Equilibrium and Rationality
Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
Seiten
1998
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-59352-6 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-59352-6 (ISBN)
This book offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
Preface; 1. Games and solutions; 2. Idealizations; 3. Equilibrium; 4. Reasons and incentives; 5. Strategic equilibrium; 6. Finding equilibria; 7. Applications; 8. Other standards for solutions; References; Index.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 28.1.1998 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory |
| Zusatzinfo | 51 Line drawings, unspecified |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 161 x 236 mm |
| Gewicht | 500 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik | |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-59352-2 / 0521593522 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-59352-6 / 9780521593526 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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