Socratic Virtue
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-84618-9 (ISBN)
Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalised, practical, and demystified account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a freshly envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology.
Naomi Reshotko is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Denver. She has published articles on Socratic ethics and Platonic metaphysics and edited Desire, Identity and Existence (2003). She serves on the editorial board of Apeiron: a Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science.
1. Introduction; Part I. The Socratic Theory of Motivation: 2. Socratic desire; 3. Socratic egoism; 4. Socratic intellectualism; Part II. Socratic Value: 5. The good, the bad, and the neither-good-nor-bad; 6. Virtue and happiness: two different kinds of goods; Part III. Virtue and its Relationship to Happiness: 7. Does virtue make us happy?; 8. Virtue as a science; 9. Happiness, virtue, and pleasure; 10. Reflections on Socratic ethics and the demystification of morality.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 3.8.2006 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 500 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie Altertum / Antike |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-84618-8 / 0521846188 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-84618-9 / 9780521846189 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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