A Cooperative Species (eBook)

Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution

Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis (Autoren)

eBook Download: EPUB

2011
280 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-1-4008-3883-7 (ISBN)

Infos

A fascinating look at the evolutionary origins of cooperationWhy do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin.In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis-pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior-show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers.The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment.Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.

Autor

Samuel Bowles heads the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute and teaches economics at the University of Siena. Herbert Gintis holds faculty positions at the Santa Fe Institute, Central European University, and the University of Siena.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 31.5.2011
• Zusatzinfo: 39 line illus. 24 tables.
• Verlagsort: Princeton
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik
• Themenwelt: Naturwissenschaften ► Biologie ► Evolution
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Ethnologie
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Kommunikation / Medien ► Kommunikationswissenschaft
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre
• Schlagworte: Altruism • altruistic cooperation • Altruistic Punishment • ancestral humans • Australia • Behavior • Behavior Modification • Behavioural Sciences • Beliefs • Calculation • Christopher Boehm • Coefficient of relationship • Coevolution • Common Good • Competition • constraints • Cooperation • coordinated punishment • correlated equilibrium • Cost–benefit analysis • costly signaling • Criticism • Cultural Transmission • Culture • defection • Dictator Game • disadvantage • Early Humans • Emergence • Employment • equilibrium selection • Ernst Fehr • estimation • ethical norms • Evolution • evolutionarily stable strategy • evolutionary dynamics • evolutionary game theory • Experiment • Explanation • Fitness • Fitness (biology) • fitness-reducing norm • folk theorem • Folk theorem (game theory) • foragers • foraging • free-riders • free-riding • gene-culture coevolution • Generosity • Genetic Differentiation • Genetic inheritance • Genotype • group competition • group conflict • group membership • group selection • Guilt • Helping Behavior • Herbert Gintis • Holocene • Homo economicus • hostility • human behavior • human cooperation • human subject research • Hunter-Gatherer • hunter-gatherer society • inclusive fitness • income • indirect reciprocity • inference • Ingroups and outgroups • Insider • Institution • Institutions • intergroup conflict • Internalization • kin selection • Late Pleistocene • learning • Leveling (philosophy) • Livelihood • Marcus Feldman • Markov Chain • Morality • Motivation • multi-level selection • Nash Equilibrium • Norms • Norm (social) • Ostracism • Parameter • parochial altruism • Parochialism • Peer Pressure • Phenotype • phenotypic expression • Pleasure • Population Genetics • positive assortment • predation • Prediction • Preference • Preference (economics) • Preferences • prehistoric human society • Price equation • Prisoner's dilemma • private Information • Probability • Prosocial behavior • Psychology • Public Goods game • public information • punishment • Racism • reason • reciprocal altruism • repeated game • reproductive leveling • Reproductive success • Reputation • Requirement • result • Richard Dawkins • Sacrifice • Sampling (Statistics) • Samuel Bowles (economist) • Selection bias • selective extinction • Self-Interest • Selfishness • Shame • Simulation • Social behavior • Social dilemma • social dilemmas • social emotions • Social Institutions • Social interactions • Socialization • Social norms • Social Order • Social preferences • Social Structure • Society • Sociobiology • strong reciprocity • The Evolution of Cooperation • the selfish gene • Third-Party Punishment • Trait Theory • Trigger strategy • Ultimatum Game • war • well-being • within-group segmentation
• ISBN-10: 1-4008-3883-5 / 1400838835
• ISBN-13: 978-1-4008-3883-7 / 9781400838837