Vom Selbst-Verständnis in Antike und Neuzeit / Notions of the Self in Antiquity and Beyond (eBook)

Alexander Arweiler, Melanie Möller (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

2008
442 Seiten
De Gruyter (Verlag)
978-3-11-021401-7 (ISBN)

Infos

The interdisciplinary debate about the genesis of the autonomous subject has tended hitherto to ignore the pre-modern period. The present collection of essays addresses this deficit. The closely interconnecting individual chapters trace and, in part, revise the history of concepts of the subject and self in classical and post-classical texts. Whereas previous work in this area has concentrated almost exclusively on philosophical texts, this collection also examines other genres, especially poetry.

Alexander Arweiler, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster; Melanie Möller, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg.

Autor

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Alexander Arweiler, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster; Melanie Möller, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg.

Inhalt

Inhalt 5
Einleitung 7
Sektion 1. Poetische Selbstkonzeptionen 15
Subjekt riskiert (sich) 17
A Sensitive, Even Weak and Feeble Disposition? 35
Intus habes quem poscis 47
Identity, identification and personae in Catull. 63 and other Roman texts 63
Sektion 2. Autobiographische Genesen des Selbst und Erzählungen vom po(i)etischen Ich 99
»Techne liebt Tyche und Tyche Techne« 103
Aitiologien des Selbst 121
Cicero on Caesar or Exemplum and Inability in the Brutus 145
Eskapismus, poetische Aphasie und satirische Offensive 169
De-Konstruktion der Ich-Identität in Augustins Confessiones 189
Wege in die Moderne 203
Sektion 3. Zwischen Scham und Schuld. ›Affizierte‹ Subjekte in Tragödie und Lyrik 227
Ich schäme mich, also bin ich 231
»Ich suche / Mich selbst, und finde mich nicht mehr« 253
Zerrissenheit 285
Die Darstellung von Subjekt und Affekt in Giacomo Leopardis Ultimo canto di Saffo 297
Sektion 4. Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstsorge in philosophischer Literatur 323
Subjectivity as Presupposition of Individuality 327
»Im Blick auf den Gott erkennen wir uns selbst« 357
The Self and Hellenistic-Roman Philosophical Therapy 373
Selbsterhaltung 395
Zu den Autoren 411
Register 414

Textauszug

Caesar: an exemplum under erasure (S. 134-135)

The Brutus and the De officiis occupy the two ends of Cicero’s productive philosophical period from 46–43 BCE9, and by the time he reaches the latter work, he has become aware that he uses his philosophical writing as therapy10. He articulates that philosophy substitutes for politics in the De divinatione 2.711. This cuts both ways: Cicero presents the equivalent of public speeches in his writings, but, depending on whether we emphasize the success of the equivalence or the displacement it entails, we will come up with a view of philosophy as either a ful.lling public endeavor for Cicero or a pass-time for when he cannot engage in ›the real thing‹.

At the beginning of De of.ciis 3, however, the extended comparison he makes between his own use of leisure to that of Scipio Africanus reveals that, at least in his own self-presentation, he writes out of weakness. This is the rhetoric of inability. Scipio is offered as a contrast to Cicero: the former was able to engage in contemplation without leaving behind »monuments of his genius entrusted to letters« (nulla enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, Off . 3.4), because his dialogue with his mind meant that »he was never less at leisure than when at leisure, never less alone than when alone«, according to the maxim Cicero cites Cato as recording (numquam se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus esset, Off . 3.1).

Two things useful for the Brutus emerge from this passage. First, writing offers a kind of dialogue solitary contemplation cannot. It is directed outward, and though Cicero may be separated from his audience, whether contemporary or of posterity, writing still affords him away of connecting with others.He cannot keep his self whole without some sort of audience. The second is related and will occupy the rest of this paper, namely that Cicero de.nes himself not on his own, but in comparison to others.

The exemplum is an overdetermined device for constituting the self. Scipio offers a model that Cicero can only partially imitate, much as he would like to. Cicero says that he does not have Scipio’s strength of mind (nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, Off . 3.4). Furthermore, their external circumstances are different. Cicero’s otium has been imposed by the extinction of the senate and destruction of the law courts (extincto … senatu deletisque iudiciis, Off . 3.2), and is not, like Scipio’s, the result of choice.

In the Brutus, Cicero likewise de.nes himself in relation to exempla, but these are contemporary: Marcellus and Caesar. The time that has elapsed between the De of.ciis and the Brutus means that Caesar has been murdered in the interval. His death does not make him any easier to talk about, and reference to Caesar simmers under the surface of the De oficiis throughout – the difference is that both overt and covert references to Caesar in the De of.ciis provide a political critique12, but in the Brutus, the threat Caesar poses to Cicero is more personal and raw. Cicero’s assessment of Caesar’s style is a politically charged moment in the Brutus.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 26.2.2009
• Reihe/Serie: ISSN
• Reihe/Serie: ISSN
• Reihe/Serie: Transformationen der Antike
• Reihe/Serie: Transformationen der Antike
• Verlagsort: Berlin/Boston
• Sprache: deutsch
• Themenwelt: Literatur ► Essays / Feuilleton
• Themenwelt: Geschichte ► Allgemeine Geschichte ► Altertum / Antike
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Geschichte der Philosophie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Anglistik / Amerikanistik
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Literaturwissenschaft
• Schlagworte: Antike • Autorschaft • Identität • Individualität • Subjekt
• ISBN-10: 3-11-021401-6 / 3110214016
• ISBN-13: 978-3-11-021401-7 / 9783110214017