Assertion and Conditionals

Anthony Appiah (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

280 Seiten

2008
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
9780521071291 (ISBN)

Artikel merken

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.

1. Cartesianism, behaviourism and the philosophical context; Part I. Belief: 2. A theory of the mind; 3. Belief and decision; 4. Computation; 5. Truth conditions; Part II. Meaning: 6. Realism and truth-theory; 7. Assertion; Part III. Conditionals: 8. Indicative conditionals; 9. Truth and triviality; 10. Logic without truth; 11. Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals.

Erscheint lt. Verlag	28.8.2008
Reihe/Serie	Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Zusatzinfo	Worked examples or Exercises
Verlagsort	Cambridge
Sprache	englisch
Maße	152 x 225 mm
Gewicht	360 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik
ISBN-13	9780521071291 / 9780521071291
Zustand	Neuware