Auction Theory
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-030-69577-4 (ISBN)
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students.
The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D.Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
lt;p>Pak-Sing Choi is assistant professor of economics at the Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics of National Central University, Taiwan. His research focuses on the effect of environmental regulation on industrial organization under asymmetric information.
Felix Munoz-Garcia is professor of economics at Washington State University (US). His research focuses on industrial organization, game theory, and their applications to environmental regulation in contexts where firms, government agencies, or both, are imperfectly informed.
Chapter 1: Second-price auctions.- Chapter 2: First-price auctions.- Chapter 3: First-price auctions, Extensions.- Chapter 4: All-pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders.- Chapter 5: Third-price auctions, kth-price auctions, and lotteries.- Chapter 6: The Revenue Equivalence principle.- Chapter 7: Common-value auctions.- Chapter 8: Multi-unit auctions.- Chapter 9: Mechanism design.- Chapter 10: Procurement auctions.- Game Theory Appendix.- References.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 27.05.2022 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
| Zusatzinfo | XIV, 296 p. 52 illus., 51 illus. in color. |
| Verlagsort | Cham |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 155 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 480 g |
| Themenwelt | Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Mikroökonomie | |
| Schlagworte | asymmetric bidding • Auction Theory • common-value auction • equilibrium bid • first-price auction • multi-unit auction • procurement auction • Revenue Equivalence Principle • second-price auction • Winner's Curse |
| ISBN-10 | 3-030-69577-8 / 3030695778 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-030-69577-4 / 9783030695774 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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