Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production

Manfred Königstein (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

XII, 197 Seiten

2000 | 1. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2000
Springer Berlin (Verlag)
978-3-540-66955-5 (ISBN)

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The book reports experimental studies and a theoretical investigation of non-cooperative bargaining games with joint production. Such games have rarely been studied within laboratory experiments despite being more general and more natural than bargaining without production. It is shown that equity theory is a good predictor of subjects' behavior. Furthermore subjects exhibit different equity notions. One chapter addresses problems of statistical data analysis that are specific to experiments. Applying evolutionary game theory within a model of bargaining with production it is shown theoretically that altruistic preferences, which generate moderate bargaining behavior, can survive the process of evolution.

Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the "pie" is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that "advance production" compared to "no pro duction" should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.

An Overview.- 1. Profit Sharing in an Asymmetric Bargaining Game.- 1.1 Introduction.- 1.2 Ultimatum Bargaining with Advance Production.- 1.3 Experimental Procedures.- 1.4 Description of the Decision Data.- 1.5 Aggregate Demand Behavior.- 1.6 Individual Demand Behavior.- 1.7 Summary.- 2. Measuring Treatment-Effects in Experimental Cross-Sectional Time Series.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Experimental Data, Repeated Measurement and Strategic Interaction.- 2.3 Fixed Effects, Identifying Restrictions and Interpretation.- 2.4 Estimation Procedures.- 2.5 Summary.- 3. Convergence to Equitable Play in the Repeated Ultimatum Game with Advance Production.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Repeated Bargaining with Advance Production.- 3.3 Theoretical Analysis.- 3.4 Experimental Procedures.- 3.5 Considerations of Experimental Design.- 3.6 Descriptive Statistics of Base Game Decisions.- 3.7 Explanatory Power of Single Predictors.- 3.8 Joint Predictions and Convergence to Equitable Play.- 3.9 Summary.- 4. Equity Anchoring in Simple Bargaining Games with Production.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 Bargaining with Advance Production.- 4.3 Experimental Procedures.- 4.4 Empirical Distributions of Production and Bargaining Decisions.- 4.5 Explaining Aggregate Behavior by a Single Equity Standard.- 4.6 Equity Anchoring and the Tactical Bargaining Margin.- 4.7 Summary.- 5. Efficiency and Evolution of Social Preferences and Prosocial behavior.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 Ultimatum Bargaining with Subsequent Social Production.- 5.3 Game Theoretic Solution.- 5.4 The Indirect Evolutionary Game.- 5.5 Solution of the Indirect Evolutionary Game.- 5.6 Summary.- A. Experimental Instructions Chapter 1.- B. Experimental Instructions Chapter 3.- C. Experimental Instructions Chapter 4.- D. Mathematical Supplement To Chapter 5.- D.2 Mutations ? < ? are Non-Improving if Candidate ? Supports Efficiency.- D.3 Technology 2. a.- D.4 Technology 2. b.- D.5 Technology 2.C.1.- D.6 Technology 2.C.2.- D.7 Technology 2. d.- References.

Erscheint lt. Verlag	6.3.2000
Reihe/Serie	Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Zusatzinfo	XII, 197 p.
Verlagsort	Berlin
Sprache	englisch
Maße	155 x 235 mm
Gewicht	290 g
Themenwelt	Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik
	Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
	Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Ökonometrie
Schlagworte	Bargaining • Evolutionäre Spieltheorie • evolutionary game theory • Experimental economics • Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung • Game Theory • Kuppelproduktion • Spieltheorie (mathemat.) • Statistica • Verhandlung • Verhandlung (wirtsch.) • Verhandlung (Wirtschaft)
ISBN-10	3-540-66955-8 / 3540669558
ISBN-13	978-3-540-66955-5 / 9783540669555
Zustand	Neuware