Cryptoeconomics
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-316-51578-5 (ISBN)
The book offers a succinct overview of the technical components of blockchain networks, also known as distributed digital ledger networks. Written from an academic perspective, it surveys ongoing research challenges as well as existing literature. Several chapters illustrate how the mathematical tools of game theory and algorithmic mechanism design can be applied to the analysis, design, and improvement of blockchain network protocols. Using an engineering perspective, insights are provided into how the economic interests of different types of participants shape the behaviors of blockchain systems. Readers are thus provided with a paradigm for developing blockchain consensus protocols and distributed economic mechanisms that regulate the interactions of system participants, thus leading to desired cooperative behaviors in the form of system equilibria. This book will be a vital resource for students and scholars of this budding field.
Dr. Jing Li is a computer scientist and Blockchain Security Engineer at CertiK. She received a Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of Houston in 2021, and a B.S. and M.S. in Computer Science from North China Electric Power University, Beijing, China, in 2014 and 2018, respectively. Her research interests include security and incentive in blockchain systems, game theory, and applied cryptography. Dr. Dusit Niyato is a Professor and IEEE fellow at the School of Computer Science and Engineering at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He received a Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of Manitoba, Canada, in 2008. His research interests include the Internet of Things (IoT), machine learning, and incentive mechanism design. Dr. Zhu Han is the John and Rebecca Moores Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Houston. A winner 2021 IEEE Kiyo Tomiyasu Award, he has been an IEEE fellow since 2014 and an AAAS fellow since 2020. Since 2017, his published research ranks among the top 1% most cited in the field, according to Web of Science.
1. Introduction; Part I. Cryptoeconomics Basics: 2. Cryptography basics; 3. Economic incentive; Part II. Consensus Protocol Design in Blockchain Networks: 4. Consensus mechanism basics: 5. Incentivized consensus mechanism; Part III. Mechanism Design In Blockchain Networks and Beyond: 6. Mechanism design basics; 7. Auction theory; 8. Contract theory; 9. Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; 10. Open questions about mechanism design in cryptoeconomics; References; Index.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 22.09.2021 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Informatik ► Netzwerke ► Sicherheit / Firewall |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik | |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik | |
| Technik ► Nachrichtentechnik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-316-51578-8 / 1316515788 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-316-51578-5 / 9781316515785 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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