Internet and Network Economics (eBook)

4th International Workshop, WINE 2008, Shanghai, China, December 17-20, 2008. Proceedings

Christos Papadimitriou, Shuzhong Zhang (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

2008 | 2008
XV, 734 Seiten
Springer Berlin (Verlag)
978-3-540-92185-1 (ISBN)

Infos

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008, held in Shanghai, China, in December 2008. The 68 revised full papers presented together with 10 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 126 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on market equilibrium, congestion games, information markets, nash equilibrium, network games, solution concepts, algorithms and optimization, mechanism design, equilibrium, online advertisement, sponsored search auctions, and voting problems.

Inhalt

Invited Talks 1: Special Session.- Mechanism Design Theory: How to Implement Social Goals.- Thirty Years of Chinese Economic Reform: Reasons for Its Success and Future Directions.- Invited Talks 2: Plenary Session.- Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily.- Assignment Exchanges.- Search Engine Ad Auctions.- Computational Economy Equilibrium and Application.- Invited Talks 3: Tutorial Session.- Four Graph Partitioning Algorithms.- Dynamic Spectrum Management: Optimization and Game Theoretic Formulations.- Some Recent Results in Algorithmic Game Theory.- The Elements of General Equilibrium Theory.- Session A.1: Market Equilibrium.- A Fast and Simple Algorithm for Computing Market Equilibria.- A FPTAS for Computing a Symmetric Leontief Competitive Economy Equilibrium.- Online and Offline Selling in Limit Order Markets.- Predictive Pricing and Revenue Sharing.- Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games.- Session B.1: Congestion Games.- Graphical Congestion Games.- How Hard Is It to Find Extreme Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games?.- On the Road to -Completeness: 8 Agents in a Singleton Congestion Game.- Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games.- The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games.- Session C.1: Information Markets.- Parimutuel Betting on Permutations.- Strategies in Dynamic Pari-Mutual Markets.- Truthful Surveys.- Correlated Equilibrium of Bertrand Competition.- Diffusion of Innovations on Random Networks: Understanding the Chasm.- Session A.2: Nash Equilibrium I.- An Efficient PTAS for Two-Strategy Anonymous Games.- Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries.- Equilibrium Points in Fear of Correlated Threats.- Performance Evaluation of a Descent Algorithm for Bi-matrix Games.- Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Restricted Routing.- Session B.2: Network Games I.- Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks.- Computational Aspects of a 2-Player Stackelberg Shortest Paths Tree Game.- Local Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics for Network Formation Games.- Interference Games in Wireless Networks.- Taxing Subnetworks.- Session C.2: Solution Concepts.- Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.- Overlapping Coalition Formation.- A Network-Based Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution.- How Public Opinion Forms.- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose.- Session A.3: Algorithms and Optimization I.- Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects.- Algorithms for Optimal Price Regulations.- Improving the Efficiency of Load Balancing Games through Taxes.- Network Formation and Routing by Strategic Agents Using Local Contracts.- Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria.- Session B.3: Mechanism Design I.- Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines.- Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling.- Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.- Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects.- Bin Packing of Selfish Items.- Session C.3: Network Games II.- Restricted Core Stability of Flow Games.- Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games.- Stochastic Submodular Maximization.- On Pure and (Approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games.- Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games.- Session A.4: Equilibrium.- Computing an Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium in Polynomial Time.- Homogeneous Interference Game in Wireless Networks.- A Network Coloring Game.- Session B.4: Mechanism Design II.- Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics.- Fault Tolerance in Distributed Mechanism Design.- Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network.- Session C.4: Online Advertisement.- Sharing Online Advertising Revenue with Consumers.- Budget Constrained Bidding in Keyword Auctions and Online Knapsack Problems.- Position Auctions with Bidder-Specific Minimum Prices.- Session A.5: Sponsored Search Auctions.- A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search.- Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability.- Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders.- Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users.- On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities.- Session B.5: Voting Problem.- Biased Voting and the Democratic Primary Problem.- Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters.- The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing.- Social Context Games.- Session C.5: Algorithms and Optimization II.- Approximability and Parameterized Complexity of Minmax Values.- An “Ethical” Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games.- The Secretary Problem with a Hazard Rate Condition.- Impact of QoS on Internet User Welfare.- Nonlinear Pricing with Network Externalities.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 11.12.2008
• Reihe/Serie: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
• Reihe/Serie: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Verlagsort: Berlin
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Web / Internet
• Schlagworte: algorithmic game theory • anonymity • approximation algorithms • competitive auctions • Complexity • Decision Making • Dynamic Algorithms • E-Commerce • economic models • equilibria algorithms • Game Theory • Internet • marketing models • multi-object aucti • search engine marketing (SEM)
• ISBN-10: 3-540-92185-0 / 3540921850
• ISBN-13: 978-3-540-92185-1 / 9783540921851