through algebraic steps and simplifications. This makes the text accessible for undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory.
Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information modelsas well as signaling games.
Ana Espinola-Arredondo is Associate Director and Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Espinola-Arredondo has published numerous articles and she and Felix Muñoz-Garcia have co-authored three other books together: Common Pool Resources: Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information (2021), Intermediate Economic Theory: Tools and Step-by-Step Examples (2020), and Practice Exercises for Intermediate Economic Theory (2020, also with Eric Dunaway and John C. Strandholm).
Felix Muñoz-Garcia is Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Muñoz-Garcia has published many journal articles and he and Espinola-Arredondo have co-authored three other books, along with other textbooks such as Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples (2017), and Industrial Organization: Practice Exercises with Answer Keys (2021, with Pak-Sing Choi and Eric Dunaway).
Chapter 1. Introduction to games and their representation.-Chapter 2. Equilibrium dominance.-Chapter 3. Nash equilibrium.-Chapter 4. Nash equilibria in games with continuous action spaces.-Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.- Chapter 6. Subgame perfect equilibrium.- Chapter 7. Repeated games.- Chapter 8. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.- Chapter 9. Auction theory.- Chapter 10. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.- Chapter 11. Equilibrium Refinements.- Chapter 12. Signaling games with continuous messages.- Chapter 13. Cheap talk games.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 21.12.2023 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | XXV, 455 p. 303 illus., 100 illus. in color. |
| Verlagsort | Cham |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 155 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 735 g |
| Themenwelt | Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Mikroökonomie | |
| Schlagworte | Cheap-talk games • Equilibrium Refinements • Game Theory • Sequential-move games of incomplete information • Signaling games with continuous actions • Signaling games with discrete actions |
| ISBN-10 | 3-031-37576-9 / 3031375769 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-031-37576-7 / 9783031375767 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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