Knowledge and Practical Interests
Seiten
2005
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-928803-8 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-928803-8 (ISBN)
- Titel ist leider vergriffen;
keine Neuauflage - Artikel merken
Presents a claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, that is, by how much is at stake for that person. This book introduces readers to strategies for resolving philosophical paradox. It is for those interested in philosophical methodology.
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. So whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. Stanley defends this thesis against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive (contextualism about knowledge attributions), and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim (relativism about knowledge). In the course of his argument Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. So whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. Stanley defends this thesis against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive (contextualism about knowledge attributions), and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim (relativism about knowledge). In the course of his argument Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Introduction; 1. Contextualism; 2. Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability; 3. Knowledge Ascriptions and Context-Sensitivity; 4. Contextualism on the Cheap?; 5. Interest-Relative Invariantism; 6. Interest-Relative Invariantism vs. Contextualism; 7. Interest-Relative Invariantism vs. Relativism; 8. Contextualism, Interest-Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox; 9. Conclusion
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 1.11.2005 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Gewicht | 756 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-928803-8 / 0199288038 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-928803-8 / 9780199288038 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
Mehr entdecken
aus dem Bereich
![Was heißt Denken?. Vorlesung Wintersemester 1951/52. [Was bedeutet das alles?] - Martin Heidegger](/media/113619842)
aus dem Bereich
die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie
Buch | Softcover (2023)
C.H.Beck (Verlag)
CHF 25,20
Buch | Softcover (2023)
Reclam, Philipp (Verlag)
CHF 9,80
